Trade unions can initiate democratisation processes, and subsequently foster democratic institutionalisation.1 Alternatively, trade unions might hinder democratisation either by being co-opted by the autocratic regime or by provoking an autocratic reversal following the initial opening up of a political system (Bellin 2002; O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986). Numerous scholars have highlighted the positive effect of organised labour on democratisation in Western Europe (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Collier 1999; Collier and Mahoney 1995). By comparison, the effects of trade unions on regime transitions in developing countries still remain ambiguous (Bellin 2000; Murillo 2000).
This article examines the effect of trade union mobilisation on democratic institutionalisation in the Republic of Niger. It focuses on the role of one of Niger’s umbrella unions for public sector workers, the Union des syndicats des travailleurs du Niger (USTN, the Union of Workers’ Trade Unions of Niger) between 1990 and 2010. The USTN is a legacy union, one whose origins pre-date the political opening up of the third wave of democratisation (Caraway 2012). Niger is the only African country to have experienced several autocratic (1991 and 1999) and democratic (1996 and 2010) breakdowns since the onset of the third wave of democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa. This thus allows for a longitudinal examination of the impact of organised labour across different regime types. The article uses a minimalist definition of democracy: the continuous holding of democratic multi-party contests and the presence of at least minimal levels of civil freedom in order for competition and participation to be meaningful (Diamond 1996).
The analysis distinguishes two periods. First, the one between 1990 and 1999 when the USTN was a major political force. During this time its effect on democratic institutionalisation was ambivalent. On the one hand, the country’s trade unions brought about the democratic changes of the early 1990s and were the facilitator of institutional reform. The unions also mobilised against the autocratic regime of Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara (1996–1999) and helped restore democratic processes. On the other hand, the USTN focused on the economic plight of their core clientele – public sector employees. Maybe more importantly, union mobilisation contributed to the delegitimisation of the democratically elected government and inadvertently helped facilitate the 1996 military coup. Throughout this period, the USTN failed to join forces with other civil society organisations or any of the country’s political parties.
The second period analysed is the one between 2000 and 2010. During that time the USTN gradually weakened, due to internal disagreements and the proliferation of new umbrella unions. Other civil society organisations now emerged as influential political movements. An increase in the global market price of uranium and in the amount of foreign aid received enabled the Tandja regime to co-opt sections of the trade union movement to support Tandja’s third-term agenda, while others opposed the government’s autocratic turn.
The article proceeds as follows. First, it reviews the literature on trade unionism and democratisation with a particular focus on sub-Saharan Africa, outlines its definition of democratisation in greater detail and discusses a number of indicators that help assess the strength of trade unions. Second, it provides a short overview of Niger’s political trajectory since 1990. The third part then examines that relationship over a period of two decades. The conclusion outlines some of the implications of this study’s findings for the future study of union mobilisation in sub-Saharan Africa.
Trade union activism and democratisation: literature, definitions and indicators
The democratisation literature frequently highlights the key role of organised labour in bringing about democratic change. The assumption underlying these studies is that organised labour is in a better position to effectively challenge autocratic incumbents than other civil society groups are. As the origins of unions often pre-date democratic change, organised labour enjoys substantial organisational resources, which allow unions to impose considerable economic and political costs on incumbents (Neureiter 2013; Tenorio 2014). Scholars working on unions in new democracies have often shown that union mobilisation can be conducive but also detrimental to the stabilisation of democratic institutions (Bermeo 1997; Levitsky and Mainwaring 2006; Valenzuela 1989). The empirical literature on the relationship between democracy and organised labour reveals three schools of thought. The first school claims that unions are first and foremost interested in their own economic benefit. The symbiotic relationship between the state and organised labour, alongside the absence of a viable civil society, means that the organisational edge that unions have to dominate the political scene is greater than in industrialised democracies (Tenorio 2014). Operating within weak democratic structures, trade unions are a set of political rent seekers unwilling to engage with other and often less endowed and less institutionalised social forces. The so-called labour aristocracy have little to no intention to lift their societies out of poverty or to initiate institutional reforms, rather only to retain their own access to public resources (Beckman 2002). Consequently, unions might display support for non-democratic regimes if they derive material benefits from autocratic incumbents (Levitsky and Mainwaring 2006; Bellin 2002). Where this occurs, unions are actively working against democratisation. In addition, unions might undermine democratisation inadvertently. As one of the few or sometimes even the only civil society actor with the capacity to mobilise larger sections of the population, as well as the capacity to paralyse public services, trade union agitation in the aftermath of a democratic opening may provoke democratic backsliding (Karl 1990; Oxhorn 1994).
A second school of thought dissents from this pessimistic view, however. As Wood (2001) has shown in the context of Ecuador and of South Africa, sustained mobilisation by the working class in concert with the poor transformed the key interests of economic elites, leading to pressure on the state to compromise with the insurgents. Lambert and Webster (2001) as well as von Holdt (2002) confirm her findings from South Africa.
Finally, there is a third group of scholars who have uncovered no discernible pattern across new democracies. They find the role of unions during democratisation processes to be dependent on the political and social contexts in which they operate (Valenzuela 1989; Robertson 2004; Beckman 2002).
Scholarship on union activity in sub-Saharan Africa in general and francophone West Africa in particular identifies three key periods of interest: first, the pre-independence one (mid 1940s to early 1960s) in which unions were the driving force behind the struggle for emancipation from colonial rule (Ananba 1979; Freund 1984). Second, the period in which autocratic one-party regimes struggled with the unions for political supremacy. By and large, the one-party regimes won that struggle – as government interventions in labour relations became commonplace. ‘Responsible participation’ became the leitmotif of the union movement (Phelan 2011a; Kester 2007; Phelan 2011b). Third, the period following the implementation of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), which saw many African citizens and unions taking to the streets protesting the economic policies of their governments (Seddon and Zeilig 2005; LeBas 2011; Phelan 2016).
Although scholars have discussed the impact of unions during the democratic transition of the early 1990s, there has been little systematic research on whether union support for political liberalisation extends to that for existing democratic institutions (for one notable exception, see Kraus 2007).
The aim of this article is to examine the extent to which union mobilisation accounts for the various regime transitions witnessed in Niger between 1990 and 2010. In line with the mainstream political science literature, I distinguish between the regime transition and institutionalisation/consolidation phase. I define the starting point of a democratic transition as the moment in time when democratising actors first whip up expectations of democratic change. Often this takes the form of street protests against autocratic incumbents. Transitions can either succeed or fail, of course. Successful democratic transitions culminate in free and fair founding elections. Rigged founding elections indicate failed transitions. Although there is no consensus about when exactly a democracy has finally become consolidated, the consolidation phase can definitely be said to begin only after the holding of founding elections (Schedler 1998, 2001b, 2001a). In this study I define democratisation in minimalist and institutionalist terms: the continuous holding of elections, and the protection of basic civil and political liberties (Diamond 1996). On the one hand this acknowledges the democratic progress made in Niger since the 1990s; on the other it takes its democratic deficits also into consideration (Tiado 2010; Diamond 2002). As scholars have focused on the change from autocratic to democratic rule (Bogaards 2009), there is no existing definition of autocratic transition or consolidation. I regard the overthrow of a democratic regime as the inception point of an autocratic transition. The transition is complete if the new autocratic rulers decide to remain in power, through rigged elections. The period following rigged elections is the starting point of the autocratic consolidation process.
A variety of indicators affect the ability of unions to achieve concessions after the onset of a democratic transition. First, if the unionisation rate (the ratio that actual union membership bears to potential membership thereof) is high, unions will have access to more financial resources and thus a greater capacity to disrupt the economy (Finer 1973; Madrid 2003). Second, the fragmentation of the union movement by the emergence of rival unions in a particular sector or the emergence of a rival umbrella union can have negative effects on the ability of organised labour to organise strikes. The ability of rival unions to coordinate their activities is also an important determinant with regard to the influence of these bodies (Caraway 2012; Neureiter 2013). Third, in order to become or remain influential, unions have to establish meaningful and lasting links with political parties (Madrid 2003; Neureiter 2013; Valenzuela 1989). While the unionisation rate and the degree of fragmentation measure organisational capacities, partisan linkages alternatively determine whether unions can translate organisational capacities into concessions from the government. Where linkages with political parties are not a given, unions with strong organisational capacities remain weak politically.
Strong unions do not necessarily make good democrats. In the developing world, union representation is often confined to the comparatively small formal and state-controlled sector of the economy. The case-based literature on organised labour allows us to distil down indicators that can evaluate the democratic potential of unions. First, the timing and the intensity of union agitation have an important effect on the trajectory of a regime (Schedler 2001b). After the onset of a democratic transition, an autocratic backlash is likely as the former incumbents continue to enjoy support among influential powerbrokers (Bermeo 1997) – especially if the transition is characterised by cycles of protest and low institutionalisation of democratic rule (Schedler 2001b). Union mobilisation conducive to democratic institutionalisation will adjust the intensity of their protests and limit their socio-economic demands in order not to sabotage any democratic gains. Union agitation that threatens democratic institutionalisation will occur during periods where political tensions are already high, and thereby endanger the transition process (Bermeo 1997).
Second, unions differ in terms of their relationships with other civil society organisations. Unions that fight for their interests, yet also want to broaden and widen democratic norms, are more conducive to democratic institutionalisation. Scholars working on contentious politics (Tarrow 1989) and on social movement unionism (Lambert and Webster 2001; Waterman 1993) have shown that when unions link up with other civil society groups and formulate goals beyond the economic concerns of their core clientele, democratisation is more likely to ensue. By acting in concert with other civil society groups, unions organise coalitions across class lines, integrate interpersonal solidarities into public politics and equalise the resources among political participants (Tilly 2004; Tarrow 1989). Alternatively, unions might refrain from practising solidarity with groups that suffer from far worse socio-economic conditions (Bellin 2000; Rakner 1992; Beckman 2002).
Third, links with political parties have different implications for union activity. Those that engage in meaningful organisational and ideational linkages with political parties whose orientations are compatible with the basic tenets of liberal democracy strengthen democratisation processes (LeBas 2011). Unions that form links with extremist or anti-systemic parties as well as those that do not collaborate with political parties at all are more likely to undermine democratisation efforts meanwhile (Levitsky and Mainwaring 2006).
Case selection and methodology
Niger’s desperate socio-economic situation (consistently ranked among the four poorest countries worldwide over the last three decades in the annual Human Development Index), in combination with recurring cycles of democratisation attempts, make it an interesting case study for democratisation processes in general and for the role of organised labour therein in particular. Table 1 displays the country’s main political junctures. Between 1990 and 2010, Nigeriens lived under six different constitutions, three different military rulers and two separate democratically elected presidents. The democratic transition of the early 1990s did not usher in democratic consolidation: in 1996 the armed forces overthrew the democratically elected government of President Mahamane Ousmane. The elections that followed were rigged in favour of General Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara, who remained in power until he was overthrown by the country’s armed forces in 1999. This military coup resulted in democratic elections, and Niger’s second democratic transition within 10 years. The elections of 1999 saw Mamadou Tandja take office as president. Re-elected in 2004, Tandja failed to adhere to the constitutionally enshrined two-term limit in 2009. The decision of his administration to hold a national referendum about a new constitutional draft resulted in Niger’s most severe political crisis since the rigged 1996 elections. The referendum proposal foresaw a new constitution, allowed Tandja to stay in power for an additional three years (until 2012) and eliminated executive term limits. After Niger’s constitutional court had declared the referendum unconstitutional, Tandja dissolved both the court itself and the National Assembly as well. Niger’s main opposition leaders were arrested under dubious circumstances. All parliamentary opposition parties, Tandja’s former parliamentary coalition partner and many civil society organisations together called for a boycott of the national referendum, which took place in August 2009. Unsurprisingly, the referendum went in Tandja’s favour. After weeks of domestic and international protest, the country’s armed forces overthrew the Tandja government in February 2010 – the third military coup experienced since the initial democratic opening of 1990 (A. Idrissa and Decalo 2012).
| Type of regime | Beginning of transition | Post-transition trajectory/regime consolidation phase |
|---|---|---|
| One-party rule | August 1960 | August 1960–April 1974: First Republic |
| Military dictatorship | April 1974 | April 1974–December 1989: military rule |
| One-party state | December 1989 | December 1989–November 1991: Second Republic |
| First democratic transition | February 1990 | August 1991–November 1991: National Conference November 1991–April 1993: transition period April 1993–January 1996: Third Republic |
| First democratic breakdown | January 1996 | January 1996–April 1999: Fourth Republic |
| Second democratic transition | April 1999 | November 1999–October 2009: Fifth Republic October 2009–February 2010: Sixth Republic |
| Second democratic breakdown | February 2010 | February 2010–April 2011: interim military rule |
| Military rule to multi-party democracy | April 2011 | April 2011–present day: Seventh Republic |
Source: author’s compilation. The periods in bold are covered in this study.
A longitudinal study on Nigerien labour throughout this volatile period allows for an analysis of how African labour has interacted with different types of political regime across time, while keeping other domestic factors constant. My unit of analysis is the Union des syndicats des travailleurs du Niger (USTN), Niger’s umbrella union for the public sector (Gazibo 2005b). Between 1974 and the onset of the democratic transition in 1990, the USTN was an integral part of the autocratic regime (Robinson 1991). By joining the public sector, all employees automatically became members of the USTN. Committed to the principle of ‘responsible participation’, the USTN never opposed the military government. Both civil servants and graduate students – who account for roughly 80% of the Nigerien workforce in the formal employment sector – enjoyed a comparatively high income in an otherwise poverty-stricken country (Robinson 1994; Charlick 2007). The uneven distribution of public expenditure in favour of this tiny segment of Nigerien society was a corollary of the uranium boom of the 1970s (Gervais 1995; Robinson 1994). The USTN’s existence thus pre-dates Niger’s democratic transition. In her pioneering work on legacy unions, Caraway (2012, 2008) distinguishes between transmission belt unions and those that emerge from an exclusionary corporatist context. Under autocratic rule, transmission belt unions enjoy a monopoly and represent all workers employed in the formal economy. They also receive generous state subsidies. Given their organisational endowment, transmission belt unions enter the democratic transition phase as strong social forces. The USTN clearly qualifies as a transmission belt union. Civil servants dominated the leadership and the rank-and-file. Affiliate unions elected their own leaderships and enjoyed some autonomy from the confederation. However, there were no known conflicts between them and the USTN leadership. As the empirical analysis will demonstrate, this began to change in the late 1980s.
The article employs qualitative research methods (Jourde 2009; de Volo and Schatz 2004) including archival research and semi-structured interviews with individuals who witnessed or were involved in Niger’s democratisation attempts between 1990 and 2010. Those informants listed agreed for their names to be published. Data collection took place during three four-week-long research stays in November 2009, August 2010 and July 2013 and one two-week-long stay in February 2018. During each stay I conducted extensive research in Niger’s national archives. Further, I conducted interviews with union activists, civil society representatives, military officers and party politicians. In total, I conducted 35 semi-structured interviews. The purpose of the interviews was to verify the information generated through archival research.
Strong labour, unstable regimes: Niger between 1990 and 1999
During this period, the USTN was a major force in Nigerien politics. As was the case during the autocratic period, every public sector worker automatically became a member of the USTN when joining the public workforce.2 The USTN remained the dominant umbrella trade union throughout this period. As a result, Nigerien labour enjoyed strong organisational capacities.
Autocratic breakdown (1990–1991): organised labour and democratisation
Niger’s autocratic regime first began to crumble in February 1990, after the Union des scolaires nigériens (USN), the student union, had taken to the streets to protest the drastic reductions in teacher salaries and student grants imposed. The reductions were part of the SAPs Niger had been forced to implement in the late 1980s. As the SAPs had not been implemented in earnest, mandatory unionisation was still practised in Niger (Gervais 1995). Already in October 1989 the Syndicat national des enseignants du Niger (SNEN), the teachers’ union, had challenged the principle of ‘responsible participation’ by organising the first nationwide demonstrations against the SAPs. At the time the USTN leadership still supported the autocratic government of Ali Saibou (Interviews: Mamoudou; Saidou). Led by Moussa Tchangari and Boubacar Sabo, the USN paralysed the streets of Niamey on 9 February 1990 (Nigerdiaspora 2012). The sole demand of the demonstrators was the maintaining of the status quo in the public sector (Raynal 1991; Interviews: Arzika; Hamani; Daounda). During the protests, three students from the University of Niamey – Alio Nahanchi, Issaka Kainé and Maman Saguirou – were killed by the country’s security forces (Robinson 1994; Charlick 2007; Le Hérisson, ‘L’avenir de la lutte syndicale au Niger’, 4 March 2014). Their death changed the political dynamics within the USTN. A growing number of USTN leaders began to demand wide-ranging political changes too (Gazibo 1998, 2005b). On 16 February, several trade unions honoured the dead students with a march through Niamey. Inside the USTN, a growing number of union functionaries now openly questioned the wisdom of the unions being loyal to the government. The USTN’s secretary-general, Issoufou Laouali, together with Mohamed Bazoum, a young trade union functionary of the SNEN, served as the main facilitators of change inside the labour movement (Harouna 2015).
The USTN used the subsequent May Day parade to call on the government to increase public spending. At this early stage, calls for institutional reform featured for the first time, yet remained overshadowed by the demands to safeguard the rights of public workers. With military rule becoming firmly associated with the implementation of SAPs, an increasing number of union leaders came to view democratic procedures as a protection mechanism against public sector reform (S. Adji 2000; Salifou 2002). Given Niger’s desperate economic situation, growing social unrest and early signs of a Tuareg rebellion in the northern part of the country, the Saibou government announced its voluntary ceding of power in November 1990. The government also announced the holding of a national conference, where the future institutional set-up of Niger was to be debated (Comité de réflexion sur la révision de la charte et de la constitution 1990; Souley 2008). Only after the military had withdrawn from power did calls for institutional reform emerge as the dominant narrative of union mobilisation (Raynal 1991). According to several union functionaries, ‘the government provided us with a new political vocabulary which disguised our economic goals’ (Interviews: Laouali; Hamani; Diallo).
In the run-up to the Conférence nationale (National Conference), the USTN established itself as Niger’s pre-eminent political player. While some rightly regard the National Conference as an important milestone (Robinson 1994; Gazibo 2004, 2005a), the work of the much less known Commission préparatoire de la conference nationale (Preparatory Committee of the National Conference) has been overlooked. The Preparatory Committee comprised 72 delegates, of which 8 represented the government, 20 represented the USTN, 36 represented a vast array of newly registered political parties, and a further 8 represented other interests (République du Niger 1991a). From the beginning, the USTN insisted on excluding representatives’ lawyers and privately funded organisations from the Preparatory Committee (Koudizé 1992). The committee elected the deputy secretary-general of the USTN as president. Throughout the preparatory meetings, the USTN managed to vote as a united bloc and achieved a majority on its position in almost all cases (République du Niger 1991a).
Two decisions taken by the Preparatory Committee had a lasting effect on Niger. First, an interim body, the so-called Haut conseil de la république (HCR, High Council of the Republic), was established to govern Niger between the end of the National Conference in November 1991 and the inauguration of its first democratically elected government in April 1993. The USTN provided the institutional blueprint for the composition and the mandate of the HCR. Second, the Preparatory Committee decided to use the National Conference as an occasion for debate about the crimes committed by the country’s various post-independence military governments (République du Niger 1991b).
The National Conference ran from 29 July to 3 November 1991. To pass a motion or to be elected to a leadership position, a majority among seven voting blocs was required. Each bloc comprised 100 delegates and represented a societal interest group. The seven voting blocs included the USTN, the USN, the union of employees, independent unions, the government, all registered political parties (united in one bloc) and non-union civil society associations (Robinson 1994). Given the dominance of unions, several leadership positions in the HCR went to union functionaries (Chaibou 2000, 92–93; Gazibo 1998). Between 9 August and 23 October 1991, delegates debated the political and economic affairs of the army. After two-and-a-half decades of being at the helm of the Nigerien state, the Nigerien senior military command faced the open contempt of representatives from all walks of life (Salifou 1993).3 Until today, some sections of the armed forces regard the National Conference as a civilian coup orchestrated by the unions and designed to humiliate and divide the armed forces (Interviews: High-ranking officers of the Nigerien armed forces). The National Conference produced a scope statement that the interim government was legally obliged to follow. It forbade the HCR to reduce the size of the public workforce and cooperate with the Bretton Woods institutions. The booklet listed 141 demands calling for an extension of public services, which was to be financed by cutting back the military budget (République du Niger 1993). The decision-making procedures and the outcomes of the National Conference clearly demonstrate the high degree of political power that the unions had by now acquired vis-à-vis both the government and other opposition groups too (Koudizé 1992; B. Adji 1998).
Democratic transition breakdown (1991–1996)
From December 1991 onwards, the HCR was under constant pressure from the unions to implement the decisions of the National Conference and to improve the situation for public sector employees – even though the public sector wage bill already accounted for 90% of Niger’s tax revenue (Kotoudi 1993). A series of USTN-led general strikes characterised the period between December 1991 and May 1992.4 More often than not, organised labour protests coincided with military mutinies. The USTN-led strikes thus considerably catalysed political uncertainty and weakened the political legitimacy of the HCR, which failed to achieve even a modicum of political stability (Ibid.; Ibrahim 1994; Souley 2008).
As the Preparatory Committee had cajoled the HCR interim government into refraining from co-operating with the Bretton Woods institutions, the influx of foreign aid was at an all-time low (Gazibo 2005a; Robinson 1994). In order to keep the transition process alive, the government had to appease the unions. In June 1992 the HCR recognised the Republic of Taiwan in exchange for a one-off payment of US$50 million, which went towards recompensing public employees (Ibrahim 1994; Kotoudi 1993, 27). Consequently, the public wage bill increased from CFA35–39 billion, and the number of civil servants in the country from 37,000 to 39,000 (Gervais 1995).
In December 1992 Niger held its first democratic presidential and parliamentary elections. The semi-presidential system of the Third Republic was to be led by Mahamane Ousmane of the Convention démocratique et sociale (CDS, the Democratic and Social Convention), which formed a coalition with the Parti national pour la démocratie et le socialisme (PNDS, the National Party for Democracy and Socialism) as well as several other smaller parties. President Ousmane (CDS) appointed Mahamadou Issoufou (PNDS) as his prime minister. The PNDS was expected to evolve into partisan allies of the unions as it recruited many of its members from the intellectual Left (Charlick 2007). Prime Minister Issoufou had risen through the ranks of the civil service and was an active member of the USTN (Ibrahim 1994; Harouna 2015; Interview: Bazoum).
The political arena remained split between three different factions: the army and supporters of the former Mouvement national pour la société du développement (MNSD, National Movement for the Development of Society) regime, the new government and the public sector trade unions. In his farewell speech on stepping down as interim prime minister, Amadou Cheiffou warned that the future of Niger depended heavily on the willingness of the unions to accept an end to their privileged position (Wegemund 1993). The incoming prime minister, Mahamadou Issoufou, highlighted the nation’s desperate need for financial support and indicated that cutbacks and negotiations with the Bretton Woods institutions simply had to be resumed (Charlick 2007). His government proposed a 24% pay cut for all public sector employees. A series of general strikes throughout 1993 led to the abandonment of this project (Wegemund 1994).
The rapid decline of living conditions for military personnel led to a new wave of mutinies in 1995. Caught between the demands of organised labour and those of the military in the overarching context of insufficient resources being available, the government delayed the passing of the 1994 budget by two years in order to mitigate political tensions (Decoudras and Gazibo 1997; Le Républicain, 25–31 January 1996).
On 26 January 1996 a military coup brought the Third Republic to an end. Scholars have attributed this coup to Niger’s semi-presidential system, to the army’s unwillingness to accept civilian rule and to internal divisions within the civilian government itself (Ibrahim 1994; Gazibo 1998, 2004). Although all of these factors are relevant, the role of organised labour in delegitimising Niger’s nascent democratic system certainly played an important part too (Decoudras and Gazibo 1997; Gazibo 1998).
Autocratic transition, consolidation and breakdown (1996–1999)
Organised labour initially neither welcomed nor condemned the January 1996 coup (Gazibo 1998; Decoudras and Gazibo 1997; Interview: Saidou). The decision of coup leader Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara to exclude the USTN from the deliberations on a new constitution was the first blow to the budding relationship between the government and organised labour (Le Républicain, 15–21 January 1996). Maïnassara’s appointment of Boukary Adji, a World Bank official, as interim prime minister provoked the first note of protest by the USTN against the new government (B. Adji 1998).
Contrary to earlier announcements, Maïnassara decided to contest the presidential elections of July 1996. For this purpose, he formed the Rassemblement pour la démocratie et le progrès (RDP, Rally for Democracy and Progress) – an umbrella group of former autocratic elites and big men who had lost their political and financial clout following the National Conference in 1991 (Interviews: Middle-ranking officers of the Nigerien armed forces). After the first day of the presidential election, the Maïnassara government dissolved the independent electoral commission. Members of the new ad-hoc commission announced Maïnassara the winner of the election. The incarceration of all opposition candidates prompted the opposition to boycott the subsequent parliamentary elections in November 1996 (Gazibo 1998) and the USTN to condemn the junta for the first time (Grégoire and Sardan 1996). All major opposition parties and several civil society groups came together to form the Front pour la restauration et la défense de la démocratie (FRDD, Front for the Restoration and Defence of Democracy); even the MNSD, which had initially welcomed Baré’s coup, joined this alliance. The USTN, however, refrained from joining the FRDD (Le Républicain, 16 January 1997). The second half of 1997 and the best part of 1998 were characterised by waves of strikes by the USTN and protest marches by the FRDD. Often their demonstrations ran in parallel with USTN protests against the reduction of salaries, and FRDD protests against restrictive press laws and political suppression (Le Républicain, various issues between July 1997 and October 1997). Previous participants in the protests against the Baré regime stated that the separation of the USTN from the FRDD was rooted in the divisions between the unions and the formerly governing parties (Interview: Mamoudou).
In addition to protest against the authoritarian nature of the Nigerien government, economic interests remained the other core driver behind union agitation. Immediately after the rigged 1996 presidential elections, the USTN demanded a salary increase and protested against the regime’s willingness to follow the policy recommendations of the Bretton Woods institutions (Interview: Hassouri; Le Républicain, 6 June 1996). In response, Maïnassara announced a 30% reduction in the public wage bill. As it had done previously, the USTN engaged in a series of general strikes that lasted throughout the last quarter of 1996 (Gazibo 1998). Throughout 1998, the USTN protested several privatisation campaigns and engaged in at least one 72-hour general strike per month (Le Républicain, 4 March and 21 April 1999). In order to weaken the power of the USTN, the Maïnassara government created a new union for the public sector, the Confédération nigérienne du travail (CNT, the Nigerien Confederation of Labour). The law that enabled the formation of the CNT also allowed for the formation of splinter unions. For the first time in history, the USTN lost its monopoly over employees in the formal sector (S. Adji 2000; International Labour Office 2010). This attempt to weaken the USTN by establishing an alternative union initially proved ineffective as only a very few member unions of the USTN joined the CNT. The unionisation rate inside the USTN remained almost as high as during the autocratic period according to local estimates (Interviews: USTN and CNT officials). On 9 April 1999, the Maïnassara government was overthrown in a military coup led by Daouda Malam Wanké, the erstwhile head of Maïnassara’s presidential guard.
Weak labour, stable regime: Niger between 2000 and 2010
During the period between 2000 and 2010 the organisational strength of the USTN weakened considerably. A large section of its membership broke away and formed an alternative umbrella union. The fact that the unionisation rate remained high is important as it meant that its rival union could rely on a high degree of organisational capacities (Interviews: USTN officials).
Democratic transition and consolidation (2000–2009)
In contrast to the coup in 1996, the 1999 coup gave way to a democratically elected government. The MNSD candidate, Mamadou Tandja, won the presidential elections in December 1999. The MNSD further commanded a majority in parliament, where it formed a stable alliance with the CDS. President Tandja was re-elected in 2004. The MNSD–CDS coalition also retained its majority. Niger’s new domestic stability was the result of two factors: first, organised labour suffered from internal fission, which greatly weakened its mobilisation capacity. Second, a drastic rise in world market prices for uranium, as well as donor funding, provided the government with the financial resources necessary to accommodate union demands. This further enabled the government to receive the support of some unions for Tandja’s attempts to change the constitutions and to remain in office.
In April 2000, the newly elected Tandja administration reached an agreement with the USTN, which foresaw the early retirement of over one thousand public sector employees and the reimbursement of all outstanding salaries. Accordingly, the government compensated early retirees with parcels of government-owned land (Interviews: Issoufou; CDTN desk officers). The agreement did little to reduce the public wage bill and divided the USTN. Some members of the executive leadership felt that the USTN leadership had negotiated a deal that was not in the interests of its members. Simultaneously, there was the growing perception among rank-and-file members that the USTN and many of its affiliate unions were run in a top-down manner (Charlick 2007).
By December 2000 several unions announced the formation of their union umbrella union, the Conféderation démocratique des travailleurs du Niger (CDTN, the Democratic Confederation of Workers of Niger). The CDTN remained an ardent opponent of any reform agenda (S. Adji 2000; International Labour Office 2010; Phelan 2011a). The CDTN managed to assemble some of the most active member unions of the USTN including the USN and the SNEN. Due to the fragmentation of labour, union mobilisation from now on remained confined to certain sectors. General strikes – a typical feature of the Nigerien political landscape in the 1990s – disappeared as joint actions became very cumbersome following the division of the erstwhile powerful USTN into USTN, CNT and CDTN (Interviews: Saidou; Hassouri; Bamdamassi).
From 2002 onward, Niger’s annual income grew substantially. The influx of additional revenue relied on three sources: first, growing world market prices for uranium ensured a steady export income. In 1991 the export of uranium generated an income of US$56 million; in 2001 that number had fallen to US$55 million. By 2010 that number had risen to US$385 million, however.5
Second, the return of multi-party democracy led to a sizable increase in development aid. Between 2001 and 2009 development aid to Niger increased by roughly a third compared to the previous decade (see Table 2). Third, Niger experienced a decline in its colossal debt repayment service as it qualified for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative (International Monetary Fund 2000). Between 2002 and 2008 Niger profited from annual debt forgiveness grants equalling US$195 million.6
| Year | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 |
| Million US$ | n/a | 505 | 492 | 516 | 348 | 328 | 476 | 421 | 272 | 325 |
| Year | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 |
| Million US$ | 417 | 454 | 626 | 646 | 604 | 611 | 565 | 591 | 466 | 744 |
Source: OECD database. Average annual official development assistance between 1992 and 1999: US$419 million; average annual official development assistance between 2000 and 2009: US$604 million.
Niger’s increased levels of export income and of foreign aid both went directly to the Nigerien treasury in order to keep public expenditure afloat. Around 70% of HIPC funds (resources that no longer have to be spent on debt repayment but are now intended to finance poverty mitigation programmes) went to President Tandja’s Special Presidential Poverty Reduction Programme, for which there was no auditing scheme in place (International Monetary Fund 2004). Even funds that were not allocated to the president’s programme were rarely accounted for. The Bretton Woods institutions only audited HIPC funds disbursed betwe|en 2002 and 2004 and not the much larger funds paid out between 2005 and 2008 (International Monetary Fund 2004, 2011). Neither civil society nor the National Assembly was at any stage included in the decision-making process on how to spend the HIPC funds (Phelan 2011a). The high illiteracy rate among Nigerien MPs rendered any parliamentary inquiries obsolete. The majority of the HIPC funds remained in the treasury in order to cover the public wage bill and to provide study grants to future civil servants (Interviews: Ihhivi; Abdoulaye; Nafidu).
While tracing money streams is impossible, Niger’s newly found financial leverage is clearly visible in the manner in which its president was able to appease societal interest groups. For instance, in the spring of 2005 the newly formed Coalition Contre la Vie Chère (CCVC, Coalition against the High Cost of Living) effectively shut down public life in the capital in order to protest a VAT increase from 15% to 19%. However, given Niger’s new financial leverage power, Tandja was able to withdraw the increase. In addition, the government reduced the prices of several basic commodities (Interview: Arzika). The demonstrations of the CCVC in 2005 occurred without active union support. CCVC representatives stressed that their movement operated in isolation from organised labour (Grain de Sel, no. 31, June 2005).
With external financing at an all-time high and no meaningful accounting system in place, Tandja became the first president to meet the demands of organised labour. In 2005 he granted a 10% pay rise to all civil servants. He further established a generous retirement package for teachers and increased their housing allowances (Economist Intelligence Unit Report Niger 2005). By 2007 severe student protests (once a typical feature of Nigerien politics) had vanished following an increase in student grants, an improvement of university facilities, and a decrease in maintenance costs for students (Economist Intelligence Unit Reports Niger 2007 and 2008). In addition to the co-optation of student protest, the Nigerien security apparatus repressed those student union leaders that were known to be involved in anti-Tandja activities. The civil service did not suffer any further cutbacks. Instead, the size of the workforce stabilised just above the oversized level of the 1980s (A. Idrissa and Decalo 2012, 127).
Democratic breakdown (2009–2010)
In May 2009 Tandja announced his intention to remain in office beyond his constitutionally prescribed second term. In June the government declared that a referendum on a new constitution (Sixth Republic) would be held in August 2009. The new constitution allowed Tandja to remain in office for another three years and to contest future presidential elections (République du Niger 2009). The run-up to the referendum saw the dissolution of the constitutional court, the National Assembly and the arrests of journalists as well as of opposition leaders (van Walraven 2009).
Tandja’s supporters gathered in the Mouvement patriotique pour la défense de la nation et du peuple (MPDNP, Patriotic Movement for the Defence of the Nation and People); his opponents, in the Coordination des forces pour la démocratie et la république (CFDR, Coordination of Forces for Democracy and the Republic). The MNSD, rural chiefs, Islamic clerks, and peasant associations joined the MPDNP. All political parties except for the MNSD joined the CFDR (Notre Pays 2012; Interview: Hamani). The situation is more complex with regard to civil society groups. The CCVC was firmly committed to a third Tandja term, with CCVC leaders such as Nouhou Arzika stressing that the Tandja period had provided stability and a minimum of basic provisions (Interview: Arzika). Most other civil society organisations could not agree on a position and remained silent.7
The trade unions remained torn. The official position of all three umbrella unions was to oppose Tandja’s constitutional referendum. Below the surface, however, things were not as straightforward, and numerous individual unions boycotted the struggle against Tandja. Particularly noteworthy was the silence of the student unions, traditionally the vanguard of union opposition. Previously one of the most active unions, the USN openly supported Tandja (A. Idrissa and Decalo 2012; La Roue de l'Histoire, ‘Crise politique au Niger : Le SNECS invite à l’organisation d’un débat national’, 30 September 2009). Although the – by now – three major trade union organisations (USTN, CDTN and Confédération démocratique du travail [Democratic Confederation of Labour, CDT]) closely coordinated their actions, their attempt to organise a general strike in late June 2009 failed. The cabinet’s decision to raise all public salaries by 50% ensured that many public employees did not follow the unions’ call for action. International observers noted that many protest rallies organised by the unions suffered from low turnouts compared to meetings organised by opposition parties or anti-referendum civil society groups (Interviews: Weber; Syga). Many middle-ranking trade union functionaries appeared at MPDNP rallies and supported a third Tandja term (Le Témoin 200 9 ). This also applied to the USN, historically the champion of democratic rule (A. Idrissa and Decalo 2012). In February 2010 the Nigerien army overthrew the Tandja regime, thus paving the way for a new democratic dispensation (Baudais and Chauzal 2011).
Conclusion
This article has examined the effects of union mobilisation on democratisation in Niger between 1990 and 2010. It has focused on the USTN, a legacy union. The effect of the USTN on democratisation can ultimately be said to have been ambivalent. This was most apparent during the period between 1990 and 1999, when the USTN enjoyed considerable organisational strength and was one of the dominant political players in Niger. Without organised labour, democratisation in Niger would not have taken place as early as it did. Union mobilisation in Niger was thus a necessary condition for democratisation in the country. The USTN did not become co-opted by the autocratic regimes of Ali Saibou (1987–1991) and Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara (1996–1999), but rather opposed both. However, the USTN consistently failed to form alliances with other civil society groups or to widen its agenda beyond the protection of the economic demands of its members.
Its mobilisation against government policies throughout the early 1990s contributed to the delegitimisation – and, ultimately, the downfall – of the Third Republic (1993–1996). During the period between 2000 and 2010, the effect of the USTN is even less clear-cut. The body gradually lost its previous strength. Changing economic fortunes enabled the Tandja administration (2000–2010) to now accommodate union demands. Some affiliate unions of the USTN supported Tandja’s third-term agenda, even though at the time of the referendum it had become increasingly clear that the government’s course of action had taken an authoritarian turn. Others opposed the third-term referendum meanwhile. By this point social movements had emerged as powerful alternative social forces, a trend which has continued in recent years too (Mueller 2013).
These findings give rise to several implications for the study of trade unionism and democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa. First, the scholarly separation between unions that act as ‘contingency democrats’ and those whose activities are conducive to democratisation does not work in every context. Here it is important to note the scope conditions of the Nigerien case: the country’s economy has until now been dominated by the public sector and, consequently, its trade union activities by public sector workers. One fruitful point of departure for future research on union mobilisation in Africa is to examine a possible connection between the economic structures and the nature of union mobilisation across other nation-states. Second, and related to the first point, these findings highlight the difficult position that union functionaries found themselves in after the onset of the neoliberal economic age. Like their governments, union leaders were caught between the demands for political freedom and the imposition of austerity measures (Abrahamsen 2000).
This raises an important question: could the USTN have pursued a different course of action? Or, was the USTN – and other African unions besides – bound to challenge the legitimacy of elected governments simply because post-1990 democratisation has required compliance with economic ideas diametrically opposed to the core ideals of the trade union movement? The Nigerien pathway certainly indicates the latter. If comparative research across the region confirms this finding, then it is impossible to expect union mobilisation to be fully supportive of democratisation attempts as conventionally defined by scholars and policymakers. This calls for new definitions of democracy, definitions which seek to reconcile institutional reforms with the economic realities of citizens.
Third, the analysis has confirmed that even those legacy unions that entered the democratic age as coherent and strong social forces have weakened over time. The findings from Niger are clearly in line with those from other countries too (Phelan 2011b). Fourth and finally, the Nigerien case suggests that broad protest movements have emerged as powerful political actors in recent years. Contemporary Africanist scholarship indeed confirms this (Branch and Mampilly 2015; Harsch 2009; Resnick 2013). A fruitful starting point for future scholarship could, then, be to examine the relationship between sub-Saharan African trade unionism and other social forces more generally.