I first visited Asmara to see the ceremony to mark the actual liberation of the city from Ethiopian over‐rule in 1991, and again to take part in the formal Independence celebrations in May 1993. Following several visits in the 1990s to observe some of the realisation of the potential after liberation, my last two were troubling occasions: one in late 1998 when the country was becoming more and more entrenched in a needless war with Ethiopia, then in 2001 when the tenth anniversary ceremony of liberation was already tinged with unease following publication of a statement by 15 members of the leadership criticising the direction of policy and political practice. This was followed a few months later by the detention without trial of those 11 of the 15 who were still in the country. There they remain, incommunicado, to this day.
I had known several of the 15 since the days of the liberation struggle during visits to the ‘front’ in the 1980s and had talks with some of them in 2001 about their statement. Their analysis of the crisis in leadership, which has been brought out in detail in Dan Connell's Conversations with Eritrean Political Prisoners (2005), was, I felt, an accurate and timely warning. So I had felt neither keen to visit Eritrea nor welcome to do so. Now after seven years I was travelling to Asmara, not without some trepidation about what I would find about the situation of friends, including detainees, and that of the society as a whole. A visit of only a few days, confined to the capital, was no thorough basis for any definitive assessment of overall conditions, but rather than offering some fleeting impressions, I prefer to share reflections my visit aroused into basic questions about where Eritrea is headed ‐ some of which I realised had been in the back of my mind for some time. So this Briefing is more a reflection on the meaning of ‘liberation’ rather than a bit of reporting on things I saw or conversations I had.
The Limits of Liberation?
It is 17 years since Eritreans forcibly liberated themselves from Ethiopian overrule, and 15 since the consummating of its status as an independent ‐ and internationally recognised ‐ state in May 1993. Time enough perhaps to take stock of what that liberation, greeted with such high promise, has achieved. Yet what will be attempted here is but an quick, impressionistic assessment ‐ not a definitive evaluation ‐ after an absence of seven years. Seeing the capital for myself and talking to many people there with a range of opinions, and putting those glimpses alongside other news and commentary from the huge Eritrean diaspora, the self‐styled ‘international community’ of great powers and international organisations, and regional neighbours gives the distinct impression that the country has not yet succeeded in defining its own position in the world and in Africa, nor its own identity.
This unfinished business of identifying the nature of Eritrea can be seen first and dramatically, in the unresolved territorial issue of its border with Ethiopia. This 10 year‐old dispute has just entered a new phase which has the potential for re‐opening the war of 1998–2000. This immediate danger will be assessed below. But exploring the context for this potential crisis in turn raises the broader matter of defining its relations with its former colonial overlord ‐ a matter that raises similar but also different questions from those facing the ex‐colonies of Europe.
Another set of issues are those to do with defining the country's relations with its other neighbours and its role in the region: its links with oil‐rich Sudan and its relation to the Islamist, military power that is still the main component of the new unity government. Eritrea has recently shown aspirations to be seen as a peace‐maker in Eastern Sudan, in Darfur and in Sudan‐Chad relations. But how then to see Eritrea's withdrawal from the one regional body that offers itself as a peace agency, the Inter Government Agency for Development (IGAD)? How is its fraught conflict with Ethiopia being played out vis‐à‐vis Somalia?
In the long run the regional links that are crucial for a small country, not selfsufficient agriculturally and seeking a service and niche industry profile, are economic. How is it pursuing regional economic co‐operation? And are internal economic policies, and its political stance, consistent with this need for healthy and mutually beneficial trade and transport links to the rest of the region?
In each of these three crucial areas, the border issue and relations with Ethiopia, Eritrea's role in the region, and internal and regional economic plans, it is not evident whether Eritrea has worked out answers. Whether the regime has a clearcut set of strategies that are consistent with each other is hardly likely to be clear to its own citizens or to outside observers, given that its policy processes are so opaque. The absence of policy statements on basic issues and the treatment of basic information as privileged offer no documentary basis to explain what lies behind policy calculations. The lack of press freedom and of association and the political atmosphere of detention and control do not encourage any popular participation in debates on such issues. This context in turn raises a further set of questions as to whether there is any clear strategy for the political future. Is the 1987 Second Congress commitment to multi‐party democracy the eventual goal, or present single party rule, with no‐party local elections? Will the constitution ever be implemented? What concept of citizenship informs the regime?
The Unresolved Border Issue & Prospects for War?
The formal status of the disputed border, which was the proximate trigger for war between 1998–2000, was advanced by one step in late 2007, but one that could make a renewal of conflict rather than its ultimate resolution more likely. The independent Eritrea‐Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), set up under the terms of the Algiers Agreement, which ended the war in December 2000, issued its ‘Decision relating to Delimitation’ in February 2002. The demarcation that was supposed to follow this specifying of the boundary has never been conducted on the ground as Ethiopia refused to accept the Decision. After five years of stalemate and failed attempts to get the two parties together to discuss the matter, the EEBC wound up its existence by utilising modern geographical positioning technology to make a ‘virtual demarcation’ as an alternative to knocking pillars along the designated line. Predictably Eritrea accepted this detailed satellite‐traceable line on the map as the final settlement defining its territory. But Ethiopia again refused to accept the process.
As of early 2008 there is still an impasse to a mutually agreed resolution, albeit a new impasse. And one with its own immediate risks, even though both governments have recently made public statements that they do not aim to seek another round of war. The Eritreans see the virtual demarcation as a ‘Decision’ not a proposal, and have a good case in law, as a pre‐condition of the arbitration was that both sides signed up to an agreement that they would accept whatever the EEBC said. Thus they feel that they can go ahead to occupy not only the Temporary Security Zone, which extended 25km into their territory but those pockets along the boundary which were the subject of counter‐claims that the EEBC have now clarified as theirs. However, some of these are still occupied by Ethiopian troops, and are still claimed by Ethiopia. It is in that light that one must read public commitments by Ethiopia that they will never start new hostilities, but only react to ‘defend’ their territory. In other words, it is conceivable that new confrontations could be sparked off by Ethiopian forces ‘resisting’ any efforts by Eritrea to take control of areas that it now sees as legally granted to it. Officials in Asmara admit that this is where the crunch would come in their seeking to reclaim what they reckon has been designated by international law as Eritrean territory.
There are two alternatives to another outbreak of what could be an escalating conflict: a continuation of the present ‘no‐war‐no‐peace’ situation of massive mobilised forces staring across what will be a narrower separating zone, or some political settlement of the outstanding issues between the two countries ‐ the boundary for sure, but also Ethiopia's access to ports and Eritrea's access to markets, the matter of citizenship and movement of people and broader questions of regional economic cooperation. Which outcome actually emerges depends not on the legalities but on the realities of relative power and on the prospects of a political process.
Thus far Eritrea has eschewed any suggestion of political dialogue with Ethiopia, or even contact with any mediators. It has insisted that the EEBC Decision was accepted in advance as binding and thus not only Ethiopia but also international actors should enforce its implementation.1
Eritrea's insistence on the sanctity of this legal principle is not unlike their stance over liberation ‐ essentially justified by an appeal to the international right of self‐determination of ex‐colonies and the presentation of their claim as inalienable right. However, their strategy (or lack of one?) has been not only to assert their right to territory but also to make this the only tactic used ‐ to insist that the settling of this one issue must be the precondition to discussion of all other issues. This stance has been at the root of their relations with international actors such as UNMEE, would‐be mediators from the US, EU and African Union, and IGAD. It is arguable that giving primacy to the border issue above all others is not even in the national interest. At least their own long struggle, which was based on inter‐related and long‐term strategic calculations, could have been expected to lead to consideration of a range of topics. But there doesn't seem to have been a Plan B.
One alternative to confrontation over the border now it has been ‘demarcated’, would be to set the boundary issue aside for the immediate future. After all, there are several other cases where disputed border areas have remained unsettled and not become a causa belli. The Elemi Triangle has remained in dispute between Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan, and the Hemid area claimed by Egypt and Sudan for decades. And there is little intrinsic significance of the border areas that remain in dispute to the broader economy and society (although obviously to the people who live or want to live there (and even their rights to access could be guaranteed by appropriate cross‐border movement agreements). But Eritrea taking such a stance would only make sense as part of a broader strategy of concentrating on what are, arguably, matters of more consequence to Eritrea, and the region.
Objectively, the distances between the two governments' positions on the various items that need to be resolved are narrow and certainly not unbridgeable. Even over the border, the areas at issue come down largely to the area around Badme which the latest Ethiopian statements seem to have conceded and that around Irob, further east, which is more populous and to which Eritrea arguably has arguably less of a historical and social claim. The latter could be the subject of a generous concessionary gesture or at least a bargaining chip in the right circumstances.
In the absence, for now, of any conciliatory moves towards broader dialogue, both sides pursue their military strategies ‐ avowedly of ‘defence’. Informed opinion in Addis Ababa seems to be clear as to what Ethiopia's is, indeed some of what they are prepared for has been made explicit: although they state they will ‘never initiate another war’, they have stated their readiness to respond with might and without restraint to what they see as any Eritrean aggression. This readiness seems to translate into a plan whereby they think they can sweep through southern Eritrea to take the port of Assab within days, and to the capital, Asmara, and then the northern port of Massawa, shortly thereafter. If they were to pursue this kind of manoeuvre it would obviously imply ‘regime change’ in Asmara ‐ and, unfortunately, that prospect holds out attractions to opportunistic elements in the exile opposition (reportedly meeting at an unification gathering in Addis Ababa as I write).
The Ethiopian regime seems to believe that the Eritrean regime is aware of this threat and will remain intimidated by the prospect. But the former also seems to be motivated not just by the possibility of an Eritrean threat over the border issue, but retains a belief that Eritrea is committed to a long‐term strategy of destabilising Ethiopia, and claims intervention in support of insurgency in the Ogaden (Somali) Region, in Oromia and elsewhere, and backing of the forces in Somalia opposing the Ethiopian invasion there.
It would be surprising in the present context if Eritrean tactics in the region and in Ethiopia itself didn't take advantage of the stretched nature of Ethiopian security forces. However, to conclude that such activities are part of some longterm strategic plan is a jump in logic, and this represents another unknown in the broader calculations of the Eritrean regime. What is clear, however, is that if there were such goals they would run counter to the country's long‐run national interests. This is evident in the international reactions to the prickly, ultimatum‐ridden way Eritrea conducts its foreign relations: there is a ‘diplomatic deficit’. For a small country that has the single central issue of its border (enforcement of the Boundary Decision), is seeking to get international backing, or at least reduce the advantage that Ethiopia has in this regard, its stance is so often counter‐productive. The liberation legacy of ‘self‐reliance’ becomes the justification of a diplomacy that rejects making allies, even tactical. But the major respect in which the political‐military stance is counter‐productive has to do with economic strategy ‐ an area of indeterminate strategy which now deserves attention.
Economic Strategy & Regional Co‐operation
Understanding what is happening to the economy faces the same opaqueness as exploring the working of politics. The budget is classified and few economic statistics are available, other than the ‘guestimates’ made by theIMF and World Bank. They paint a picture of production in which total exports may be as low as $20 million (though this may not sufficiently reckon with livestock exports to the Gulf), and where even in the last two years of good rains, food self‐sufficiency is below consumption needs. The growth sectors have been financial services and construction, the latter in the hands of companies spawned by the ruling party. Insofar as the circle is squared, it is entirely because of remittances, estimated at $400 million per year, about a third of total GDP, from the sizeable and expanding diaspora in Europe, US, the Gulf and Ethiopia. Unlike Zimbabwe where the whole effort of those who send money to kin is geared to avoiding an official rate of exchange which is at an absurd level of a tenth of the parallel, in Eritrea the strictness of controls means that almost all transfers go through financial services that are in practice parastatals. Hence, foreign exchange is available to the public authorities.
Given little potential of agricultural exports and the need to finance food imports, probably for the long run, and only limited potential of minerals (unless rumoured oil and gas prospects come quickly on line), it has been clear since liberation that Eritrea's only comparative advantage lies in being a trading link, adding value to re‐exports, and niche production for outside markets ‐ as well as charting its much vaunted self‐sufficiency in supplying internal markets with manufactured goods. Government statements have always recognised this need for access to markets, especially those in the region, and more particularly in Ethiopia. Indeed one recent initiative has been the creation of free economic zones, to attract foreign investment and foster trade, in the ports of Massawa and Assab, and the border town with Sudan, Tessenei.
It is too soon to evaluate progress in the zones, but the political preconditions ‐ good relations with Sudan and Ethiopia and other more distant hinterland areas, like Southern Sudan (which might be a separate state after 2011!) ‐ are not in place. Although clearly an effort has been made in relation to Sudan, with a shift from irritant and supporter of opposition movements from the SPLA to the Beja Congress and other Eastern parties in the 1990s, to being an active ‘Partner for Peace’ in relation to negotiations over Darfur and between Chad and Sudan, and in the SGNU process on the Eastern Front. Relations with the Government of South Sudan are also being separately fermented.
There is a National Development Campaign (NDC) but there seems to be no clear articulation of its content or logic, and it has not been made apparent to the people. Any economic strategy is apparently no longer based on the ‘Singapore model’ which was in vogue in government circles in the 1990s ‐ inappropriate in several regards, notably the choice of one of the two East Asian tigers based on a ‘city state’ and thus with no significant agriculture or land question. Two basic issues for Eritrea's development remain the strategic choice of whether to build on or by‐pass the existing peasant and pastoral systems of production, and the question of land reform. Emphasis has not been on improving peasant agriculture and livestock but on medium‐scale concessions and projects. Land reform had been seen as a crucial area for liberation and democratic reform as an instrument for political support of the liberation movement in the 1970s and 1980s, but that approach was ditched ‐ with no explanation or justifying policy statements ‐ in favour of wiping the existing systems away and parcelling out all land to individuals. The blueprint did set out an equitable formula for this, but specified a process that was not feasible and it remains seemingly unimplemented, although no reports are available. Meanwhile what is presumably occurring in practice is allocation of land on a local ad hoc basis that are varying amalgams of part market, part 'traditional’ mechanisms but with primacy for appropriation for state and party‐company use.
The few descriptions of agricultural programmes do emphasise efforts to encourage alienation of land for new enterprises, based often on irrigation, rather than farreaching steps to promote peasant farming and livestock rearing. There are no detailed breakdowns of how much the last two years of good harvests owe to the new projects as opposed to smallholder and small‐herder growth ‐ and thus little indication of how sustainable this recent achievement of 70–80% self‐sufficiency in major foods may be in years of drought. For the moment, the markets appeared well‐stocked with grain, vegetables, fruit and meat ‐ but were not busy, suggesting that people in town did not have incomes to spend (other than remittances). Bread is rationed and distributed through designated shops (but at least its availability is equitable). Even grain for beer is in short supply, making distribution of the renowned 80 year old ‘Melotti’ beer unpredictable.
The slogan of ‘self‐reliance’ is not just rhetoric; reliance on own resources and technical capabilities as opposed to reliance on aid‐organised ‘projects’ or inviting tenders by foreign corporations has been refreshingly present in programmes such as the restoration of the old Italianbuilt railway line from the port of Massawa 2,500 metres up through stunningly beautiful mountains to Asmara. More broadly there is reliance on mobilising organised labour for infrastructure, but also for ‘campaigns’ for planting or harvesting in agriculture, and for state and party businesses. Much of this is organised through conscription into national service, now on a huge and seemingly permanent scale, with an estimated 400,000 young people in service at present (Mehreteab, 2007), plus an army reserve. How far this is a continuing precaution against a continuing Ethiopian threat, or a political expedient of controlling youth, as opposed to a longterm strategy of social engineering that some observers see as motivating the regime, is another opaque area. But certainly any vision of creating a new Eritrean citizenry among the youth who were too young to engage in the heroic period of national liberation seems ‐ like Mao's cultural revolution ‐ to be perceived by many of the youth as coercion, and they are marching with their feet. Estimates from inside the country and figures available in receiving countries in the region and in Europe and North America suggest several hundreds are leaving monthly. This, despite coercive measures to hold parents of ‘draft dodgers’ to account by fines (50,000 Nakfa) and even exclusion from access to land, although I heard one suggestion that these are being used more leniently today.
To be sure, there is a refreshing absence of masses of expensive, logo‐ridden SUVs, of earnest young westerners in the streets and coffee bars of Asmara, and those other signs of the ubiquitous representatives of international NGOs elsewhere in Africa, and presumably no inflation of salaries as the best locals are seduced into such organisations. But even the virtual banning of INGOs has not been selective, sending packing even those with considerable local experience or some useful international influence where it might matter to an internation ally friendless Eritrea, like Norwegian Church Aid, and thus in practice has been counter‐productive.
The Unfinished Business of the Constitution & Citizenship
What then of political strategy? The historic Second and Unity Congress of the old EPLF in 1987 had laid out a vision of eventual multi‐party democracy. That principle was among several democratic features of the Constitution, drafted as a result of a two‐year popular consultation process and approved by the National Assembly in 1996 and then by a Constituent Assembly. But it was never promulgated, as expected, in 1998. Nor have elections provided in it been implemented. Clearly the war with Ethiopia disrupted the timing, but does the now indefinite postponement of promulgation and national elections signify a rejection of the model in favour of a ‘guided democracy’ or permanent single party rule? To be sure, another round of local elections and indirectly at regional level is going on, but there is no clear statement of where these initiatives will lead. Meanwhile, there is a perpetuation of a public stance on the part of government, reflected curiously enough by international governments when dealing with human rights and asylum matters to do with Eritrea, to pretend that the constitution is in fact in force, although it has never been formally implemented.
In addition to this impasse in the legislative architecture, other practices have been shaping other dimensions of the political system. In spite of rhetoric about the constitution, the judiciary is not independent; there is an absence of freedoms of association, of speech and media, only a couple of civil society organisations, and there is a lack of due and transparent process in treating a range of ‘dissent’ from religious bodies to political expression. At the same time, there are recent initiatives to restore the political education that was so effective in the liberation struggle ‐ now via national service and in a new cadres school. In understanding these initiatives it does not seem to be recognised that what was appropriate then may not suit the different context today. Moreover, it might repay historians of that struggle ‐ of whom there are clearly many at work inside and outside the country ‐ to consider the contrary influences in this regard that were at work inside the EPLF: the ‘line’ and the imposed discipline of the military intelligence (still very much in command today seemingly) and the more genuinely educational role of the Department of Political Education whose main architect in the 1970s and 1980s now languishes in detention.
The overall climate is one of secrecy that leads to all policy matters being kept under wraps, and of repression inhibiting any notion of public discussion about the strategic lacunae over peace, regional policy, development and political futures. It is precisely the nature of the inter‐related crises and strategic alternatives to the present impasse that need to be pursued with all the energy, creative commitment and urgency that characterised previous periods of struggle.
In practice, the people are not being mobilised to play this role of engaged citizens with rights, and with opinions. Their incorporation is restricted to the mobilisation of their labour, courage and readiness for self‐sacrifice and their ‘loyalty’. An alternative notion of citizenship needs to be developed ‐ a process for which the draft Constitution provides only a limited and not very detailed starting point. That process should also include clarification of the status of the several hundreds of thousands caught in an ambiguous position between the old, ‘greater’ Ethiopia and the new state of Eritrea ‐ requiring a final negotiated settlement just as crucially as the boundary issue.