Introduction
On 11 February 2011, after 18 days of mass protests across the country, Egyptian citizens brought down the government of Hosni Mubarak which had ruled the country for 30 long years. The uprising that began on 25 January 2011 rejected torture, poverty, corruption and unemployment. An unprecedented event in the history of Egypt, the revolt brought to the streets millions of people from all walks of life, to make political, economic and social demands. Indeed, the revolt marked the end of a long period of public fear from an authoritarian regime and its police.
Since Mubarak's downfall, Egyptians have witnessed the formation of new political parties, a federation of independent trade unionists, and a coalition of political and social groups hoping to influence post-revolution Egypt. All of these are positive developments that can contribute towards the building of democracy. The desire of Egyptian citizens to participate in the political life of their society was reflected in the high turnout of voters for the constitutional referendum. The referendum held on 19 March found 77.2 % of the 18 million voters in support of the proposed changes. Nonetheless, challenges still remain for Egyptian workers and protestors. The military has openly refused to undertake any radical reforms. Workers have been asked to go back to work, and strikes and public protests have been made illegal. Struggles by workers, students, women, peasants and other social groups continue across the country despite military orders criminalising protests.
For researchers of the Middle East, the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions and the ongoing mass uprisings against the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East and North Africa have posed an important challenge to the way scholars have explained the dynamics of change in these societies. Indeed, the fact that few scholars predicted these events has exposed the limits of theories that explained the resilience of autocratic rulers. How do we understand the balance of social forces in Egypt? How strong is the opposition of the workers, peasants, students and citizens? What possible scenarios might emerge in the coming months? In order to understand the full meaning of the revolution, there is a need to provide some historical context. The revolution is a product of decades of neoliberal economic policies that were carried out with the use of political repression by the state security forces. The social polarisation created by Mubarak's economic, political and social policies resulted in the breakdown of his regime and the opening of space for possible democratic change in the coming years. In this paper, I provide a background for the rise of social movements and the outbreak of protests that have occurred in recent times. Next, I outline the protestors' main demands and compare them with the demands of the workers' movement that has been emerging in recent years. Third, I explain the political, economic and social factors – especially the changing balance of social power under Hosni Mubarak – that galvanised Egyptian citizens and brought them to the streets in their millions. Finally, I discuss two possible scenarios coming out of the current struggles and what these would mean for Egyptian politics.
The lead-up to the uprising of 25 January 2011
The uprising took not only Western powers and media outlets by surprise but also the Egyptian elite (Sharrock et al. 2011). Even academic experts could not have predicted the timing of this uprising given the way the regime had suppressed protests and strikes in the past few decades (Brown, N. 2011). A coordinated national effort to oppose the regime of Mubarak and then bring it down after only 18 days was indeed unimaginable. Just days prior to the unrest, the Egyptian elite rejected any possibility of a Tunisian style uprising in Egypt (Ramadan and Daoud 2011). Nonetheless, they introduced precautionary economic and social aid packages for urban and rural areas (Ezzat 2011, El-Fiqi 2011).
The uprising was the result of a build-up of many years of strikes and protests in various parts of Egypt. There were clear signs that there was a potential for a mass uprising, although no one was sure when such a mobilisation would take place. Warning signs of a social upheaval were everywhere. In a special report in the July 2010 issue of The Economist, Max Rodenbeck drew parallels between the 1952 revolutionary moment and that of 2010 arguing that both periods shared rising social tensions and a huge wealth gap where the benefits of economic reforms had flowed to ‘a cosmopolitan elite that was out of tune with the street’ (Rodenbeck 2010, p. 4). The polarisation of wealth was also displayed in the organisation of living space as the rich were shielded in their gated communities outside of crowded cities and the poor continued to live in dilapidated buildings and slums (Joya 2008, Mitchell 2002, p. 274, Altorki and Cole 1998, pp. 191–195). As recently as January 2011, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) warned that rising food prices, high levels of unemployment and the uprising in Tunisia would mean that the Egyptian state would have to increase subsidies and social welfare in order to maintain social stability (Wahish 2011).
Michaele Browers traced the rise of the current protest movement in Egypt to 2000 during the second Palestinian Intifada (Browers 2009). Following this, in 2002, the Cairo Conference was convened in an effort to organise various social groups who shared two main stances: anti-war and anti-neoliberalism. The Kifaya – the Egyptian Movement for Change – then formed in 2004. Its followers and supporters ranged from leftists to nationalists as well as moderate members of the Muslim Brotherhood (Browers 2009, p. 113, El-Mahdi 2009, pp. 91–92). The Kifaya movement opposed Hosni Mubarak's rule and the succession of his son, Gamal Mubarak. Given the diversity of its membership, the Kifaya group felt it could not press ahead with any economic demands as these tended to divide its supporters and followers; instead it focused on political demands (Browers 2009, p. 127).
Since 2004, a whole host of other social protest groups have emerged in Egypt including Students for Change, Youth for Change, University Professors for Change, Workers for Change, Artists for Change, and the People's Campaign for Change. The intellectual brain behind the People's Campaign for Change was Tariq Al-Bishri who outlined his demands in a 2004 letter titled ‘I call upon you to disobey’. Al-Bishri was appointed the head of the Constitutional Reform Committee on 15 February 2011. Protests against Mubarak continued in 2005 and after. Indeed on 21 February 2005, the Kifaya group staged a massive anti-Mubarak protest at Tahrir Square. Since then, demands for political reforms continued as both Kifaya and the Muslim Brotherhood remained excluded from the political process (Browers 2009, p. 114, see also El-Mahdi 2009, pp. 89–90).
Further demands for constitutional reforms were put forward in June 2005 by a group of Egyptian intellectuals who formed the National Assembly for Democratic Transition. After the presidential elections of September 2005, protests for political reforms peaked after the Judges Club refused to endorse the results of the elections (Browers 2009, p. 117, Human Rights Watch 2010). The most notable alliance of social groupings that transcended the religious-secular divide in this period was that of the Revolutionary Socialists and moderate members of the Muslim Brotherhood who intended to form a mass movement against the state (Browers 2009, p. 126). Another notable umbrella group, the United National Front for Change, was formed in October 2005 by political groups and parties that included Kifaya, Karama, al-Wasat al-Gadid (1996–2006) and the Muslim Brotherhood. Further protests by activists, lawyers and journalists who represented all parties in support of judicial independence, an end to Mubarak's rule and the Emergency Law continued in 2006 (Browers 2009, pp. 109–110). There has been a tremendous degree of dialogue among various social and political groups in Egypt which provides the backdrop for the united front observed in Tahrir Square (Amar 2011a).
The protests were organised mainly by the 6th April Youth Group (named after the labour strikes in Mahalla of 6 April 2008) and the ‘We Are All Khaled Said’ Facebook group as well as other groups and parties including the Wafd, the Nasserist Party, the Tagammu Party, Al-Ghad Party (Kifaya) and a broad association called the National Association for Change (NAC) led by Mohamed ElBaradei. The Muslim Brotherhood kept its distance from the protestors, although its members participated in the revolts (Dreyfuss 2011). Other groups behind the uprising included the Popular Democratic Movement for Change (HASHD), the Justice and Freedom Youth Movement, and the Revolutionary Socialists. The protesters came from all walks of life, including workers, students, lawyers, teachers, bankers, activists for human rights, unemployed youth as well as thousands of Bedouins. The protests gained momentum and culminated in the March of Millions on 28 January 2011. The protests, although concentrated in Egypt's main urban centres of Cairo and Alexandria, were spread out across the country. Violent clashes between workers and protestors and the police occurred in Suez, Ismailia, Luxor, Aswan, and Wadi al-Gedid in Upper Egypt (El Wakil and Sarant 2011, Al Masry Al Youm 2011d ).
The 25 January protesters can be characterised broadly as two groups based on their demands: political reforms and economic reforms. The latter were pursued mainly by workers while the former were demanded by a wide range of social groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, leftists, nationalists as well as journalists, judges and youth groups. Political demands have focused on constitutional reform, the end of Mubarak's rule and opposition to Gamal Mubarak's succession. They also demanded an end to police repression and specifically an end to arbitrary arrests that were facilitated by the emergency law enacted in 1981 (Shahhat 2001, pp. 24–25, The Human Rights Center for Assistance of Prisoners 2003, Rodenbeck 2010, p. 13).
Workers have demanded economic and social rights since at least 1998. Through a wave of strikes, protests and factory occupations, workers have demanded better wages, lower food prices, affordable housing, the right to adequate health care and a better educational system (Essam El-Din 2010a, 2010b, Beinin 2011, Ajl 2011). These demands gained momentum as Egyptians felt the effects of neoliberal budget cuts in various aspects of social and economic life. The persistence of the workers' struggle has encouraged other Egyptians to take to the streets and demand their rights (Charbel 2011b).
The socioeconomic and political background
The revolution was a response to many years of neoliberal policies that radically transformed Egyptian society by transferring social power to the hands of an elite while disempowering workers and dispossessing the peasantry. Neoliberal policies followed a period of deep economic crisis in the 1980s characterised by declining oil revenues, reduced earnings from the Suez Canal and a shrinking level of remittances sent back by Egyptian migrant workers. All of these factors led to an expansion of foreign and public debt and an increasing fiscal strain on the state.
In 1990 Egypt received debt relief from Western powers in return for its support for the Iraq war. The relief was arranged by the IMF and with the intention of enabling Egypt to repay the remainder of its foreign debt by restructuring its economy according to free market principles. As stipulated by the Post-Washington Consensus the role of government is to provide suitable conditions for the smooth functioning of the free market, including the encouragement and facilitation of the private sector through liberalising the economy and privatising state owned enterprises (Joya 2010, p. 226). In 1991 Egypt implemented a major Economic Restructuring and Adjustment Program (ERSAP) which entailed the privatisation of public sector enterprises, the liberalisation of trade and prices, the introduction of flexible labour legislation and the removal of progressive social policies (Farah 2009, p. 42, Ikram 2006, p. 61, Momani 2005, Ayubi 1995, p. 346). The privatisation of state enterprises transferred public resources into the hands of a new economic elite. This new elite found allies within the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and Mubarak's son, Gamal. The two decades of liberalisation increased collusion between businessmen and bureaucrats, increased the role of businessmen in policy making and turned the state into an active promoter of business interests. Increasingly, businessmen took charge of policy circles as the number of businessmen elected to Egypt's parliament increased from 8 in 1995 to 150 by 2005 elections. Under Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif (2005–2011), six of the important portfolios in the cabinet were held by six of the big businessmen in the country: trade and industry, housing, transportation, health, agriculture and social welfare (Farah 2009, pp. 48–49). As Salwa Ismail has recently pointed out, in a country of almost ninety million ‘Only a thousand families count in a country that Mubarak and his cronies regard as their fiefdom’ (Ismail 2011). Western-trained economists and businessmen who determined Egypt's economic policies were well versed in the rules of global capital accumulation and knew how to manipulate those rules to their own advantage. These included Rasheed Ahmed Rasheed, Minister of Foreign Trade and Industry (2004–2011) who controlled Egypt's main food brand ‘Fine Foods’, and engaged in public–private joint ventures; Youssef Boutros Ghali, a senior economist with the International Monetary Fund before becoming Egypt's Minister of Finance (2004–2011); Mohie-Eddin, Minister of Investment and Ahmed Nazif, Prime Minister (Menza 2005).
Economic liberalisation benefited foreign and domestic investors as investor-friendly laws were passed. The Ministry of Investments created in July 2004 was assigned the task of speeding up the privatisation process. This was not difficult to achieve as the tax structure facilitated the prospects of bankruptcy amongst public sector firms. Law 91 of 2005 cut personal and corporate income taxes by 50% while imposing a 20% flat tax on both. The public sector, however, was subjected to a higher 40% tax rate. As more public sector firms faced crisis, the pace of privatisation picked up. Between July 2004 and March 2006, the Ministry of Investments sold 80 public sector companies (Farah 2009, pp. 49–50). A further positive gesture towards investors was the passing of Investment Law No. 8, which exempted investors from state regulations, offered five to ten years of tax holidays and complete foreign ownership of local projects. Other incentives included permanent exemption from taxes, duties and customs in free zones, to activities ranging from land reclamation in the desert, industry and mining, air transportation and tourism (Momani 2005, pp. 68–71).
The political outcome of economic liberalisation was a strengthening of ties between the NDP and the landlords and businessmen who had acquired monopoly control of important sectors of the economy (iron, steel, cement, telecommunications, food and beverages) (Farah 2009, p. 81). Rather than relying on economic competitiveness, investing in research and development and involving the population in the economy, the wealth and power of these ‘crony capitalists’ was the product of the state sponsored appropriation of public resources facilitated by the IMF-led privatisation programme.1 As Farah (2009, p. 50) pointed out, privatisation of public sector firms was ‘in essence subsidising the private sector at the expense of the nation as a whole.’
A prominent example of crony capitalism who also symbolised corruption and embezzlement under Mubarak was Ahmed Ezz. Ezz monopolised the steel industry, controlling two-thirds of the steel market and thus determined the price of an important construction material. His control over the market was directly linked to his political power within the ruling NDP as he was a close friend of Gamal Mubarak and played an important role in the budget committee and in the Egyptian parliament. As a symbol of the corrupt politician-cum-businessman that the Mubarak regime had fostered, it was no surprise that the protestors set his house on fire during the protests. Thus, what was projected as a competitiveness drive by the Egyptian business community masked deep-seated corruption and cronyism by redefining the embezzlement of public resources as entrepreneurial initiative. This marked the beginning of a new form of patronage that was masked in the language of the free market.
Despite the neoliberal discourse of a reduced role for the state and a bigger role for the private sector, in reality the privatisation process led to the emergence of industrial and rural elites who were dependent on the state for access to public resources and services (Farah 2009, p. 80). This process was actively organised through partnerships between bureaucratic elites (e.g. Gamal Mubarak who controlled the Policy Unit) and the new industrial and rural elites.2 Embezzlement of public resources reached new heights under the neoliberal cabinet of Ahmed Nazif. Loans provided by state banks were used by the private sector to acquire state enterprises, often backed by false guarantees. Investors continued to keep ownership of state companies even after they defaulted on their loans (Farah 2009, p. 81).
The military
The Egyptian military is the second dominant group that plays an important role in the economy. Under Hosni Mubarak, military men have been appointed as provincial governors, village headmen and heads of state companies or other important bureaucratic posts (Rodenbeck 2010). These appointments in turn provided guarantees for Mubarak's regime and his ruling party to secure electoral outcomes during his thirty-year rule. According to a WikiLeaks cable from 2008, the Egyptian state has granted the military ownership of vast tracts of land in the Nile Delta and the Red Sea Coast in exchange for loyalty (The Guardian 2011). Law 143/1981 extended the power of the Ministry of Defence over state property and its development for ‘strategic use’ (Cole and Altorki 1998). Over the past three decades, the military has engaged in land expropriations in various provinces, the most recent case being that of the northwest coast (Cole and Altorki 1998, pp. 201–202).
Through its factories and companies, the military plays an extensive role in the economy. It is involved in manufacturing, agriculture, construction, consumer industries, hotel and gasoline industries (Mitchell 2002, p. 241). Since Nasser's time, the military has played an important role in the construction of infrastructure and public housing projects and this role expanded to include land development projects for tourism under Sadat and Mubarak (Abu Lughod 1971, p. 234). In the construction sector, the Ministry of Defence continued to build its own military cities around Cairo and by 1986 these numbered 13, each with a population of 150,000 to 250,000 (Mitchell 2002, pp. 241–42). Indeed, the largest builder of the city of Cairo is the Ministry of Defence. The military also engaged in coastal resort development and tourist services, as a result of which it has been identified as a class of its own by Robert Springborg (cited in Mitchell 2002, pp. 241–242). For a long time the military has benefited from keeping its business dealings secret, not paying taxes, and having access to a secure and controlled labour market mainly constituted of conscripted labourers (Kirkpatrick 2011). The military's assets, comprising land, factories and hotel businesses amount to millions of Egyptian pounds, yet there is no disclosure of their revenue and therefore no accountability (Droz-Vincent 2009, p. 225). Paul Amar writes that these patronage policies of the state have shaped the military:
into an incredibly organised interest group of nationalist businessmen. They are attracted to foreign investment; but their loyalties are economically and symbolically embedded in national territory. … And it seems that the military, now as ‘national capitalists,’ have seen themselves as the blood rivals of the neoliberal ‘crony capitalists’ associated with Hosni Mubarak's son Gamal who have privatized anything they can get their hands on and sold the country's assets off to China, the US, and Persian Gulf capital (Amar 2011a).
Contestation by workers and peasants
Economic liberalisation had an adverse impact on workers and peasants. Overall, the process of economic restructuring introduced a trend towards flexible labour laws, mergers and monopolies. While investment in the public sector shrunk, the private sector did not step in to fill this gap and thus the Egyptian economy and society relies on a deteriorating infrastructure and declining services (Ikram 2006, p. 74, Mitchell 2002, p. 277). Employment growth slowed down as public investment in employment creation was cut down under pressure from the ERSAP (Farah 2009, p. 44). As state enterprises were privatised, massive layoffs followed. In the decade of 1993–2003, 197 public enterprises were privatised and their workforce were either laid off or forced to retire (Farah 2009, p. 45, Beinin 2009, p. 76). Workers, who defended their jobs, were faced with violence by the state. For instance, in September of 1994, 7000 workers from Kafr al-Dawwar Spinning and Weaving Company were locked out because of their strike action. On 2 October, state security forces used live ammunition against the striking workers, killing four and injuring 120. Ninety people were arrested. Farah highlights the rapid pace of job losses as public sector firms were privatised: ‘Major strikes took place at the Misr Helwan Spinning and Weaving factory in 1998. The entire workforce of 8,700 was given three weeks’ leave, but only 2,800 workers were allowed to return' (Farah 2009, p. 46).
Under these conditions of jobs loss, the prices of basic commodities and staples skyrocketed, rents were liberalised and wages either remained stagnant or lost most of their value due to inflation (Wallis 2006). Furthermore, in July 2006, the government increased the prices of transportation, electricity, and communication, placing further pressure on workers' limited incomes (Farah 2009, p. 51). Workers who had experienced extensive benefits from the Nasserist period were witnessing a withering away of those benefits under neoliberal reforms. Under Nasser, workers' benefits ranged from extensive labour rights such as high wages, public pensions, sick leave, child bonuses, fixed rents and price controls of basic commodities. Whether these policies were sustainable or not, what is important is that the urban population of Egypt had experienced such citizenship rights (Posusney 1993, p. 88). The abandonment of workers' rights under Mubarak was seen as a violation of the gains made after the 1952 revolution.
Workers who have been striking for years have demanded living wages so that they can afford the rising cost of food, housing, and health care. The year 2010 witnessed massive protests by workers who demanded an increase in the monthly minimum wage from $100 to $240 (Ismail 2011, Rodenbeck 2010, p. 13). The scale and number of strikes and protests increased over the past decade after the Egyptian government implemented a series of neoliberal economic reforms (Beinin 2009, pp. 77–79). The last two years (2008–2010) witnessed a radical increase in the number of demonstrations, protests, sit-ins and strikes with estimations of around 300 actions by the Land Center for Human Rights.3
Rural Egyptians had benefited from secure tenure and fixed rents as well as a popular programme of land redistribution under Nasser's rule. Under Mubarak's neoliberal economic policies, 1.3 million peasants (or 6 million individuals including families of the peasants) became landless as rural land was privatised and turned into large estates. Land Law 96 of 1992 liberalised the agriculture sector by removing tenancy protection and allowing the free market to determine rents (Farah 2009, p. 46). King captured the intentions of the Egyptian government behind the agricultural reforms facilitated by Law 96:
The Egyptian government chose winners and losers in this instance, weakly backed by claims of increasing productivity. By formulating Egypt's agricultural crisis as a crisis of ownership rather than access, security of property rights for owners rather than security of rights for tenants and employment opportunities for the landless and near landless, law 96 accelerated rural social differentiation, marginalized female-headed households, and promoted a return to indentured child and adult labour. (King 2009, p. 119)
The state carried out violent rural dispossession. Hundreds of Egyptian citizens who defended their rights to land were murdered, thousands were injured and many thousands were incarcerated (Bush 2009, p. 61–62, Saad 2002, pp. 107–108, The Land Center for Human Rights 1999). As Prosterman has noted, peasants with secure tenure rights were transformed into landless sharecroppers or migrant labourers. Power relations in rural Egypt resembled the period prior to 1952 as landlords had regained the power to evict tenants at their pleasure, while tenants were subjected to short-term contracts, and rent levels were decided at the will of the landlord. Land prices were liberalised, making it impossible for peasants to purchase land. By the end of the 1990s, average land rents had reached 22 times the land tax, causing many tenants to become indebted or to lose their land (Prosterman 2011, Bush 2002).
The outcome was a rural population that resented the government and its local representatives in various governorates. With the loss of livelihood, rural populations were ready to fight back. King has pointed out that despite sporadic protests, the peasantry were faced with severe challenges to self-organisation, because under Mubarak the formation of independent unions in rural Egypt were banned (King 2009, p. 100). Rural Egyptians expressed their anger against tourists, which resulted in attacks on tourists on numerous occasions. The government, often keeping a Western audience in mind, painted these attacks as being perpetrated by Islamists as opposed to the dispossessed expressing their anger at the Egyptian government. As recently as February 2011, there was evidence of the expropriation of farmland by the government in Luxor (El Wakil and Sarant 2011). Since its implementation in 1991, ERSAP has gone hand in hand with repression in rural and urban Egypt, and indeed, these policies could not have been implemented had the regime been more democratic.
After more than two decades of neoliberalism, Egyptian society has become more unequal in terms of social power and wealth while levels of social conflict have increased every year along with a rise in the cost of living (rent, health care, education and food), a stagnation of wages and a rise in unemployment. Levels of poverty have intensified as a result of the mass privatisation of state enterprises and declining levels of subsidies for basic commodities. According to M. Riad El Ghonemy, the number of poor increased from 27.8 million in 1996 to 32.7 million in 2000 (El Ghonemy 2003, p. 5). At the beginning of 2011, 40% of Egypt's population lived below the poverty line of less than US$2 a day, with unofficial unemployment levels reaching as high as 25% (Rodenbeck 2011). The 25 January uprising was thus the culmination of years of frustration by Egyptian workers and citizens who experienced economic austerity coupled with police brutality (Amar 2011b).
Possible outcomes of the uprising and the implications for neoliberalism
Some analyses of the revolution have already considered it to be a failure. For instance, Western powers, including the US, have expressed concern about the possibility of the post-revolutionary electoral success of the Muslim Brotherhood, which they consider to be linked to al-Qaida, thereby endangering US strategic and economic interests in the region (Escobar 2011). However, neither the Americans nor European leaders expressed any support for the radical reforms that would resonate with the legitimate grievances of the Egyptian protestors. Instead they called for a transition that would maintain stability and peace in the region and in Egypt. Similarly, Robert Springborg, in his piece in Foreign Policy wrote that the military dominance of the Egyptian state after Mubarak leaves no room for democratic alternatives (Springborg 2011). Samir Amin argued that given the absence of strong workers' and peasants' organisations, it is very likely that Egypt might witness an alliance between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood (Amin 2011).
The threat of an Islamist turn in Egypt is not a serious one, but rather an implausible one that reflects the bias of the West which sees the region as a hub of Islamist activity. In reality, the Egyptian military, which receives annual military aid from the US, will not allow an Islamic shift in Egyptian society given its regional interests and close ties with the US. This is reflected in the fact that the Armed Forces Supreme Council announced a ban on religious parties on 28 March (Al Masry Al Youm 2011h). The military has assured Israel and the US that it will respect all past international treaties signed by Egypt (Egypt State Information Service 2011).
The Muslim Brotherhood, in a more democratic political environment, would have to adapt itself to increasing ideological competition as new political parties enter the political scene (Stein 2011, El-Hennawy 2011b). Mona Makram-Ebied suggests that the Brotherhood might evolve along the same lines as Europe's Christian Democratic parties (British Broadcasting Corporation 2011a). The Muslim Brotherhood has always been a proponent of the free market and therefore will not obstruct the current transitional government or a future government so long as its members are allowed to participate freely in the government. The Brotherhood has announced that it will form a political party – the Freedom and Justice Party – modelled after the Turkish Islamic Justice and Development Party. In the past two decades, businessmen linked to the Brotherhood have become integrated into the economy and will have a stake in any future government that allows it political and economic space.5
A recent positive development has been the re-emergence of the al-Wasat al-Gadida Party which existed as an illegal party from 1996 until 2006. The party is the alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood and is constituted by the more moderate members of the group. Their membership includes both Muslims and Christians and their vision of Egyptian society is an inclusive one, as opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood's main group. Their leader, Abou Elela Mady, recently stated the organisation's position as follows: ‘We want freedom for Islamists and secular people, for believers and atheists, for men and women, for Muslims and Christians, for women who wear the headscarf and those who don't’ (Reuters 2011b).
Given the unlikeliness of an Islamist takeover of the Egyptian state, I would suggest two possible scenarios that might come out of the current revolution. First, there is a potential for some form of corporatist rule where the military will continue to play an important role in the economy, but will at the same time purge the state and economy of corrupt businessmen and corrupt practices. A second scenario would be a radical transformation of economic and political arrangements and a larger role for workers and peasants in society. The second scenario would depend on a highly organised and sustained demand for change by social groups.
First scenario: the military's new role in post-revolutionary Egypt
Given the military's obsession with stability and order and given its important role in the transitional government, it seems likely that we will see a slowing down of the pace of neoliberal reform, if not an outright retrenchment of neoliberalism altogether. The fate of neoliberalism in Egypt depends as much on the military rulers' openness to protestors' demands as it depends on the mobilisation of the workers. According to a WikiLeaks cable from 2008, the Egyptian military is a ‘force that generally stifles free market reform’ (The Guardian 2011). In other instances, military leaders have been portrayed as ‘old and resistant to change’ which is also seen as contributing to the military's negative attitude towards free market reforms (Kirkpatrick 2011, Borger et al. 2011). In reality, it is not so much their opposition to the free market, but rather what they perceived to be the negative results of Egypt's emerging ‘crony capitalism’ that has shaped the military's attitude towards neoliberalism. The military believes that neoliberalism has bred corruption and has destabilised Egypt by intensifying poverty and social conflict. They have expressed their distrust of and disagreement with the ministers around Gamal Mubarak (Osman 2011a).
In the coming months, the military will continue to play an important role in redirecting the economy. It had previously intervened to put a halt to free market reform after the bread riots of 1977 under Sadat. More recently, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, the Minister of Defence and Military Production and currently the head of the Council of Officers ruling Egypt, has strongly advocated government control of prices and production given the high levels of poverty and unemployment that brought millions to the streets of Egypt (Kirkpatrick 2011). It is possible that the military would curtail the role of crony capitalists in the economy. With the downfall of Hosni Mubarak, many past ministers in crucial posts of the government have been either arrested or are under investigation while their assets have been frozen (Osman 2011a, The Guardian 2011).
Twenty-eight businessmen have been accused of the illegal acquisition of state lands and the unauthorised conversion of desert farmland into tourist resorts in the West Delta region. Thousands of acres of land across Egypt fall under these cases (Al Masry Al Youm 2011b, Reuters 2011c). The military is also investigating the personal profits gained from the sale of state enterprises by Egyptian politicians and businessmen of the Mubarak era. Egypt's Illicit Gains Authority (IGA) has requested that the accumulated wealth of Hosni Mubarak and his family as well as the following ministers be investigated: Ahmed Ezz, the steel tycoon, former Tourism Minister Zuhair Garana, former Housing Minister Ahmed el-Maghrabi, Minister of Agriculture, Amin Abaza, Local Development Minister Othman Mohamed Othman, former Interior Minister Habib el-Adli, former Finance Minister Youssef Boutros Ghali and former Trade Minister Rachid Mohamed Rachid as well as a number of other ministers and NDP officials who have all been charged with profiteering (Kirkpatrick 2011; for a full list of names see El Badry 2011).
That said, the military cannot be seen as an agent for radical change towards a Nasserist style of socialism in Egypt, as some scholars have claimed it to be (Paul Sullivan cited in Kirkpatrick 2011). While the military did not take action against the protestors, neither did it show tolerance towards those demanding economic reforms. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) issued a warning against labour strikes stating that ‘Noble Egyptians see that these strikes, at this delicate time, lead to negative results’ (Charbel 2011b). Despite the Egyptian military's opposition to neoliberal reforms, they are nevertheless fundamentally supportive of the system of private property. One of the acts after the fall of Mubarak was to forcefully evict residents who had occupied 650 housing units in the tourist resort of Hurghada and Ras Ghareb (Al Masry Al Youm 2011b). Thus a more realistic outcome might take some form of corporatist rule with the military offering bargaining rights to workers. Some Egyptian businessmen, who have gathered their wealth through public sector industries have also expressed agreement over a new deal that would revive the Egyptian economy (Al Masry Al Youm 2011f, Amar 2011b).
Since taking power, the military has had to make some concessions to the pro-democracy movement. For instance, Ahmed Shafiq, who was appointed prime minister by Hosni Mubarak during his last days in power, was replaced by Essam Sharaf, a former transport minister who spoke out against corruption during his time in power and who joined the protestors at Tahrir Square (British Broadcasting Corporation 2011c).The appointment of Sharaf was welcomed by January 25th supporters, as they saw his appointment as a fulfilment of one of their demands: namely having a civilian without a history of corruption in the post of prime minister (Ahram online 2011). The cabinet shuffle at the end of February 2011 resulted in a new cabinet made up of members of the Leftist Tagammu Party, the Wafd Party, and the Democratic Front Party (linked to Al Baradei), as well as two ministers sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood and critical of the Ahmed Nazif's neoliberal policies (Shehab 2011, Nassar 2011). In an attempt to take the protestors' demands into consideration, the army replaced 13 unpopular governors who were appointed by Hosni Mubarak. Besides appointing a progressive cabinet, Sharaf has purged the state owned media of Gamal Mubarak's friends and supporters (Osman 2011b).
Earlier, in the month of February 2011, the SCAF's appointment of Tareq Al- Bishri, an independent retired judge who headed the Constitutional Reform Committee, was seen as welcoming news to the pro-democracy protestors since Al- Bishri is a progressive judge who called for public disobedience in 2004 and supported the People's Campaign for Change (Browers 2009, p. 114, Reuters 2011a).
The appointment of Samir Radwan as Egypt's Finance Minister cannot be seen as a very positive sign for workers who demand better wages and a reform of labour rights and pensions. Radwan was the senior economic advisor at the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority during the last government of Hosni Mubarak. He is no critic of neoliberal reforms and thinks that they should not be compromised in the coming months. He has suggested using public spending to launch a series of infrastructure projects that would create some of the badly needed jobs in the short term (Han 2011). In the long run, he believes that job creation will have to rely on an increase in the levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Radwan 2010). Recently Radwan asked the EU to write off Egypt's debt and extend unconditional loans in order for the transitional government to meet some of the demands of the workers and protestors (Al Masry Al Youm 2011d).
In short, it is doubtful that the Egyptian army and the current transitional government would support any radical redistribution of wealth in Egyptian society, unless the momentum by workers and protestors continue. Their investigation of the wealth of crony capitalists is an attempt to stabilise the revolutionary process, possibly through some form of populist redistributive policies. While some are doubtful of the intentions of the military and are sceptical about its desire to start a democratic process in the country, others are openly expressing their support for them believing that they can purge the country of corruption: ‘We trust them’, said Walid Rachid, a member of the April 6 Youth Movement that helped set off the revolt. ‘Because of the army our revolution has become safe’ (Kirkpatrick 2011).
Second scenario: potential for radical change
Another possible scenario is that a coalition of workers, peasants and various social movements will emerge that might push the revolution in a radical direction. There are a number of factors that might lead to this scenario. First, the uprising of 25 January brought to the streets people from all backgrounds and professions presenting a united front to the Mubarak regime. Their strength and unity throughout the 18 days was the force that ended the 30-year rule of Mubarak on 11 February 2011. These are remarkable developments in a society that has been under Emergency Law since 1981. The uprising itself marks the beginning of a radical social transformation whereby citizens have decided to actively participate in the politics of their society. The protestors' organisation and their strength in terms of numbers will continue to remain a force that the military cannot easily crush or ignore. The revolution has marked the beginning of a new dawn whereby the people have effectively expressed their will against their rulers. It seems that the revolution has already marked the beginning of what Paul Amar has called a ‘new political society’ which in itself is historically unprecedented (Amar 2011a). This new political society has been taking shape since February 2011. New political parties are being established, coalitions with common interests and goals are emerging and a new federation of independent trade unions has been formed.
In the 18 days of the revolt, workers across Egypt threw their support behind those protesting in Cairo and Alexandria demanding the end of Mubarak and his regime. Workers from the Ministries of Health and Aviation, from banks, from the State Atomic Agency, from Al-Azhar Hospital as well as public transportation workers actively participated in the protests (Rashed 2011, Azouz 2011). The protests and strikes of workers demanding better wages and working conditions continued all over the country even after Mubarak was deposed (British Broadcasting Corporation 2011a, McGreal 2011b). Workers also targeted their attacks against the official union (the state-controlled Egyptian Trade Union Federation, ETUF), demanding its dissolution and the investigation of its leaders, including the union president Hussein Megawer who was also ‘a member of the Board of Directors of Suez Cement Company which yielded millions of Egyptian Pounds for him every year’ (CTUWS 2011, see also Charbel 2011b).
While the army's seizure of power might have signalled a return to normalcy for some Egyptians, others have just begun their fight for change. Workers from a wide range of sectors have engaged in strike action. Emboldened by the removal of a corrupt head of state, bank workers have demanded the removal of their corrupt bosses, while demanding better working conditions and an increase in their wages. Workers from various ministries and economic sectors have also demanded wage increases and better benefits (Al Masry Al Youm 2011i). Even police officers have attempted to take advantage of this opportunity and transform the institution of the police by demanding living wages so that they would not have to resort to taking bribes.
The main accomplishment of the workers during the Days of Anger was the formation of a broad federation of independent trade unions on 30 January 2011. This was only the second independent trade union, CTUWS, which was born on 26 March 1990 following the strike of railway workers (1986) and steel workers (1989). On 19 February 2011, workers from various sectors, including pharmaceuticals, construction, transportation, information, health, postal services, public sector workers, military factories, and tax collectors published a list of their demands: raising the minimum wage and pension and offering unemployment benefits, all adjusted with rising prices; narrowing the gap between minimum wage and maximum wage so that the latter does not exceed 15 times the former in order to stay true to the spirit of social justice as a pillar of the revolution; freedom to organise and form unions; job security, protection from arbitrary dismissals and an end to temporary contracts; renationalisation of privatised enterprises; removal of the corrupt managerial class who were involved in the sell-off of public sector enterprises; opening job opportunities for younger workers; price controls on goods and services to protect the poor; the rights of workers to strike and demonstrate; health care; and finally the dissolution of the official trade union (ETUF) and the investigation into the wealth of its leaders and other member unions. Workers have stated that without fulfilling these demands, the revolution would be a failure. The following excerpt from the declaration of the workers captures the significance of the revolution for workers in Egypt and why it is crucial to achieve economic rights alongside political rights:
It is our opinion that if this revolution does not lead to the fair distribution of wealth it is not worth anything … The right to vote is naturally dependent on the right to a loaf of bread. (Arabawy 2011b)
There does not seem to be any sign that the military law passed on 28 March 2011 banning protests and strike action will slow down the pace or number of strikes. Indeed, they might increase in the coming days and weeks as protestors return to their work places with a renewed spirit of revolt against corruption, illegal practices and unfair wages and working conditions (Afify 2011). There is a potential for more progressive and democratic reforms given that protestors oppose the current dominant role of the military in the government and instead favour an increased role for civilians as well as demanding a new constitution (McGreal 2011a). Other possible positive outcomes could include free party politics, a new constitution that will embody the demands of workers and peasants, and the accountability of government officials through the curbing of corruption, increased monitoring of public expenditures, and the repatriation of stolen public wealth from abroad. The revolution is still in its early phases and Egyptians have already witnessed the arrest and investigation of past ministers and corrupt officials and businessmen, as well as the former president and his family. These investigations are unprecedented events not only in the country but also in the region.
Challenges ahead of the revolution
Challenges still lie ahead for the social forces seeking radical change. The lack of strong leadership remains a major weakness within the pro-democracy movement and will have a decisive influence on whether the movement can effectively challenge military rule/corporatism. This weakness can be exploited by the military in its attempts to derail the revolution and undermine the interests of workers, peasants, and the unemployed. Strong leadership and a coherent ideology are needed as preconditions for forming democratic demands and pursuing those demands in the face of strong opposition from conservative forces in society (El-Hennawy 2011a ). Recently the formation of an umbrella organisation – the Egyptian National Congress, or Egyptian Congress to Defend the Revolution – is a positive sign of cooperation and collaboration among the progressive forces that want to hold Egypt's military leaders accountable during this transition phase.
In his article titled ‘Will the revolution turn right or left?’, Egyptian journalist Amr Adly has provided a sober assessment of the class bias of the protests and how that could possibly determine the outcome of the reforms under the current military government. He writes that the protests were mainly organised by urban middle class cyber-activists who mainly demanded political rights. The military can more easily extend a series of political rights, but what worries the military is labour's demand for economic rights. If the revolution is stifled and conservative forces dominate its outcome, the chances are that labour will not gain much and instead the military will extend some political rights over economic and social rights. This might move Egypt more towards a Turkish form of democracy, where free elections provide space for Islamists and other centre-right parties while the military remains in control of its own economic interests and acts as a guardian of the constitution. If no strong, independent labour movement or political party representing the interests of such a labour movement emerges out of the recent spate of labour struggles, then it is likely that political divisions will be drawn ‘along identitarian lines’ such as religious sectarianism (Adly 2011).
The threat of counter revolution has been looming over Egypt ever since Mubarak was ousted from power. The increasing sectarian clashes in recent weeks has been interpreted as a clear sign of a counter revolution supported either by remnants of the Mubarak regime and/or by the Saudis who are fearful of any potential revolutionary outcomes.6 This fear has been aggravated by Egypt's opening towards Iran.7 Other conservative Gulf States are worried about the spillover of revolutionary change from Egypt to their countries. Therefore, the rich oil states have been using their investments to shape the course of the revolution. More importantly they want to prevent Mubarak from being brought to justice as it would set a precedent in a region where absolute monarchs and authoritarian rulers have ruled for decades. The power of these conservative states is considerable, with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait constituting three of the largest investors in Egypt, and as destinations for Egyptian migrant workers (Massad 2011, Strasser 2011). The United States and the IMF are also potential counter-revolutionary actors. In his speech of 19 May 2011, beside the one billion dollar of debt relief, President Barak Obama announced an aid package for Egypt tied to the promotion of the private sector. He also stated that he had instructed the IMF and the World Bank to arrange an economic recovery plan for Egypt in the next Group of Eight (G8) summit at the end of May 2011. These attempts of the US to ‘buy off’ the transitional government clearly disregard the will of those Egyptians who protested against the neoliberal policies promoted by the IMF and enacted by Mubarak.
There are further concerns. The plight of rural Egyptians also remains a grave concern. Despite the geography of the protests spanning across Egypt, it seems that the goals and demands of the uprising were determined by the urban educated youth and did not reflect the demands of rural parts of Egypt (El Rashidi 2011a).8 The weight of urban revolt depended on the large number of educated youth who could march in the streets and pose a threat to the stability of the regime. In rural Egypt, as Rodenbeck writes, the police and the power of the ancien régime remain intact (Rodenbeck 2011a). With the rural population continuing to remain unrepresented in Cairo, and a labour movement that has had very little experience with independent trade unionism, challenging the neoliberal economic structures put in place during the past 20 years will not be an easy task in the coming months and years. Another important concern relates to the role of women in post-revolutionary Egypt. The constitutional committee has excluded women from participating in constitutional changes that will affect their lives, a concern that was expressed on the occasion of International Women's Day (Brown, W. 2011). Finally, pro-democracy activists and new political parties have expressed concern about the timing of the parliamentary and presidential elections to be held in September and November 2011 respectively. They argue that they will have very little time to prepare and launch effective campaigns. The election timing might work to the advantage of existing politicians and parties and those with sufficient funds to finance quick and successful campaigns (El Rashidi 2011b, Osman 2011c).
Conclusion
In this paper, I have suggested two potential scenarios emerging out of the current struggles in Egypt. The first scenario would see a slowing down of neoliberalism, with a limited number of reforms in the interest of workers. A second scenario would entail ongoing mobilisation and pressure by workers, students, and peasants across Egypt demanding a radical retrenchment of neoliberalism.
The Egyptian people rejected neoliberalism when they took to the streets with a united voice and demanded Mubarak's resignation and the end of his regime on 25 January 2011. It is undeniable that these protests and revolts are unprecedented in that they mark the beginning of a new era in mass mobilisation and anti-government protest after 30 years under an autocratic regime. The Egyptian people confronted the authoritarian regime by getting rid of their fears of the state and its oppressive arm, namely the Ministry of the Interior and its police force. Police stations were attacked and destroyed. The symbol of state oppression, the state security apparatus, was dismantled on 5 March, signalling the end of public silence against torture and arbitrary power of the state.
The revolution has shaken up Egyptian society and unleashed a social force that demands democratic rights to determine who governs Egypt. As Slavoj Zizek aptly put it, the Egyptian revolution was a ‘universal revolution for dignity, human rights, economic justice – universalism at work’ (Aljazeera English online 2011). Indeed, the revolution demonstrated that for people of Egypt and for Arabs in the Middle East, the choice is not necessarily between autocratic dictatorship and radical Islamism. People's democracy is about freedom and dignity. By opening up space for popular struggles and mass protests the revolution carries the potential for building a progressive, democratic society.