100 years of the ANC
A ‘centenary golf day’ opened the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the African National Congress (ANC) in Mangaung, the city where the party was born in 1912. Its founders were often portrayed as petit bourgeois, but the early ANC was much closer to its contemporaries' – including workers' – aspirations (Limb 2010). Their golfing heirs belong to a different elite, enriched in a nearly 20-year-long lead on the post-apartheid democratic state. Interconnections between the spheres of business and politics and the emergence of rent mechanisms through Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) were highlighted as structuring elements in a post-apartheid compromise between former and new elites (Southall 2007; Tangri and Southall 2008). This dimension of access to and control of resources also played a role in perpetuating the Tripartite Alliance – the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) – in power since 1994. There is also a fundamental political dimension to such longevity on which this paper will further insist.
Once a lawful opposition force to white minority rule, subsequently turning into an underground liberation movement, the ANC is now a million-member ruling party elected to Parliament. Some have argued that it remains relevant and faithful in terms of its internal debate (Lodge 2004), while others have questioned both its effective functioning and democratic vibrancy behind an apparent mass-character (Darracq 2008). ANC president Jacob Zuma once prophesied that the organisation would rule ‘until Jesus comes back’. The ANC still proves able to manage internal conflict and tells its own history in a surprisingly unified way (Butler 2012). The project of the ANC was also described as continued ‘regeneration’ of power through internal discipline, state control and the phenomenon of a convergence of protest and voting for the party (Booysen 2011). The cohabitation of diverse political and ideological streams within the ANC has also historically secured its integrity (Turok 2010).
Once South Africa's hopeful saviour in the struggle against apartheid, the ANC has become the main problem in the country's political equation. For almost 20 years, politics in South Africa has been dictated by the internal dynamics of this movement–party, which holds a quasi-monopoly on state institutions and whose own political pulse seems to have become a self-perpetuating cycle and a never-ending power struggle for the top positions. This paper provides an overview of the main steps leading to the current situation. It documents faction-fighting and argues that the left of the movement has paradoxically never been so firmly in control of the ANC since the early 1990s, while the party appears ever more detached from – and even hostile to – ongoing protests against social injustices.
Marginalising the left
When the ANC and the SACP came back from exile in 1990, not only was their political leadership contested within South Africa, but their organisational capacity on the domestic front could not compare with that of the civic organisations (United Democratic Front) or the unions gathered under the umbrella of the COSATU federation. The forming of the Tripartite Alliance proved decisive for them to gain a militant base. A complex network of alliances at the time involved exiles, Robben Islanders and ‘inziles’ (Lodge 1999; Séverin and Aycard 2006) and the conflicting ambitions of rising ANC politicians were partly managed by Nelson Mandela and other historic leaders during the political transition. Yet, following the assassination of SACP general secretary (GS) and Umkhonto we Sizwe chief of staff Chris Hani in 1993, Thabo Mbeki gradually got the better of his last generational rival Cyril Ramaphosa, then ANC secretary general and a stalwart leader in the workers' movement.
In 1997, Mbeki was strategically positioned at the presidency of the ANC and as South Africa's deputy president he just waited for Mandela to step down in 1999. His conquest of power opened up on a decade marked by the personalisation of power, cooptation of loyal lieutenants in strategic positions and a critical reduction of internal debate in party and Alliance structures. During the early 2000s, the ANC was turned into a modern party, funded by business friends, disciplined and dedicated to winning elections. Mbeki's rule also shifted government policies towards neoliberal macroeconomics and contentious foreign or health orientations (Gevisser 2007; Gumede 2005; Pons-Vignon & Segatti in this issue). Privatisations of state assets became the preferred policy aimed at producing a black bourgeoisie and hence fuelling conflicts of interest, corruption and patronage networks (Southall 2004, 2008).
A new alliance unfolds to the left
Mbeki's ascent had also, however, relied on the Alliance before he muzzled it. COSATU GS Sam Shilowa, the federation's president John Gomomo and even Charles Nqakula, GS of the SACP, had initially supported him, and they were rewarded with political positions. Yet rifts quickly emerged between the Mbekites, COSATU and the SACP. The latter two realised they could no longer access power and influence policies. A 2003 union report noted that the federation was going on a general strike every year to denounce government policies. Partners in the Alliance exchanged ‘harsh words’ and COSATU and SACP activists and programmes were labelled ‘ultra-left’ by Mbeki and his entourage. The term was considered a derogatory one by the then GS of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), Gwede Mantashe (NUM 2003). Beyond the denunciation of macro-economic policies, the opposition to Mbeki must also be read, however, in its more immediate political translation: his fierce rejection of the communist faction in the ANC, which he labelled ‘left sectarians’ (Munusamy 2012), barred the political ascent of leaders belonging to the left.
Politically, Zuma himself was never a strong proponent from the left and his ‘credentials as a worker leader were thin’ (Ceruti 2008). However, Mbeki's exclusion and victimisation of leaders from the left turned him into a symbol of resistance. The unions were ready to fight a battle, and major strikes were organised in 2006 and 2007. Tension escalated when Mbeki, who could not constitutionally lead the country for a third term, tried to split the ‘two centres of power’ (the state and the ANC) by retaining control over the party. His main contender Jacob Zuma was forced to resign from his position as South Africa's deputy president following charges of corruption. He regained political momentum after these charges were lifted, and was elected ANC president in Polokwane (2007), before becoming president of the country (2009), thanks to the support of COSATU, the SACP, and other fringes of the ANC such as its Youth League (ANCYL).
Disciplining the youth
The ANC has three leagues, or internal groupings: the Youth League, the Women's League (ANCWL) and the Veterans' League (ANCVL). The Youth League is the most powerful of the three.
While most youth structures in political parties are limited to training new generations of leaders and promoting the decisions taken by their seniors, the ANCYL has always conceived and exerted its role differently. It is regularly torn between its limited constitutional autonomy and its aspirations to influence and gain independence from the party. It regularly claims the legacy of its notorious forebears from the 1940s who took over the ANC in the 1950s. Its post-apartheid leaders include politicians like Peter Mokaba, Malusi Gigaba, Fikile Mbalula and Julius Malema, whose support often proved decisive in winning political battles in the ANC: Mokaba campaigned for Mbeki against Ramaphosa, and Mbalula was the first in the ANC galaxy of the mid 2000s to voice support for Zuma against Mbeki. But the ANCYL was also regularly silenced by its elders when it proved too unruly. Gigaba – now Minister of Public Enterprises – ensured it kept quiet under Mbeki's rule and, more recently, Malema was ousted from the ANC after challenging Zuma's bid for a second term.
Critical to the Youth League's power are its past achievements. Until Zuma defeated Malema, no senior leader in the ANC had successfully campaigned for the movement's top position without the support of its youth wing. The ANCYL is therefore a valuable ally and it lobbies delegates to ANC elective conferences (where it also gets a small quorum of representatives). In 2011 it claimed 366,000 members, which makes it a significant force in the overall ANC, especially since overlapping is common between the two organisations at all levels. The League also relies on a network of ‘graduates’ who hold senior positions in the ANC, in provincial government or in Parliament. Last, but not least, it has its own financial resources and was once funded by controversial tycoon Brett Kebble as well as through its own investment vehicle, Lembede Investment Holdings, which closed in 2009 after it was found to have evaded millions of rand in taxes (Botiveau 2007; Forde 2011; Glaser 2012).
Under Gigaba, the organisation mainly addressed issues such as gender, health and sports. Under Mbalula it was focused on succession in the ANC. Malema resolutely placed the emphasis on economic transformation. ANCYL National Congress resolutions in 2001 (21st Congress), 2004 (22nd Congress) and 2008 (23rd Congress) show this shift. In 2001 and 2004, economic resolutions remained marginal and vague, and they conformed to ANC positions. In 2008, however, the emphasis was on ‘economic transformation’ and the ANCYL stated its intention to put the Freedom Charter back on the agenda. That was when the first call to nationalise mineral resources was launched, unnoticed at the time because all the attention was still on the Mbeki vs Zuma feud (ANCYL 2001, 2004, 2008). 2008 was the beginning of Malema's reign over the ANCYL. A millionaire, Malema portrayed himself as an ‘economic freedom fighter’ re-enacting the history of the ANC in the 1940s with a mission to radicalise the movement. After numerous attempts to channel his political energy within, the ANC disciplined and expelled him and his close allies in 2012. The disciplinary committee headed by Cyril Ramaphosa found him guilty of portraying the ANC, government and Zuma in a ‘negative light’ and of calling for a regime change in Botswana. On the eve of the ANC 2012 National Conference the youth faction was silenced and its leadership, which partly remained loyal to Malema, was disbanded soon after Zuma's re-election.
A triumphant SACP
The years of exile were the golden age of SACP influence in the ANC (Ellis and Sechaba 1992). In 1985, 21 out of the 35 members of the ANC's National Executive Committee (NEC) belonged to the party. The SACP also recruited key trade unionists in the late 1980s (Lodge 1992). Its influence, however, was never uncontested and the diplomatic initiatives of the ANC were often led by non-communists or by SACP leaders who, like Mbeki and almost half of its Central Committee members, would soon allow their membership to lapse (Williams 2008). Once back in South Africa, the SACP could no longer rival the ANC whether financially or in numbers (it only had 25,000 members in 1992 in comparison with the ANC's 750,000). After the political settlement, the SACP shortly lost influence in the ANC and it only started to regain ground following Zuma's victory in 2007. Figure 1 shows how intertwined SACP, COSATU, ANC and government leaders now are. The party has six prominent representatives in Cabinet and it holds the pivotal position of ANC secretary general through Gwede Mantashe.
Mantashe's influence, combined with that of Blade Nzimande, marks the domination of the party by its own statist faction, which believes communists should be deployed to government in order to directly influence policy making. These leaders are also very intolerant of discordant views – especially if they filter through the media – and they promptly label anyone opposed to them as ‘counter-revolutionary’. Mantashe, who used to lead the NUM and was the national chairperson of the SACP, made sure that Frans Baleni, whom he coopted as GS of the mineworkers' union, and its president Senzeni Zokwana held leadership positions in the SACP. Only two other leaders of COSATU's 20 affiliates, Fikile Majola (GS of the National Education Health & Allied Workers' Union, NEHAWU, close to Baleni) and Fezela Liliwe (vice president for Sports, Arts and Culture of the South African Democratic Teachers Union, SADTU), also belong to the SACP's Central Committee. Before the party's 2012 congress, divisions were rife on whether Nzimande should remain its GS while staying in Cabinet. He eventually did so thanks to the creation of a second position of deputy GS, which practically secures his control of the party without the administrative duties attached to the task (Molefe 2012). What lies beneath the direct participation of the left in government is in fact an old dilemma, particularly strong in the union movement, regarding political involvement. It has historically been embodied in COSATU by the diverging views of the NUM – favourable to direct political participation – and the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) – which favours a workerist approach focused on the shop floor (Baskin 1991; Thomas 2007).
COSATU: a permanent split
While the SACP and COSATU's support of Zuma's bid for a second mandate went very well for the party's statist faction, the tripartite relationship has increasingly turned into a political impasse for the federation. Zuma was supported in the first place against Mbeki. After his victory, the left started to regain influence and was rewarded with ANC and government positions, which Zwelinzima Vavi, GS of COSATU, and other union leaders (e.g., NUMSA's general secretary Irvin Jim) have consistently declined. Others such as Thulas Nxesi, former GS of SADTU and now the Minister of Public Works, accepted. But public policies remained relatively unchanged and the New Growth Path (2010) did not address key determining features of the post-apartheid economy (Fine 2012). The second phase of South Africa's transition, ‘which should concentrate in particular on a radical shift in economic policies’ was still being ‘called for’ in 2012 … (COSATU 2012). However, faced with the possibility of seeing an anti-left faction take control of the ANC, the status quo remained COSATU's preferred option despite the contortions involved. Recently for instance, amid scandalous allegations that public money was used to fund Zuma's seigneurial residential complex in Nkandla, and while the president was being covered by Nxesi and Jeremy Cronin, COSATU issued a press release expressing its shock at the fact that no less than R206 million in public money had been invested in the project, some of it to allegedly enhance security (COSATU 2013).
The federation is of course not monolithic and Vavi, a supporter of COSATU's independence, remains the principal critic of corruption. COSATU recently voiced – especially via NUMSA – its opposition to the National Development Plan adopted by the ANC in Mangaung against the federation's will. Inspired by the Brazilian experience it also backs the creation of a national minimum wage. Moreover, Vavi declined nomination to the ANC NEC and lobbied against Nzimande staying in government. In the run-up to Mangaung, Vavi was perceived to be backing a change of leadership in favour of Zuma's deputy Kgalema Motlanthe and is now under attack again (Matshiqi 2013), just like in 2010, when the ANC tried to discipline him after he publicly denounced corrupt ministers. Vavi had been expected to step down in 2012 and Mantashe had plans to get him replaced with his protégé Baleni, but this did not happen. The federation is now deeply divided between its pro-Zuma president Sidumo Dlamini, and a more independent Vavi who can count on the leaders of NUMSA (Matlala 2011), which leaves him with a relevant support base in the federation, especially since the pro-Dlamini NUM is undergoing a crisis and recently lost representation at major platinum mines (Figure 2). Note that NUMSA has now become COSATU's leading affiliate after the NUM lost several thousand members following the Lonmin-Marikana strike in 2012.
COSATU's main affiliates.
Source: COSATU 11th Congress Secretariat Report, 2012. Note that the NUM membership figure was updated since it showed considerable variation: Baleni (2013).
From Marikana to Mangaung
A mutual dependency prevails between a divided left of the ANC and Zuma, who de facto leads it along with Mantashe. In the 2012 conference the left decided to side with Zuma rather than expose its divisions. Motlanthe featured as a reluctant contender who had lost before the fight even began. Other ambitious leaders, such as Minister of Human Settlements Tokyo Sexwale, identified with the business faction of the ANC and did not really enter the fray, but many now have their eyes on the 2017 ANC conference, a sign that both the party and the Tripartite Alliance remain focused on internal factional games. Recent reports, for instance, alleged that Ramaphosa, a unionist turned businessman who was elected ANC deputy president in December 2012, could not be Zuma's choice for the deputy president of South Africa after the 2014 general elections. Zuma, who fears future corruption investigations, is unlikely to trust Ramaphosa to secure his political retreat after his – still hypothetical – second presidential mandate. Controlling the state has thus seemingly become an end in itself for factions in the ANC and, ultimately, in the Tripartite Alliance. Yet what if the ANC did not secure an absolute majority in the 2014 elections and had to share power with opposition forces?
This is, in today's South Africa, a pure political fiction, but failing to take it into account could prove suicidal for the ANC and its allies. Some saw the recent rejection of the NUM by striking mineworkers as a harbinger of political decline for the ANC. The NUM was on its way to achieving a quasi-monopoly in mineworkers' representation and it was eliminating competing unions in the sector one after the other. The NUM is also a key block in the national architecture of the ANC because it is/was COSATU's main affiliate and provided top cadres to the party. Such an analogy between the apparent decline of the NUM and the potential demise of the ANC is hypothetical, be it only because mineworkers who brought South Africa's mines to a standstill in 2012 first struck against their companies in demand of a decent living wage. They did not directly target the government's economic policy. The shooting of 34 striking mineworkers by the police on 16 August 2012 is a major landmark in post-apartheid South Africa. If no one can anticipate its medium- and long-term political effects, it already marks an escalation in the resort to violence in order to solve political and social conflicts (Von Holdt in this issue). More critical to the ANC-affiliated union movement and to the ANC itself is the fact that other COSATU affiliates recently experienced defections and are losing members: a majority of the South African Municipal Workers’ Union's members (SAMWU) refused to strike in 2011; the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU) experienced a schism; and the Food and Allied Workers' Union (FAWU) was overtaken by strikers during the recent strikes in the farming areas of the Western Cape (Marrian 2013).
Recent strikes once again showed a growing divide between workers and their representatives (Buhlungu and Tshoaedi 2012). Anti-mineworkers' comments by SACP and NUM general secretaries show, beyond the strategic divergences they may have with the strikers, a contempt worthy of the Stalin era for workers at war with capitalist mine owners. Nzimande described the strike action as ‘criminality’ (Marrian 2012) since it happened outside the labour law framework, while Baleni portrayed the strikers as uneducated outlaws misled by ‘dark forces’. Insisting on the need to develop ‘class consciousness’, Baleni even stated: ‘an unconscious member is as dangerous as an enemy’ (Baleni 2012).
In addition to such controversial comments, the lack of political will to decisively alter the post-apartheid socio-economic balance of forces through ambitious and renewed public policies is all the more paradoxical, given that the left – the SACP claims 160,000 members, its highest membership ever – is strategically positioned in the ANC and the South African government. But with an ANC led by Zuma, his business friends and communist allies, and focused on internal politics on one hand, and divided unions stuck in their political alliance (despite the growing cost incurred) on the other, South Africa is politically blocked, despite urgent socio-economic issues calling for reform.