Kenya took a historic step towards democracy in 2002, when opposition leader Mwai Kibaki was elected president in multiparty elections after 24 years of Daniel Arap Moi's dictatorial and repressive rule (Bourmaud 1988, Schmitz 1999). A divided opposition had failed to defeat Moi in Kenya's first two multiparty elections in 1992 and 1997 (Grignon and Maupeu 1998, pp. 14–16). By the 2002 elections, however, the opposition had managed to line up behind Kibaki, under the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). Having held office for two terms since the 1992 constitutional amendment, Moi was legally obliged to step down. He designated Uhuru Kenyatta as the official candidate of his party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), but did not succeed in manipulating the results sufficiently in Kenyatta's favour to influence the outcome. Although instances of violence and vote buying were reported, most observers agree that that the elections were significantly freer and fairer than those of 1992 and 1997 (Anderson 2003, p. 338, Anderson and Mapeu 2003, pp. 6–10). Kibaki won 63% of the votes, leading to Kenya's first electoral succession. Moi allegedly approached military officers shortly before the elections to prepare an intervention in case of a NARC victory. However, the army – which is almost as ethnically divided as Kenyan society itself (Asingo 2003, p. 41) – refused, probably having already arranged a deal with the Kibaki coalition (Holmquist 2003, p. 202). This left Moi with few options other than to peacefully hand over power to Kibaki, turning Kenya into an electoral democracy, although not a consolidated one (Diamond 1999).
Kibaki's election raised enormous hopes among Kenyans and donors (Närman 2003, p. 343). Indeed, Kibaki was elected on an ambitious reform agenda which included universal primary education, economic growth, adoption of a new constitution and the fight against corruption (Kenya, State House 2002). This last point was of particular importance to the Kenyan people, as corruption under Moi had literally ruined the country for the benefit of a few (Southall 1999, Southall 2005). Many believed that the 2002 election would bring about a new type of rule. A common joke in Nairobi was that the drivers would now stop at the same road crossing where they used to be arrested by policemen and demand a bribe refund (Interview, Mattli, 2007). According to Afrobarometer, 92% of Kenyans surveyed approved or strongly approved of the way President Kibaki performed his job during his first eight months in office, while the mean for the 15 countries included in the survey was 70%. Similarly, 85% of Kenyans believed the government was doing fairly to very well in fighting corruption in government, while the average for the 15 countries was 42% (Bratton et al. 2004, p. 51).
Unfortunately, despite significant progress in other domains, Kibaki failed to fight corruption. A year and a half after his election, the enormous Anglo-Leasing graft scandal, and Kibaki's protection of the cabinet members involved, marked the end of the anti-corruption war. Theoretically, there were good reasons to believe that Kibaki's election would lead to significant reforms, including the fight against corruption. The population had proven its power by turning to the opposition in 2002. It could do so again if Kibaki failed to deliver on reform. In addition, as Kibaki was elected on a reform agenda, he could be considered to have entered into a social contract with his electorate. Such a situation was likely to increase the demands of the population on their government. Furthermore, most interviewees agreed that Kibaki genuinely had the political will to fight corruption in 2002,1 confirming the Afrobarometer results cited above (ibid.). Why, then, did the 2002 electoral transition not lead to a genuine fight against corruption during Kibaki's first term?
A key explanation highlighted in the Kenyan literature is that the political transition occurred without a comprehensive constitutional review process able to reform the electoral system (Nasong'o 2007), and judiciary, among other institutions, so as to foster the accountability of elected officials (Branch and Cheeseman 2009). In other words, while the opposition and domestic civil society could mobilise strongly against Kibaki's government in a backlash against the Anglo-Leasing corruption scandal, they lacked the institutional means to pressure the government more effectively.
Building on this literature, and borrowing from international relations scholarship on transnational advocacy networks developed mainly in the field of human rights (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Risse and Sikkink 1999), this article argues that domestic pressures are most effective when combined with international pressures. This argument finds strong support in the history of Kenyan democratisation, which saw long-term domestic pressures on Moi to restore multiparty politics eventually triumph in 1991, when donors agreed to cut all aid to Kenya until opposition parties were legalised (Widner 1992, pp. 217–218, Branch and Cheeseman 2009, p. 10). As this article shows, the combination of domestic and international pressures on Kibaki to dismiss ministers involved in the Anglo-Leasing scandal did, initially at least, have a significant effect.
However, this paper argues, the politics behind the Anglo-Leasing scandal cannot be fully understood if the analysis is limited to pressure for the fight against corruption. Indeed, along with these pro-reform pressures, a ruler necessarily faces what may be called ‘counter-pressures’, that is, pressures from powerful people who do not view the anti-corruption war as in their interest. Depending on the pre- and post-electoral alliances forged by a ruler, these counter-pressures can sometimes be stronger in the short term than the combination of international and domestic pressures, and hence can block reform. The present author's ongoing research in other African countries shows that counter-pressures can come from many different types of actors such as the army, the domestic or international private sector, or even from foreign countries. In Kenya, as this article shows, counter-pressures on Kibaki came mainly from political leaders supposedly able to secure electoral support from selected ethnic groups.
This article thus uses the Anglo-Leasing corruption scandal, which broke during Kibaki's presidency, as a case study to empirically test the respective roles of pressures and counter-pressures around governance reform in the post-Moi era.2 The first of two substantive sections which follow this introduction describes the background to, and the Anglo-Leasing affair and its political consequences, while the second analyses the pressures and counter-pressures implicated in the scandal and its aftermath, helping to explain Kibaki's seemingly irrational handling of the crisis. Information is drawn from, among other sources, a total of 23 interviews conducted in Nairobi in January 2007. Selected via the snowballing method, the interviewees included some of the most influential actors involved in governance, and were drawn from among donors, domestic non-governmental organisation (NGOs), the media and the Kenyan government.
Politics, power and the Anglo-Leasing scandal
As already noted, Kibaki's election raised enormous hopes among Kenyans as well as donors (Närman 2003, Bratton et al. 2004, p. 51): an apparently reformist opposition leader had finally assumed power. Such a positive atmosphere was not due only to the election of, or promises made by, Kibaki during the campaign. The new regime did initiate significant reforms immediately after it took power, the most impressive of which concerned education. Right after his election, Kibaki told Kenyans to take their children to primary school ‘and not to pay a shilling’ (Interview, Kisia, 2007) – a policy that was supported by funding from the UK Department for International Development (DFID) (Wrong 2009, p. 210).
Significantly, too, Kibaki appointed some true reformists to key positions. For example, he created the National Commission on Human Rights and appointed Maina Kiai as chairman. Kiai was a key figure both in Kenyan and transnational human rights civil society, having occupied the position of Africa director at Amnesty International in London (Interview, Mattli, 2007).
On the economic front, per capita GDP growth had been negative in the 1990s. However, Kenya managed to reach an average of 2.6% real per capita GDP growth between 2003 and 2007 (World Bank 2008). Moreover, the reform of the Kenya Revenue Authority resulted in an increase of tax revenue by 25–35% a year (ibid.).
Kibaki was, unfortunately, power-hungry. This had the double consequence of isolating him politically and torpedoing the constitutional review process. Kibaki was elected under the banner of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), an alliance between his National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) and Raila Odinga's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The coalition was based on a memorandum of understanding, which was the result of harsh negotiations among many ethnic leaders (Wanyande 2006, p. 72). Under this memorandum, 11 of 23 cabinet positions would be allocated to NAK, and 11 to LDP, while Kibaki would be the presidential candidate. Once elected, however, Kibaki reneged on the agreement, appointing 13 ministers from NAK and only nine from LDP, two of whom were people who had not even been on the list drawn up by LDP leaders. Moreover, Kibaki did not respect regional balance while appointing to key positions in civil service and parastatal agencies (Steeves 2006, pp. 229–230). This is important, as ethnically based appointments in the Kenyan public administration are one of the main mechanisms of patronage and ethnically biased distribution of state resources (Berman 2004).
Worse, Kenya's national conference – the result of intense domestic pressure on Moi in the 1990s – had produced a draft constitution based on a broad, popular consensus in 2004 (Holmquist 2005, p. 212). This draft, known as ‘Bomas’, aimed to reduce presidential power through decentralisation at province, district, division and location levels (Ghai 2008), as well as by creating a powerful prime ministerial post, which was promised to Odinga under the NARC memorandum. However, instead of presenting this draft for adoption in a national referendum, Kibaki presented his own draft, known as ‘Wako’. The Wako draft increased presidential power, limited decentralisation to the district level only, and circumscribed the Prime Minister's powers by making the role subordinate to that of president (Lynch 2006, p. 240). In contrast to many other African states, Kenya is characterised by strong executive control over provincial administrations, which have been used by incumbent presidents to secure victory during multiparty elections (Branch and Cheeseman 2006). It is this which largely explains Kibaki's preference for the limited form of devolution set out in the Wako draft (Lynch 2006, Ghai 2008).
NARC was dissolved as a result, with Odinga and other former LDP leaders joining the opposition, and forming the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). The latter effectively campaigned against Kibaki's draft constitution, leading to its rejection in the November 2005 constitutional referendum. Directly afterwards, Kibaki reshuffled his entire cabinet, excluding almost all of the former LDP ministers (Steeves 2006, p. 231). Dissension inside NARC, and around the issue of constitutional review, set the stage for the dramatic 2007 election, pitting Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU) against Odinga's ODM (and which is discussed later in the paper).
However, this article focuses on another of Kibaki's failures, which also produced tremendous disappointment: the fight against corruption. Indeed, far from being a minor side effect of poor governance, corruption is the fundamental mechanism that allows many African rulers to secure their support base (Bayart 1989, p. 296, Chabal 1992, p. 172, Bratton and van de Walle 1997, p. 61). Fighting corruption is thus among the most challenging tasks an African ruler can face, even one genuinely committed to improving governance. Significantly, Kenya has been characterised as a kleptocracy (Southall 1999), with the extensive and illegal redistribution of state financial resources, as well as public land, contributing to the ‘formation and consolidation of Kenya's political elite’ (Southall 2005, p. 150). Moreover, as this article will show, this is further complicated by the strong ethnic bias characterising the illegal distribution of public wealth.
Kibaki had shown an initial commitment to fighting corruption in 2003 by passing a law obliging civil servants to declare their assets, and forbidding them from conducting business activities. He also established the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission. However, asset or wealth declarations proved meaningless as they were neither open to public scrutiny nor easily accessible to the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (Interview, anonymous, representative of international governmental organisation, 2007). Above all, however, the infamous Anglo-Leasing corruption scandal that became public in April 2004, and the failure of the government to prosecute the cabinet members involved, completely discredited Kibaki's political will to reform governance in public financial management.
Unlike most cases of grand corruption in Africa, which remain in the shadows, the Anglo-Leasing scandal is well documented. Indeed, the Permanent Secretary for Governance and Ethics, John Githongo, issued a report on his investigation of the scandal, notably detailing all the attempts by cabinet ministers to make him stop the inquiries (Githongo 2005). As Githongo was the founding president of Transparency International's Kenya chapter prior to being appointed by Kibaki, he enjoyed enormous credibility in Kenya. His report was further corroborated by audio recordings played by Githongo to the BBC a few months after the publication of his report (Githongo 2004). Anglo-Leasing is thus a perfect opportunity to examine the counter-pressures that can occur behind the scenes in an archetypal African grand corruption case.
Anglo-Leasing was a private company, supposedly from the UK, that was awarded a US$35 million government contract in December 2003 to produce tamper-proof passports. Githongo discovered in March 2004 that no such company was registered in the UK, and asked the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission to investigate the case, while conducting his own parallel inquiry. It soon became clear that people at the highest level of Kibaki's government were implicated, including Vice-President Awori, as well as various cabinet ministers and permanent secretaries. In May 2004, investigators further discovered that at least 18 other contracts in the security sector, of the same type as Anglo-Leasing, had been signed between August 2001 and January 2004, to a total value of approximately US$721 million (Githongo 2005).
During the inquiry, there were various attempts to persuade Githongo and the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission's investigators to drop the case: high-level pressure, threats and attempted bribery. Githongo, for example, was offered the opportunity to have his father's private debt cancelled. On 17 May, Finance Minister Mwiraria warned Githongo that a businessman called Wanjigi had sworn to kill him. Such half-hidden death threats came more than once during the inquiry. Hierarchical pressure was the most common tool of intimidation, however. Githongo even tape-recorded an incriminating discussion with Justice Minister Murungi and Finance Minister Mwiraria on 11 June 2004, in which the latter two explicitly asked Githongo to stop his investigation (Githongo 2004). On 18 June, President Kibaki himself advised Githongo not to hand over three important files to the Attorney General and the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) (Githongo 2005, p. 11).
That the scandal had become public did not deter the ministers involved from attempting to secure authorisation for payment for the contract to proceed. Commitment fees paid to three different fake companies were initially refunded as a result of Githongo's investigation. However, on 13 June 2004, a journalist discovered that within the budget for fiscal year 2004/05, the Finance Minister had allocated US$2.8 million to Anglo-Leasing as payment for one of the security sector contracts. Worse still, towards the end of 2004, Justice Minister Murungi and Security Minister Murungaru implicated themselves in the affair, by demanding that Githongo allow payment of at least some of the contracts that had been blocked as a result of his and the KACC's investigations. In discussion with Githongo, the ministers openly admitted that the proceeds from the contracts were intended to finance election campaigns. Moreover, they were not cowed by the prospect of their approach being reported to President Kibaki, pointing out that as an ex-Finance Minister himself, the latter ‘understood how these things were done’ (ibid., p. 19).
By this stage, it had become clear that Githongo's options had narrowed considerably: he could either agree to drop the case and, in so doing, become party to corruption, or he could flee the country. In Githongo's own words, ‘These ministers, my closest colleagues sat there and told me to my face that they, they were the ones doing the stealing. Once they said that, I knew I had to go.’ (Wrong 2009, p. 20). Githongo submitted his resignation from London in January 2005 and made his report public in November of that year. In February 2006, he played the audio recordings of Mwiraria and Murungi asking him to stop the investigation to the BBC (Githongo 2004).
The political consequences for the ministers mentioned in the report were limited. On 13 February 2005, Kibaki moved Security Minister Murungaru to the less prestigious transport ministry (The Standard 2005b) and, eventually, dismissed him while reshuffling his cabinet on 7 December 2005. Justice Minister Murungi was merely downgraded to the Energy Ministry, while Vice-President Awori and Finance Minister Mwiraria both retained their positions (The Standard 2005a). On 1 February 2006, Mwiraria finally resigned (The Standard 2006a), followed on 13 February by Murungi and Education Minister Saitoti (The Daily Nation 2006). Mwiraria and Murungi were accused of obstructing Githongo's investigation of Anglo-Leasing; and Saitoti had been mentioned in a report, published a week earlier (BBC News 2006c), about the Goldenberg scandal that had occurred during Moi's presidency.3 However, Vice-President Awori – who took a back seat during Githongo's investigation yet was clearly mentioned in the report – refused to step down.
Except for Murungaru, the resignations were short lived. On 15 November 2006, Murungi was reinstated as Energy Minister and Saitoti as Education Minister (BBC News 2006c; The Standard 2006b), while Mwiraria was appointed Environment Minister on 24 July 2007 (The Standard 2007a). Saitoti had previously been cleared of involvement in Goldenberg by the Court on 31 July 2006 (The Standard 2006c) in a judgment that Chairman of The Kenya National Commission of Human Rights, Maina Kiai, described as ‘ridiculous’: as Parliament had previously cleared him, judges applied the double jeopardy rule from common law, according to which a person cannot be tried twice for the same crime, neglecting the fact that Parliament is not a judicial organ (Interview, Kiai, 2007). The Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission cleared Murungi, Mwiraria and Awori, on 19 January 2007 – that is, after Murungi's reappointment. The judgment was no less ridiculous: the three cabinet members were cleared of obstructing Githongo's investigation on the grounds that ‘Githongo is not an investigator in the legal sense’ (Interview, Kibaka, 2007). The question of whether the Permanent Secretary for Governance and Ethics is an investigator under Kenyan law is not debated here. It is, however, difficult not to read this judgment in the same way as most Kenyans: the three cabinet members were cleared on the basis of legal technicalities, although the Githongo report leaves little doubt of their implication in the Anglo-Leasing scandal.
Accountability pressures and ethnically based counter-pressures on Kibaki
Information such as that above, which ended up in the public domain, incriminated various members of Kibaki's cabinet, and suggests that Kibaki was at the very least passively involved. But while the Githongo report contributed significantly to the visibility of the Anglo-Leasing graft scandal, this should not be allowed to totally eclipse the positive achievements of the Kibaki regime in other domains. Thus, despite the scandal, the judgment of interviewees on the Kibaki government was not completely negative. Indeed, the economic recovery, the implementation of free universal primary education and the dramatic increase in democratic space were seen as major advances, compared to the Moi era (Interview, Muthoga, 2007). In the field of governance in particular, various interviewees mentioned the achievements in the Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sectors (GJLOS) reform programme (Interview, Nagel-Dick, 2007) – a cross-cutting reform programme involving 32 departments in seven ministries. GJLOS, which was initiated under Kibaki with much international support and significant civil society participation, seemed to be successfully enhancing efficiency and transparency in some sectors of public administration (Interview, Carstens, 2007). On the question of whether Kibaki personally had the political will to improve governance and fight corruption when he assumed power, most interviewees answered positively, mentioning, for example, the fact that having studied law in London, he had been socialised to a different manner of rule (Interview, Mattli, 2007). This positive view was shared by the vast majority of Kenyans surveyed in Afrobarometer (Bratton et al. 2004, p. 51).
How do we explain the politics at work here? Firstly, why did Kibaki dismiss the four ministers involved in the graft scandals? Secondly, why were they not properly prosecuted, and why were three of them reinstated shortly before the 2007 elections? And, finally, why did Vice-President Awori survive in Kibaki's government, despite his incrimination in the Githongo report?
The evidence suggests that such political gymnastics were the result of a president caught in a whirlpool of pressures and counter-pressures, who was desperately struggling to stay in power. In order to support this argument, particular attention needs to be paid to the sequence of the various pressures on, and actions of, the Kibaki government. For this purpose, a chronology of the most important events can be found as an appendix to this article.
Regarding the pressures on Kibaki, a combination of factors made them particularly strong, especially where governance in public financial management was concerned. First is the fact that Kibaki was elected on a reform agenda. People had been exasperated with Moi's corrupt rule and hence, in electing Kibaki, had voted for change. They gave their trust to Kibaki, but expected results in return (Interview, Jayawardena, 2007).
Second, the expansion of political space under Kibaki strongly enhanced domestic pressures. When governance issues arose in the public domain, civil society and the media protested with a virulence that was not possible under Moi (Interview, Nagel-Dick, 2007).
Third, the broad coalition on which the Kibaki regime rested implied more political competition inside the government. As ministers are also Members of Parliament who would eventually face the issue of re-election, they are quick to denounce wrongdoing in other ministries for fear of being tainted with guilt by association (Interview, Rogers, 2007). Moreover, as many people in Kibaki's government were either in opposition or part of civil society during the Moi era, they were the same people who had criticised the former regime for its failure on governance issues (Interview, Mugonyi, 2007).
Fourth, the international community supported Kibaki's government, but became more demanding in exchange. The World Bank and DFID pushed strongly for reforms, notably in public procurement (Interview, Jayawardena, 2007). In addition, the initial push for reforms in the GJLOS reform programme came from donors, 15 of whom had co-financed it (Interview, Carstens, 2007).
As a result, when Githongo's report became public in November 2005, there was a storm of protest from both national and international actors, who demanded action from Kibaki. His dismissal of former Security Minister Murungaru in December 2005 was far from sufficient to calm protestors. In December, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) postponed the fourth and fifth tranches of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) loan, worth US$73m. In January 2006, the World Bank suspended five projects, worth a total of US$265m, because of corruption (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006, pp. 20–21). Mwiraria resigned on 1 February 2006, but pressure continued, with a group of 76 civil society organisations meeting a few days later, under the banner of ‘Global Anti-Corruption Watchdog’, to pressure Kibaki to sack all the other people involved in the scandal. The chairman of The Kenya National Commission of Human Rights even suggested that Kenyans should stop paying taxes until all the money from the various contracts was recovered (The Standard 2006d).
Despite Murungi's resignation on 13 February, pressure continued to build on Kibaki to take decisive action. Indeed, on the same day, following a trip by the Parliament's Public Account Committee to London to meet Githongo, a group of 80 Members of Parliament headed by former presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta called for Vice-President Awori's resignation (BBC News 2006a). On 16 February, street demonstrators mobilised by civil society marched to Awori's office and handed over a letter which demanded his resignation within 72 hours (The Standard 2006e). In April, the Netherlands suspended aid to Kenya worth US$146m, because of Kibaki's lack of action against corruption (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006 p. 21). Awori, however, refused to step down until he lost his parliamentary seat in the December 2007 elections (The Standard 2007b), and was not recalled to Kibaki's new cabinet in January 2008 (The Standard 2008). There is little doubt among interviewees that it was the combination of domestic and international pressures that forced Kibaki to dismiss Murungaru, Mwiraria, Murungi and Saitoti (Interview, Oloo, 2007).
But since this pressure was so high, and the image of those cabinet members so sullied by the corruption scandals, why then were they not properly prosecuted? Why did Kibaki refuse to dismiss Vice-President Awori? And why did he reinstate three of the four dismissed ministers to his government a year before elections?
The explanation for this apparently irrational behaviour lies in the study of counter-pressures. The same answer was given by various interviewees: Kibaki felt he needed those four cabinet members for his re-election. First, George Saitoti, who became one of the wealthiest Kenyans under Moi, is said to have greatly contributed to Kibaki's 2002 campaign fund and to have been in a position to finance the 2007 campaign as well (Interview, Muli, 2007).
Second, during his time in power, Moi managed to structure the political debate in terms of ethnicity. Being himself from the Kalenjin community (12% of the population),4 he convinced smaller ethnic groups to support him, manipulating their fear of being otherwise dominated by the Kikuyus (Oloo and Oyugi 2002). This policy has led to high levels of inequality, not only between rural and urban populations as the dualistic model predicts, but also within rural populations (Gîthînji 2000). Once introduced, this tradition of ethnically based politics is, unfortunately, not easy to overcome (Närman 2003, p. 347). In Kenya, a candidate can be elected by a simple majority, with at least 25% of votes cast in five of the country's eight provinces, even during the first round of presidential elections (Oloo and Oyugi 2002, p. 258). As a Kikuyu himself, Kibaki could count on support from Kikuyus, who constitute the main ethnic group (22%). This would not, however, have been sufficient to win against an opponent as popular as Odinga, who could count on his Luo community (13%) (Interview, Oloo, 2007). Ironically, although Moi called on Kalenjin to support Kibaki in 2007, his past narrative of Kikuyu hegemony had become ingrained in the Kalenjin mind. As a consequence, the majority of Kalenjins supported Odinga instead (Lynch 2008). Kibaki was, therefore, absolutely reliant on the support of other communities. He thus stuck with Awori, hoping he would be able to secure the support of his Luhya community (14%) (Interview, Odhiambo, 2007). Likewise, Murungi and Mwiraria both come from the Meru community (6%), which traditionally voted with the Kikuyu. Here again, had their leaders been left out of Kibaki's cabinet, the Meru may have felt betrayed and turned to the opposition (Interview, Muli, 2007, Interview, anonymous representative of a Kenyan autonomous government institution, 2007).
However, the 2007 general elections revealed the miscalculation in Kibaki's corrupt strategy, as many Kenyans refused to vote strictly on ethnic lines (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008). For example, Awori not only failed to secure the Luhya vote in favour of Kibaki, but the vice-president was not even re-elected as Member of Parliament for his constituency (The Standard 2007b). Moreover, while Kibaki polled more than 20% more votes than Odinga during the 1997 presidential elections (African Elections Database 2010), the two candidates were so close during the 2007 elections that it is really not clear who would have won if the election had been free and fair (Throup 2008). Taking into account Kibaki's advantage as an incumbent (Branch and Cheeseman 2006), the 2007 elections were clearly a popular disavowal of Kibaki's policies. Hence, while producing tremendous violence and human suffering, the 2007 elections at least allowed the population to give the elite two strong signals: first, that they were not ready to accept a step backwards on the democratisation agenda and, second, that they refused to back a corrupt system. Kenyan society had evolved despite its president. Kibaki's big mistake was to betray the memorandum of understanding on which NARC was based (Branch and Cheeseman 2009, p. 17). If, instead, he had respected the terms of the memorandum, sponsored the national assembly's Bomas draft constitution which was based on a broad and popular consensus, and appointed Odinga as Prime Minister, his popular legitimacy would have been so great that no corrupt deal would have been necessary to secure his re-election in 2007. Rather than struggling to survive in the Anglo-Leasing storm, he would have had two presidential mandates, with Parliament, the population and the international community solidly behind him in a quest to progressively institutionalise good governance in Kenya. Kibaki failed to grasp the historic opportunity thus offered to become the leader of real political change in Kenya, and instead became a pale copy of his corrupt predecessor, Daniel Arap Moi.
Conclusion
The analysis of the enormous Anglo-Leasing graft scandal in Kenya highlights the intense struggle of pressures and counter-pressures that occurred partly behind the scenes. The cabinet members mentioned in Githongo's report were Kibaki's ultimate political allies. If it had not been for the intense pressures he was subject to when the Githongo report and tape recording were released, he would not have asked them to resign. The donor community suspended aid. Seventy-six civil society organisations, the media, and 80 Members of Parliament, as well as street protestors, simultaneously asked for corrupt officials to be punished. Kibaki had no choice but to dismiss at least some ministers: Murungaru first, followed by Mwiraria, Murungi and Saitoti. This point is consistent with the predictions of the international relations transnational advocacy network literature developed mainly in the field of human rights (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and, in particular, with the application of the spiral model of human rights change to the field of governance: once a sufficiently strong transnational advocacy network is developed, it is able to effectively constrain the ruler through normative pressure (Risse and Sikkink 1999).
Other aspects of the affair cannot, however, be explained by the spiral model. Despite continued international and domestic demands, Kibaki refused to dismiss Vice-President Awori. Worse, Awori, Mwiraria, Murungi and Saitoti were soon cleared of all allegations in judgments that could only be the result of political protection. Three of the four dismissed ministers were reinstated in Kibaki's cabinet shortly before the 2007 elections. Various interviewees argued that the reason behind those very unpopular and apparently politically irrational reappointments was that Kibaki felt he needed those allies for his re-election: Saitoti's wealth was needed for campaign financing. And Awori, Mwiraria and Murungi were considered key allies in mobilising the Luhya and Meru votes. In other words, Kibaki gave in to the counter-pressures exerted by his ultimate political allies.
In light of these findings, the question that arises is what could have been done to force Kibaki to fight corruption and prosecute corrupt cabinet members? The answer is that probably nothing more could have been done in the short term. Domestic and international actors did exactly the right thing by protesting. By doing this they achieved two goals. Firstly, they warned the elite that grand corruption was no longer acceptable in Kenya. Secondly, they contributed to the socialisation of the population into the norms of good governance. Fundamental change in governance was unlikely to occur over just one presidential term, given the culture of corruption and patronage that prevailed under Moi. The fact that Kenyans sanctioned Kibaki's government in the 2007 elections indicates that the socialisation of the Kenyan population into good governance norms is clearly under way.
However, for governance to be durably improved and corruption to diminish, the constitutional review process, which started in 1997, needs to be pursued until a consensual constitutional draft is adopted in a new national referendum (Lynch 2006). Building on this new constitution, key governmental institutions such as the electoral commission, the judiciary and the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission need to be strengthened, and their independence from the executive guaranteed (Nasong'o 2007, Branch and Cheeseman 2009). Meanwhile, much more civic education is necessary in order to facilitate a definitive shift from ethnic-based to programme-based voting. A few more years of democratic struggle between political parties is required to stabilise the party system.
While transition to democracy was a necessary step, democratic and good governance norms need to penetrate all spheres of society to become sustainably institutionalised in domestic practice. Such a stance is in sharp contrast to the democratic sequencing argument, according to which democratisation without fundamental transformation of the political processes and institutions is too dangerous a strategy (Nasong'o 2007). As Branch and Cheeseman (2009) rightly point out, reform is even less likely to occur under a dictatorial regime. Thus, although a dangerous strategy, pushing for simultaneous processes of democratisation and reform appears the only way forward. To this end, donors should ally with reformist domestic civil society to push for democratic consolidation through constitutional review, institutional development, and civic education, in order for pro-democratic and pro-governance pressures to surpass potentially corruptive counter-pressures in the future.