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      China-Iran Relations: Prospects and Complexities

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            Abstract

            China-Iran relations have steadily evolved and expanded in the domains of geopolitics, economics and diplomacy since the Iranian revolution. Presently, being increasingly isolated from the world under Donald Trump's maximum pressure campaign, Iran has been further drawn towards China, which, in the long term, can significantly alter the existing regional security architecture of the Persian Gulf. The recent agreements and partnership between the two countries, which is reflected in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as well as the draft 25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) will pave the way for a long term strategic cooperation between the two countries. In this context, the paper analyzes various factors that have systemically fostered friendly ties between the two countries. The paper also explores historical and contemporary trends that can impact the future of bilateral relations. Further, it evaluates the economic relations between the two countries outlining the trade in the oil sector as well as other sectors. Lastly, the paper examines the plausible challenges to the future of bilateral relations. For this, the paper relies on three variables: the internal dynamics and perception in Iran about its relations with China; the major power-middle power dynamics that can prove to be a barrier in the relations; and the outlook and responses of the regional countries that may scuttle the process of strategizing bilateral relationship.

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            Author and article information

            Journal
            10.2307/j50009730
            polipers
            Policy Perspectives
            Pluto Journals
            1812-1829
            1812-7347
            1 January 2020
            : 17
            : 2 ( doiID: 10.13169/polipers.17.issue-2 )
            : 47-66
            Affiliations
            [* ]Research Officer, Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), Islamabad; and Lecturer, University of Management and Technology (UMT), Lahore, Pakistan.
            Article
            polipers.17.2.0047
            10.13169/polipers.17.2.0047
            727e40a7-692f-4ecc-90b6-1be495a859b2
            © 2020, Institute of Policy Studies

            All content is freely available without charge to users or their institutions. Users are allowed to read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of the articles in this journal without asking prior permission of the publisher or the author. Articles published in the journal are distributed under a http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.

            History
            Custom metadata
            eng

            Education,Religious studies & Theology,Social & Behavioral Sciences,Law,Economics
            China-Iran Relations,Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,Saudi-Iran Rivalry,Belt and Road Initiative,Middle East Security

            Notes

            1. Paras Ratna, “What the US Iran Sanctions Mean for India,” Diplomat, August 8, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/what-the-us-iran-sanctions-mean-for-india/; John Garver, “China and Iran: An Emerging Partnership Post-Sanctions” (Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 2016), https://www.mei.edu/publications/china-and-iran-emerging-partnership-post-sanctions.

            2. John W. Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post Imperial World (London: University of Washington Press, 2006), 3-25.

            3. Mehrdad Afshoun, Hossein Moftakhari, Parviz Perez Talebzadeh, “A Study on the Motivations of the Arab Invasion of the Southern Province of Iran,” in “4th World Conference On Educational Sciences (WCES)” eds. Gülsün A. Baskan, Fezile Ozdamli, Sezer Kanbul; Deniz Ozcan, special issue, Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 46 (2012): 108-110, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2012.05.076.

            4. Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai, Triple Axis: Iran's Relations with Russia and China (London: I B Tauris, 2018).

            5. Mahmoud Pargoo, “What Does Iran Really Think of China?” Diplomat, November 7, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/what-does-iran-really-think-of-china/.

            6. Shirzad Azad, Iran and China: A New Approach to their Bilateral Relations (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2017), 1-10.

            7. Ibid.

            8. Ibid., 1-2.

            9. Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post Imperial World, 308.

            10. Esfandiary and Tabatabai, Triple Axis: Iran's Relations with Russia and China, 5.

            11. Ibid. Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post Imperial World, 95-120.

            12. Scott Harold and Alireza Nader, “China and Iran: Economic, Political and Military Relations” (paper, RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy, Santa Monica, 2012), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP351.pdf7; Kristin Huang, “China and Iran: A Relationship Built on Trade, Weapons and Oil,” South China Morning Post, January 9, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3045253/china-and-iran-relationship-built-trade-weapons-and-oil; and “China sold Silkworm Shore-Based Anti-Ship Missiles to Iran,” NY Times, June 22, 1987.

            13. Matthew J. Ferretti, “The Iran-Iraq War: United Nations Resolutions of Armed Conflict,” Villanova Law Review 31, no. 1 (1990): 197-252 (229), https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss1/3.

            14. Harold and Nader, “China and Iran: Economic, Political and Military Relations,” 7.

            15. Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post Imperial World, 95-120.

            16. Ibid.

            17. Manoj Joshi, “China and Iran: JCPOA and Beyond” (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2019), https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/china-and-iran-jcpoa-and-beyond-48244/.

            18. Kinling Lo, “China Backs Iran Nuclear Deal as United States Walks Away, But Could it be a Costly Decision?” South China Morning Post, May 9, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2145406/china-backs-iran-nuclear-deal-united-states-walks-away.

            19. Margaret Besheer, “US Presses for Extension of UN Arms Embargo on Iran,” VOA News, August 6, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/voa-news-iran/us-presses-extension-un-arms-embargo-iran.

            20. “China Reiterates Opposition to Extension of Iran's Arms Embargo,” Tehran Times, June 30, 2020, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/449443/China-reiterates-opposition-to-extension-of-Iran-s-arms-embargo.

            21. Dalileh Rahimi Ashtiani, “Iran's Geostrategic and Geo-economic Advantages for Northern Neighbors in Central Asia and Caucasus,” Iran Review, May 1, 2017, http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Iran-s-geostrategic-and-geo-economic-advantages-for-northern-neighbors-in-Central-Asia-and-Caucasus.htm.

            22. Evangelos Venetis, Iran at the Time of Alexander and the Seleucids, ed. Touraj Daryaee, The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

            23. Morad Kaviani Rad and Hasan Maldari, “The Impact Of Geopolitical Position on National Strategy: Case Study-South East Iran,” Human Geography Research Quarterly, 49, no. 4 (2018): 841-855, https://dx.doi.org/10.22059/jhgr.2016.58558; Ali Rastbeen, “Iran and the Geostrategic Issues of the Twenty-First Century,” Hérodote 133, no. 2 (2009): 180-197, https://doi.org/10.3917/her.133.0180. Iran forms a link between the East and the West connecting South Asia and the Middle East, North and South connecting Caucasus-Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. Iran has a considerably long coastline on the North Arabian Sea, overlooks the entire eastern flank of the Persian Gulf in its south and also shares a long coastline on the Caspian Sea in its north. The country also shares borders with Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan and some of the residual republics of the former USSR.

            24. Lara Jakes, “U.S. Hopes a Small Step in Easing a Mideast Rivalry Could Further Rattle Iran's Economy,” New York Times, last modified January 6, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/02/world/middleeast/qatar-iran-saudi-arabia-kushner-overflights.html. Qatar pays $100 million a month to Iran for using its air corridor.

            25. Ashtiani, “Iran's Geostrategic and Geo-economic Advantages for Northern Neighbors in Central Asia and Caucasus.”

            26. Ibid, 4. Esfandiary and Tabatabai, Triple Axis: Iran's Relations with Russia and China, 8-15.

            27. Jun Liu and Lei Wu, “Key Issues in China-Iran Relations,” Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) 4, no. 1 (2010): 50-52, https://doi.org/10.1080/19370679.2010.12023147.

            28. John Garver, “China-Iran Relations: Cautious Friendship with America's Nemesis,” China Report 49, no. 1 (2013): 69-88 (71-73), https://doi.org/10.1177/0009445513479247.

            29. Ibid., 69-88.

            30. Ibid.

            31. Gal Luft, “Fueling the Dragon: China's Race Into The Oil Market” (Potomac: Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, n.d.), http://www.iags.org/china.htm.

            32. Ibid.

            33. Winberg Chai and May-lee Chai, “The Meaning of Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream,” American Journal of Chinese Studies 20, no. 2 (2013): 95-97, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44289022?seq=1. In 2012, Xi Jinping assumed the leadership of the CCP and coined the term, ‘Chinese Dream’ that not only encapsulated his vision for China in the twenty-first century based on nationalism and Chinese revival but it is also built on the historical collective memory that forms a narrative that China was subjugated by the Western powers, not given its rightful place in the world and was stripped of its territories. Hence the Chinese Dream resolved to restore the past glory.

            34. Hamid Dabashi, “Persian Empire, Anyone?” Aljazeera, May 25, 2015, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/5/25/persian-empire-anyone.

            35. Yang Zhusong, “Advantages of China's Political System: Points For Stability,” CGTN, March 2, 2019, https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d514d3245444d33457a6333566d54/index.html.

            36. Peter Mackenzie, A Closer Look at China-Iran Relations, report (Alexandria: CNA China Studies, 2010), https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0023622.A3.pdf.

            37. OPEC, “Iran Facts and Figures” (Vienna: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, n.d.), https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/163.htm; “Top Ten Countries With The World's Largest Oil Reserves, From Venezuela To Iraq,” NS Energy, November 4, 2020, https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/features/newstop-ten-countries-with-worlds-largest-oil-reserves-5793487/. Mackenzie, A Closer Look at China-Iran Relations.

            38. IEEJ, “Recent trends in Oil Supply from Iran: Oil Group, Oil and Gas Unit” (Tokyo: Institute of Energy Economics Japan, 2012), https://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/4363.pdf.

            39. Daniel Workman, “Top 15 Crude Oil Suppliers to China,” World's Top Exports, December 2, 2020, http://www.worldstopexports.com/top-15-crude-oil-suppliers-to-china/.

            40. Ibid.; Brian Scheid and Eklavya Gupte, “As US Sanctions Increase, China Remains Iran's Top Crude, Condensate Importer,” S&P Global Platts, January 10, 2020, https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/011020-as-us-sanctions-increase-china-remains-irans-top-crude-condensate-importer.

            41. Yigal Chazan, “US Sanctions Prompt China to Cut Most Iran Oil Supplies, Officially at Least,” Diplomat, May 21, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/us-sanctions-prompt-china-to-cut-most-iran-oil-supplies-officially-at-least/.

            42. Liu and Lei Wu, “Key Issues in China-Iran Relations,” 40-57; Zahid Khan and Changgang Guo, “China's Energy Driven Initiatives with Iran: Implications for the United States,” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 11, no. 4 (2017): 15-31, https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2017.12023315.

            43. Refers to the crude oil exploration and production.

            44. Khan and Guo, “China's Energy Driven Initiatives with Iran: Implications for the United States.” The China National Petroleum Corporations (CNPC), Sinopec, and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation.

            45. Refers to the refining and distribution of crude oil products.

            46. “Sinopec Persists With Iran Refinery Upgrade,” Argus Media, September 20, 2018, https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/1757722-sinopec-persists-with-iran-refinery-upgrade.

            47. Ibid.

            48. Mohsen Shariatinia and Hamidreza Azizi, “Iran and the Belt and Road Initiative: Amid Hope and Fear,” Journal of Contemporary China 28, no. 120 (2019): 984-994, https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1594108; Alex Yacoubian, “Iran's Increasing Reliance on China,” Iran Primer, September 11, 2019, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2019/sep/11/irans-increasing-reliance-china.

            49. Saeed Ghasseminejad, “Iran-China Trade Plummets Despite Plans for Strategic Partnership” (Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2020), https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/07/23/iran-china-trade-plummets-despite-partnership/.

            50. “UAE Second Largest Importer of Non-Oil Iran Goods,” Middle East Monitor, August 20, 2018, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180820-uae-second-largest-importer-of-non-oil-iran-goods/.

            51. “Annual International Trade Statistics by Country,” November 15, 2020, Trend Economy, https://trendeconomy.com/data/h2/Iran/TOTAL.

            52. Shariatinia and Azizi, “Iran and the Belt and Road Initiative: Amid Hope and Fear;” Muhammet Ali Güler, “China and Iran: Obstacles to Trade and Revised Goals for Future,” Daily Sabah, September 4, 2020, https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/china-and-iran-obstacles-to-trade-and-revised-goals-for-future.

            53. Mackenzie, A Closer Look at China-Iran Relations.

            54. SASAC, “Belt and Road Initiative Expands China-Iran Cooperation” (Beijing: State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, 2019), http://en.sasac.gov.cn/2019/02/27/c_2098.htm.

            55. Maha S. Kamel, “China's Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for the Middle East,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 31, no. 1 (2018): 76-95, https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2018.1480592.

            56. Anthony H. Cordesman, “China in the Gulf: A New Partnership with Iran” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-gulf-new-partnership-iran.

            57. Farnaz Fassihi and Steven Lee Myers, “Defying U.S., China and Iran Near Trade and Military Partnership,” New York Times, July 11, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/11/world/asia/china-iran-trade-military-deal. html.

            58. Amanat Ali Chaudhry, “Towards a New Cold War?” News, July 18, 2020, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/688289-towards-a-new-cold-war.

            59. Ibid.

            60. Shahram Chubin, “Iran: Between the Arab West and the Asian East,” Survival 16, no. 4 (1974): 172-182 (172-174), https://doi.org/10.1080/00396337408441488.

            61. Alam Saleh and Zakiyeh Yazdanshenas, “Iran's Pact with China is Bad News for the West,” Foreign Policy, August 9, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/09/irans-pact-with-china-is-bad-news-for-the-west/.

            62. Shariatinia and Hamidreza Azizi, “Iran and the Belt and Road Initiative: Amid Hope and Fear.”

            63. Dara Conduit and Shahram Akbarzadeh, “Great Power-Middle Power Dynamics: The Case of China and Iran,” Journal of Contemporary China 28, no. 117 (2019): 468- 481, https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1542225.

            64. Erika Holmquist and Johan Englund, “China and Iran: An Unequal Partnership” (paper, Swedish Defense Research Agency-FOI, Stockholm, 2020); Conduit and Akbarzadeh, “Great Power-Middle Power Dynamics: The Case of China and Iran.”

            65. Conduit and Akbarzadeh, “Great Power-Middle Power Dynamics: The Case of China and Iran.”

            66. For instance, Shannon Tiezzi, “China's Two-Pronged Response to the Quad,” Diplomat, October 7, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/chinas-two-pronged-response-to-the-quad/.

            67. “Ahmadinejad Calls for Regional Security Alliance to Counter US Influence,” Guardian, June 15, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/15/ahmadinejad-sco-united-front-against-us.

            68. Vali Kaleji, “Iran and the SCO: Continued Obstacles to Full Membership,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 17, no. 169 (2020).

            69. Mohsen Shariatinia, “The SCO Policy toward Iran: When Yes Means No” (Ankara: Center for Iranian Studies, 2018), https://iramcenter.org/en/the-sco-policy-toward-iran-when-yes-means-no/; and Kaleji, “Iran and the SCO: Continued Obstacles to Full Membership.”

            70. James M. Dorsey, “China Could Signal Increased Engagement with Iran but Doesn't,” Modern Diplomacy, September 11, 2020, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/09/11/china-could-signal-increased-engagement-with-iran-but-doesnt/.

            71. Conduit and Akbarzadeh, “Great Power-Middle Power Dynamics: The Case of China and Iran.”

            72. “Iran: Total and NIOC Sign Contract for the Development of Phase 11 of the Giant South Pars Gas Field,” Total, July 3, 2017, https://www.total.com/media/news/press-releases/iran-total-and-nioc-sign-contract-development-phase-11-giant-south-pars-gas-field.

            73. Kulsoom Belal, “Elections and Political System in Iran (brief, Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, 2016), https://www.academia.edu/25693091/Elections_and_Political_System_in_Iran_IPS_Situational_Brief.

            74. “Iran's Eastern Strategy,” Strategic Comments 24, no. 36 (2018), https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2018/irans-eastern-strategy.

            75. Shariatinia and Hamidreza Azizi, “Iran and the Belt and Road Initiative: Amid Hope and Fear.”

            76. From this point of view, the lightning-speed expansion of relations with China has led to the closure of a considerable number of key Iranian factories and the unemployment of their workforce. For example, Iranian First Vice President Eshagh Jahangiri has criticized the former administration led by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, accusing it of the uncontrolled import of USD 700 billion of goods from various countries, especially China, and claimed that these imports led to the unemployment of Iranian youth and instead, created employment opportunities for Chinese youth.

            77. Belal, “Elections and Political System in Iran.”

            78. Shariatinia and Hamidreza Azizi, “Iran and the Belt and Road Initiative: Amid Hope and Fear.”

            79. Jeremy Garlick and Radka Havlová, “China's ‘Belt and Road’ Economic Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf: Strategic Hedging Amidst Saudi-Iranian Regional Rivalry,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 49, no. 1 (2020): 82-105, https://doi.org/10.1177/1868102619898706.

            80. For instance, “India Plans $20B Investment in Iranian Port,” Maritime Executive, November 4, 2016, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/india-plans-20b-investment-in-iranian-port.

            81. Indermit Gill, Somik V. Lall, and Mathilde Lebrand, “Winners and Losers along China's Belt and Road,” Future Development Blog, June 21, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2019/06/21/winners-and-losers-along-chinas-belt-and-road/.

            82. W. Travis Selmier II, “The Belt and Road Initiative and the Influence of Islamic Economies,” Economic and Political Studies 6, no. 3 (2018): 257-277, https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2018.1498989.

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