In 1991 the Republic of Somaliland broke away from Somalia. With a constitution-ally-based and popularly elected government, the Republic of Somaliland has a democratic system matched by few other countries in Africa and the Middle East, although Somaliland's independence has not been recognised internationally. However, the history of the region indicates that the Somali political system faces several challenges. In order to understand these challenges one has to establish an analytical framework, a definition of democracy that could provide some guidance to what such challenges can consist of, and which specific areas of the political structure to examine.
The term democracy comes from a combination of two Greek words: demos (people) and kratos (rule). Accordingly, democracy has been defined as ‘rule by the people’ (Sorensen, 1998:3). A demand for ‘rule by the people’, although seemingly straightforward, requires a definition of who ‘the people’ are and an agreement on mechanisms for their political inclusion or exclusion. For example, should émigré or diaspora communities have political rights in their country of origin, and should there be age restrictions on political participation? What is the most appropriate form of popular participation, and how can the rights of minority groups be accommodated?
Moreover, democratic systems vary and these variations are the result of a number of factors. First, the form they take can be influenced by a country's stage of capitalist development and pre-existing institutions. They may, for example, be a result of elites attempting to hold on to their power, as in the case of the Upper House of Parliament in Great Britain where the elite sought to entrench their powers by creating an institution that is not subject to democratic elections. Popular participation also varies between democratic systems. It can take a restricted form, where the citizens' role is limited to influencing their elected representatives to whom they have delegated full powers (Schumpeter, 1976), or may take a more comprehensive form with an emphasis on individual rights (Held, 1987). In such systems, citizens are free to determine their own lives, as long as they do not negate the rights of others. Another form of democracy – described by Arndt Lijphart (1984) as the ‘consensus model’ and practiced in Scandinavian countries – is based on an expectation that the elected leaders will strive to achieve the greatest degree of consensus amongst the citizens and political parties.
Second, forms of democracy can also be influenced by culture. Claude Ake (1993) outlines an ‘African model’ of democracy based on African traditions of political participation. However, as African political systems take many forms, it is difficult to conceive of a single model of democracy in Africa. In Somali society – a society famously described as a ‘pastoral democracy’ (Lewis, 1961) and influenced by Arab and African culture1 – traditional political institutions and practices have, as we shall see, been particularly pertinent to efforts to establish a liberal democracy in Somaliland.
While being conscious of the various models of democracy that exist, it is helpful to establish some basic criteria to distinguish a democratic political system from a nondemocratic one. In his classic treatise ‘On Democracy’, Robert Dahl (1988) argues that in a democratic system there must be three fundamental elements: effective participation whereby all citizens must have an equal and effective opportunity to make their views known on the formulation of public policy; voting equality, whereby every citizen must have an equal and effective opportunity to vote, and that all votes must be counted as equal; and an enlightened understanding, whereby, within reasonable limits, every citizen must have an equal and effective opportunity to learn about relevant policies and their probable consequences (Ibid. p. 9).
Few, if any, of the existing states in the world actually fulfil the requirement of one person, one vote.2 Some electoral arrangements, such as the majoritarian system of the United Kingdom, can result in the party with the largest popular vote gaining a larger number of elected representatives than is actually proportionate to their vote. Moreover, the principle of one person one vote is often unfulfilled due to age restrictions, the use of quotas for underrepresented minorities, traditions, and the variable size of constituencies. As will be seen in Somaliland, in some societies, the introduction of a majoritarian system of one-person-one-vote can, if employed rigorously, restrict the representation of women and minority groups in a country's political institutions.
Sorensen (1998:12) takes Dahl's, Schumpeter's and Held's models as a point of departure and establishes more flexible criteria. He asserts, first, that a democratic system requires that all positions of effective authority in government – both parliamentary and cabinet positions – must be open to meaningful and extensive and non-violent competition amongst individuals and organised groups (or political parties) at regular intervals; second, a democracy also requires a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies; third, eligibility for public office must be broadly defined ensuring that no social group is excluded; and fourth, there should be a high degree of civil and political liberties, including freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom to form and join organisations. One could add to this the right to alternative sources of information.
In the rest of this article we use these criteria to examine the challenges facing Somaliland in institutionalising a democratic political system. These criteria are used only as points of departure for analysis of the process of democratisation in Somaliland rather than to make a judgement on the existing political system. In this sense, the criteria are rather to guide our focus than an analytical framework employed rigidly to evaluate if Somaliland is a democracy or not. This also allows the article to focus on some of the very case- and region-specific factors influencing the political system in Somaliland. Following Tilly (2003), this allows us to examine democracy as a process and, additionally, to take into account non-western Somali democratic practices.
Somaliland: An Historical Background
Before looking at contemporary challenges facing Somaliland we outline briefly its recent history. The Republic of Somaliland, comprising the former regions of northwest Somalia, was created in May 1991 when the leadership of the Somali National Movement (SNM) declared that they were dissolving the union between the former colonial territories of the British Somaliland Protectorate and Italian Somalia established in 1960. The Somaliland authorities assert that rather than being a secessionist state, the sovereign independence of Somaliland has been restored, a status it held for five days between 26 June and 1 July 1960 when it united with Italian Somalia to form the Somali Republic (Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002).
So far no country has recognised Somaliland's sovereignty, although a number of countries have shown sympathy with its cause. South Africa has formally declared that Somaliland fulfils the Montevideo criteria for statehood and it also accepts the Somaliland passport.3 Furthermore, the African Union (AU) is considering Somaliland's application for membership and has indicated a willingness to deal with it as an ‘outstanding case’ (ICG, 2006:3).
The first political election in Somaliland territory dates back to February 1960, when the Legislative Council of Somaliland was formed under the British colonial administration. The decision by the elected council to unite with Italian administered Somalia was popularly supported, although discontent with the union began to surface as northerners felt increasingly marginalised by the concentration of socio-economic and political developments in the south. Somaliland's political elite nevertheless played a prominent role in Somalia's post-independence politics and all the leaders of Somaliland's present-day political parties were previously highranking civil servants or prominent politicians in Somalia.4 Alienation from the Somali state grew among northerners in the latter years of Siyad Barre's military dictatorship (1969–1991). The centralisation of political power by the regime and its policies of economic expropriation estranged the predominant Isaaq clan in northwest Somalia. A large influx of Somali refugees from Ethiopia into Somaliland following Somalia's defeat in the 1987–88 war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden, further strained the economy and the environment of the region. The humanitarian assistance and preferential treatment accorded to the refugees by the government, most of who were from different clans to those resident in Somaliland, exacerbated social tensions. In 1981 mounting grievances with the regime led to the creation of the Somali National Movement (SNM) which fought a ten year insurgency against the Barre regime.
With its base in neighbouring Ethiopia, the SNM recruited its fighters mostly from the Isaaq clan. In 1988 a peace agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia forced the SNM to take desperate measures to attack and briefly capture the northern cities of Hargeisa and Burco. In response, the government bombed Hargeisa and carried out harsh reprisals against the Isaaq civilian population. Africa Watch (1990) estimated that between 1988 and 1989 up to 60,000 civilians were killed and half a million people fled to Ethiopia. The ranks of the SNM were swollen by those who fled and most non-Isaaq's were purged from the SNM. Many members of the SNM who had previously supported a united Somalia now argued for independence. The declaration of Somaliland's independence in May 1991 followed the overthrow of Siyad Barre in January 1991 and was precipitated by the hurried installation of Ali Mahdi as President of Somalia by one faction of the United Somali Congress (USC) without prior consultation with the SNM.
The declaration of Somaliland's independence was announced at a gathering of the SNM and northern clans in the city of Burco. With a hastily written Charter, the SNM was granted a mandate by the gathering to govern for two years and to prepare the country for elections. This proved to be an impossible task given the government's lack of resources and the destruction wreaked upon the territory by ten years of war. Within a year splits inside the SNM and a failure to disarm clan militias threatened to drag the country into civil war. This was averted through a series of clan peace conferences (shiir beeleed) brokered by clan elders and backed by civil activists and business people.
The conference held in the town of Borama over several months in 1993 proved to be decisive. At Borama, a Charter for government and mechanisms for controlling and disarming the militia were agreed, and the SNM relinquished power to a civilian government whose President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal was nominated by an assembly of elders. The structure of government agreed at Borama fused indigenous forms of social and political organisation with western-style institutions of government, in what became known as the ‘beel system’ of government. This consisted of an executive president and a bicameral parliament, comprising an Upper House of Elders and Lower House of Representatives, whose members were nominated on a clan basis by an electoral college of elders (Bradbury et al. 2003). This clan-based power-sharing system provided the basis of government for eight years. Despite two years of civil war between 1994 and 1996, it brought a high degree of stability to Somaliland. The last country-wide shir beeleed was held in Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, from October 1996 to February 1997. In addition to reelecting Egal as president, the attendant elders approved a draft constitution and a schedule for a transition from the clan system of governance to a democratic, multiparty system. At first it appears perverse that the elders would support a move, which ostensibly sought to weaken their status, but there were a number of other pressures – those from the diaspora to democratise. Another was a wish to get funds from donors as well as international recognition, which even the elders were eagerly awaiting. The Hargeisa conference marked the beginning of five years of stability in Somaliland.
The transition from a system of selected representation to elected representation in Somaliland's political institutions has occurred in four stages. In May 2001 a plebiscite approved a constitution, which provides the framework for a democratic political system. This was followed by elections to 23 district councils in December 2002, the formation of three national parties, presidential elections in April 2003 and, finally, elections to the Lower House of Parliament in September 2005. All of these elections have been deemed relatively free and fair by foreign observers (Abokor, et al. 2005; Hansen & Linderman, 2003; Abokor, et al. 2002)
Meaningful & Extensive Competition
But to what extent are these new institutions producing a democratic transition as set out in our introduction and what role does local political culture play in determining the nature of this potential democracy? The adoption of a multi-party political system and elected representation requires an environment that allows for meaningful competition. And meaningful competition requires competing political alternatives. These alternatives need not be ideologically grounded, but must have clearly distinguishable political agendas and strategies to deal with social, political and economic challenges. In Schumpeter's (1976) version of democracy, an election is more about removing political leaders that fail to perform, rather than a contest between ideological or political agendas. In Somaliland we see a hybrid form of government, which mixes clan and party politics and is conditioned by the historical layers of political institutions and actors.
Somaliland's constitution limits the number of political parties to three. Of the six ‘political organisations’ that fielded candidates in the district election, three won sufficient support to become accredited national parties: UDUB (The United Democratic People's Party), Kulmiye (The Unity Party) and UCID (The Justice and Welfare Party) (Bradbury et al. 2003). A critical challenge faced by the parties is to sustain themselves as political organisations that offer distinct policies and a meaningful political and social agenda.
In all three elections UDUB, the party founded by the late president Mohamed Ibrahim Egal and led by his successor President Dahir Rayale Kahin, has maintained its position as the governing party, holding the largest number of seats in the district elections, narrowly winning the presidential race, and but loosing the majority in the parliament during the parliamentary elections. Although UDUB does not have an ideologically defined political programme, the party's campaign focused on the continuity of governance structures, stability and experience of government, which give UDUB some of the characteristics of a right of centre ‘conservative’ party.5
Kulmiye is led by the veteran politician – Ahmed M. Mohamoud ‘Silanyo’ – a former Minister of Planning (1969–1973) and Minister of Commerce (1973–1978, 1980–1982) in Siad Barre's government, the longest running leader of the SNM between 1984 and 1990. Silanyo was also Minister of Finance (1997–1999) and Minister of Planning (1999–2000) in two of Egal's Somaliland administrations. The party leadership also includes several other leaders from the SNM, and this is used by some of it members to give the party a popular political legitimacy.6
The Justice and Welfare Party (UCID) is the party with the most clear-cut ideology, promoting itself as a Scandinavian-type social democratic party. This is influenced by its founder Faisal Ali Farah ‘Warabe’ who lived in Finland and several of its founding members have lived in Scandinavia.7
In the Horn of Africa, competition between political parties has often been off-set by a breakdown in party structures. In Ethiopia, for example, the opposition has been notoriously fragmented and attempts to create larger political coalitions have been mired with problems. Ruling parties in the region have also sought to engineer the fragmentation of opposition parties in order to entrench their own positions. They have usually been more successful at maintaining their own party unity and loyalty, through use of money and state resources. However, they have also been affected by lack of party discipline.
Such political party fragmentation was also prominent in the last period of democratic government in Somalia, between 1960 and 1969. The first independent government of Somalia in 1960 was a coalition of four major political parties: the southern Somali Youth League (SYL), which was the dominant party, the northern based United Somali Party (USP), the Somali National League (SNL), and the Hisbiga Digil Mirifle (comprising members from the Digil Mirifle clan). The coalition collapsed when Muhamed Haji Ibrahim Egal and several other prominent members of the SNL withdrew and joined with politicians from the SYL to form the Somali National Congress (SNC). Although this was a demonstration of national unity, the realignment of politicians also illustrated the weakness of party discipline. The SYL succeeded in retaining power in the 1964 election, in which 21 parties participated,8 but the lack of party discipline was to have extreme consequences. Parliamentary voting on certain issues was done in secret which weakened the party's control over its members; parliamentarians who nominally belonged to the SYL often voted with the opposition. Consequently, despite SYL's overall majority, the government came close to resignation in 1966, because it lost a vote in the parliament. The weakness of party structures had a clear influence in the 1967 elections, during which Egal defected from his new party and rejoined SYL. The Party fragmentation normally occurred along lineage lines. This reached a new extreme in the 1969 election which was contested by 62 parties, mostly representing one man and his lineage. The Somali Republic was fundamentally damaged by the conspiracy of silence that concealed the extent of clan influence over politicians. In the case of Somaliland, being open about it and examining the extent of clan power in politics is essential if the country's fledgling political democracy is to develop and strengthen.
However, the fragmentation of the parties in the Somali republic was also due to other factors. Party fragmentation was fuelled by the way candidates were required to raise their own funds for their campaigns. As the parties lacked the resources to support their candidates a majority of the 1,002 candidates standing in the 1969 elections were self-funded. I. M. Lewis estimated that some may have spent as much as £15,000 of their own money, a considerable investment at a time when the annual budget for the entire country was only £15 million (Lewis, 1972:397). The lack of party support meant that the candidates relied on their clans to raise the funds needed, being one of the few efficient fundraising structures.9 As many of the candidates were former civil servants who had quit their jobs to stand for parliament, candidates and clans had an interest to see a return on their investments. This may have motivated the mass defection from the opposition to the SYL after the election once its victory was confirmed. Given the limited reach of the Somali media at the time and high illiteracy rates, much of the public was uninformed about policy issues, and understandably voted according to lineage loyalties. The influence of the clan system on politics was patently obvious to Somalis. But it was the rampant misuse of government funds during the 1969 election, and the use of the army for campaign purposes, that caused widespread public dissatisfaction with the government and helped to pave the way for the dictatorship of Siyad Barre. This was a sad end for a country that had experienced in the 1960s the first peaceful democratic transition of power in Africa.
There are some striking continuities between the 1960–1969 political process in Somalia and the legislative elections in Somaliland in 2005, which highlight some of the challenges of instilling a democratic system in Somaliland. One such similarity is the continuing influence of ethnic or clan based loyalties. Although the Somaliland elections were intended to mark a progression from clan-based politics to multi-party politics, the Somali lineage system continues to have a strong influence on the political system. During the parliamentary elections, clan leaders had a role in nominating party candidates, providing the parties with lists of candidates from which to select those most able to run for office. Candidates interviewed by the authors estimated that it was necessary to spend US$30,000 to run a campaign. As the parties had few resources, candidates relied on their own resources or funds raised through their clans to finance their campaigns.
Furthermore, there was little to distinguish between the parties in terms of policies. Voters were therefore more easily mobilised around parochial clan issues and promises of gifts than by political arguments. Ideological cleavages between the parties were either non-existent (between Kulmiye and UDUB) or, in the case of UCID, so weakly developed that even the parties' own MPs failed to realise that the party was supposed to be Social-Democratic/Socialist. The extent of vote-buying was unclear, but was a troubling development in Somaliland. For MPs nominated by their clan and reliant on them for finance, the potential for a conflict of loyalty between the clan and party must have been strong. This was illustrated in the parliamentary elections, when five out of six candidates from the Essa clan decided to boycott the election over the allocation of parliamentary seats to the Essa, despite heavy pressures from their respective parties.
The situation in Somaliland is also characterised by relatively young parties made up of older political organisations and factions. Kulmiye incorporates several political factions. One includes former SNM military commanders who were associated with a marxist tendency within the movement and are commonly referred to as the ‘Red Flag’ (calan cas).10 Another comprises a small religious group, and a third includes members of the ‘Hargeisa Group’ of civil activists famous for their stand against the Barre regime.11 Although the name Kulmiye – the ‘Gathering’ or ‘Unity’ – implies that it is a party that unites disparate tendencies, these differences are a challenge to party discipline. Prior to the parliamentary elections, UCID had avoided any challenges to party unity, partly because it had limited support. However, following the big gains it made in the parliamentary elections, the party may begin to experience internal divisions.
In 1960, conscious of the problems associated with political parties, Somalilanders took steps to minimise the potential for political fragmentation by restricting the number of parties to three and banning MPs from changing parties whilst in parliament. However, this does not guarantee party discipline in parliament today, where the lack of a party whip leaves room for MPs to vote against their own party. UCID indeed faced a rebellion from one of its MPs in the first session of parliament and sought to remove him from parliament by ejecting him from the party. The case was sent to court and UCID lost (interview with Warabe, 2005). One strategy by UCID to instil party discipline has been to inculcate a Scandinavian-style social democratic ideology among its MPs. But, the ideological consciousness amongst MPs is generally weak. UDUB can potentially use the state coffers to create party loyalty, by bestowing rewards on loyal MPs. However, not only is this illegal, but history also illustrates that such strategies do not necessarily guarantee success.
Since the elections in September 2005, it appears that public profile of the parties has diminished. Offices have been closed due to lack of resources. The parliamentary sub-committees have cross-party membership and by all reports are not split along party lines. There is more coherence amongst the candidates of the two oppositional parties, but at times it seems like the coherence have merged the two party groups into one. The scramble by politicians after the district elections for posts in the new national parties and the alliances of convenience that were formed, illustrated the opportunistic nature of politics and the absence of loyalty to the parties and their policies. The parties' links with and control over members elected in their name to the district councils has been tenuous. Paradoxically, party discipline and unity could worsen if Somaliland receives international recognition, and if the one political issue that unites the parties and their members is removed and the government begins to benefit from direct foreign support. Several conflicts between the lower house of the parliament and the cabinet of president Kahin has emerged during the spring of 2007. The electoral commission nominated by the president was voted down by the lower house of parliament, which it according to the constitution had the power to do. However, the parliament prolonged the mandate of the sitting commission, going beyond the powers granted to it by the constitution. Kahin unconstitutionally vetoed the budget suggested by parliament, a provocative budget which suggested cutting the expenses of the presidents' office back to the 2004 level. The paradox is that these issues, which are indicators of a struggle between parliament and president partly because of lack of precedence, might prevent the emergence of fissures within the parties, they create the need for unified fronts, and political issues larger than the quarrel over the use of resources for local patronage.
The limited experience of conducting politics through political parties and the weak party structures increase the likelihood that clan will have a large influence on Somaliland politics. The politicians will have a form of constituency, but it will be a clan based. This has several consequences. The influence of the clan means that women are under-represented in political institutions. Moreover, the mix of clan and party nominations lack transparency and leaves the system open to clientism as formal party rules for nomination are disregarded.12 These problems are likely increase popular pressure for a review of the constitutional restrictions on the number of political parties or the development of mechanisms that would enable the de-selection of a party that fails to deliver. In April 2007, a new party, Qaran, was established. Since the Somaliland constitution (articles 22 and 23) allows Somalilenders to create political parties, it is only the participation in elections that is restricted; the party lives an uneasy existence and its status in upcoming elections is uncertain at best.
Political Participation
As we outlined at the beginning, for Sorensen public participation in the selection of political representatives and in policy formulation is a defining feature of a democratic system. Since public pressure forced the SNM leadership to break with Somalia in 1991, public participation has been a feature of the political system. The Borama conference and other clan conferences were large-scale public consultation exercises. The Somaliland constitution enshrined the right of universal suffrage and changed the system of selecting government from a college of elders to individual voters. The level of public participation in the elections and degree to which communities in Somaliland are adequately represented in parliament can therefore be a measure of Somaliland's democratic credentials.
A total of 670,320 valid votes were counted in the 2005 parliamentary election. The turn-out was lower than some had speculated and less than half the 1.3 million ballot papers that were printed for the election. Nevertheless, it was considerably higher than in the preceding district and presidential elections, with turn-outs of 440,067 valid votes and a total of 488,543 respectively. The absence of a census and voter registration or a post-election voter survey makes it difficult to determine whether the turn-out was a reasonable representation of the eligible voting population in Somaliland. Determining the representative nature of the poll is made more complex by some marked differences in regional votes between the three elections.13 However, the fact that in the three elections the western regions of Woqooyi Galbeed (Hargeisa region), Awdal and Saaxil accounted for over 60 per cent of the votes cast, is probably a reasonable reflection of the concentration of Somaliland's population in the west of the country. Furthermore, the fact that the largest numbers of votes were cast in Woqooyi Galbeed also attests to the rapid growth of the capital Hargeisa since the end of the war.
These regional patterns of voting also reflect historic socio-economic differences between Somaliland's regions. Better transport and infrastructure, shorter distances for voters to travel, better media coverage, more intense campaigning and voter education and a more sedentary population also facilitated a higher turn-out in the west. The smaller number of votes in Somaliland's three eastern regions of Togdheer, Sanaag and Sool can, in part, be accounted for by the smaller population and the fact that it is more nomadic than in the west of the country. Despite efforts to extend the elections to rural areas, the infrastructure required for elections favors settled rather than nomadic populations. It is likely, therefore, that a substantial part of the nomadic population, which accounts for a significant proportion of Somaliland's population, did not vote. The lower poll in eastern Somaliland is also accounted for by the fact that several districts of Sool and eastern Sanaag regions and one district of Togdheer did not participate in the polls. Somaliland's authority over these regions is contested by the Puntland State of Somalia to the east, and since 2003 Puntland has taken control over several of the larger towns.14 Threats from populations in these regions and the Puntland authorities to disrupt the elections left the Somaliland Electoral Commission with no option but to ‘postpone’ elections in several districts in these areas. This partially accounts for the lower overall poll in eastern Somaliland.
Clan loyalty was very important in the politics of the Somali Republic 1960–1969 despite claims by politicians that it had little influence. The Somali Republic was fundamentally damaged by the conspiracy of silence that concealed the extent of clan influence over politicians. In the case of Somaliland, being open about and examining the extent of clan power in politics is essential if the country's fledgling political democracy is to develop and strengthen. The non-participation in the elections of most of the Warsangeli clan populating eastern Sanaag and the Dulbahante clan in Sool and Togdheer in the elections has important implications for Somaliland. The participation of people in these areas could have affected the outcome of the elections. While the 2002 district election to a certain extent consolidated the Somaliland state by establishing popularly elected councils that recognise the authority of the Hargeisa government and pay taxes to it, the nonparticipation of populations in eastern Sanaag and Sool effectively served to shrink the Somaliland polity and make politics in Somaliland more exclusive (Bradbury et al. 2003). The lack of political structures that recognise the authority of the government in Hargeisa weakens the Somaliland government's claim to represent the people of these regions.
As noted, the adoption of the multi-party system has done little to move Somaliland away from clan-based politics. For example, the 2003 elections were postponed several times until agreement was reached over the demarcation of constituency boundaries and a formula was agreed for distributing the 82 parliamentary seats to Somaliland's six regions. The first postponement occurred when Gadabuursi elders and MPs from Awdal region rejected the election bill on the grounds that they would end up with fewer seats than they held. A feature of the power-sharing beel system has been its inclusiveness in terms of clan representation. Since 1991, non-Isaaq clans have been represented in both the executive and legislative wings of government and after the 1997 Hargeisa conference, minority groups gained representation in the legislature. But the adoption of a majoritarian electoral system has produced ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Although the three party system encouraged the emergence of multi-clan alliances, at a local level people voted along clan lines. The clan composition of district councils reflects the major clans in the district, while smaller clans and minorities are not represented.
The 2005 parliamentary elections did not produce any dramatic changes in popular support for the parties, but the clan composition of parliament did change (Abokor et al. 2006). The clearest changes were the increase in Isaaq and Gadabuursi representation in parliament, and the decline in the number of seats held by the Harti and ‘minorities’. Despite an increase the popular vote, the Dhulbahante and Warsengeli people of Sool and eastern Sanaag lost four parliamentary seats. This will only increase their sense of marginalisation within Somaliland. The number of Esa MPs also declined, largely as a result of four candidates withdrawing from the election prior to polling day. The ‘minorities’, who gained representation in Somaliland's second parliament, retained only one seat in the legislature.
Within the majority Isaaq clan family, the three largest clans – the Habar Awal, Garhajis and Habr Jeclo' – all gained seats, while the smaller Arab and Ayub both lost seats (Ibid.). Within the Isaaq the most significant change was the increase in Habar Yunis politicians in parliament. The clan is represented in all the parties and across Somaliland (with the exception of Awdal region) and they potentially command the single largest ‘clan block’ of votes in parliament. This is a significant change from the mid-1990s, when the Habar Yunis belief that they were underrepresented in parliament was one of the grievances behind the civil war. The equitable representation of the three major Isaaq clans should mitigate such ructions in the future. Other changes can be found at the level of sub-clans, with some of the larger and politically stronger lineages losing ground to smaller lineages, due to the larger lineage fielding too many candidates. The impact of these changes, if any, will only become apparent over time. The lack of participation and representation amongst the Harti clans of eastern Somaliland, however, has to be addressed because in the long term it could destabilize the country.
That clans function as a unit of political mobilisation also leads to a lowering political participation, particularly along gender lines. The beel political system was criticised, because it excluded women from representative politics. The Somaliland constitution gives women the same political rights as men. In all three Somaliland elections, women exercised their right to vote by turning out in large numbers. Very few women, however, were put forward by the political organisations as candidates. And those who were nominated stood little chance of being elected as they were put low down on the candidate list. Women were selected by the parties rather than being proposed by the clan, but as they could not guarantee to deliver the vote of their clan there was no incentive for the parties to select female candidates. Interviews collected by one of the authors indicates that the lack of will to vote for female candidates again was partly a result of the structure of the clan system in which a wife is often married into a different clan, creating doubts about her loyalties both towards the husband and the father's clan. Consequently, only two women from over 2,000 candidates were elected onto municipal councils and only two of the 246 parliamentary seats were won by women (Ibid.). Accordingly, women – who constitute a majority of the adult population and the voting public – and who contribute significantly to local government revenues through small businesses, have no direct voice in these councils and have only a marginal influence in parliament. Their lack of success has convinced women advocating for political participation to advocate for a quota of seats for women in parliament.15
However, it is important to underline the successful aspects of Somaliland political participation. While party-based politics has not removed the influence of clan politics, the large number of candidates in the elections, the large turn-out of voters and the active participation of the clans did ensure the broad participation of the public in the electoral process, with the exception of Sool and eastern Sanaag. The nature of political debate has also ensured that the elections linked local district and regional politics to national politics. Rather than Hargeisa dominating the national debate, therefore, local politics have had an influence on national-level politics and likewise the election results will impact on political relations at a local level.
Civil Liberties, Political Liberties & Access to Mass Media
Political philosophers, from John Stuart Mill (1989) to Amartya Sen (1999), have argued that the existence of a free press is essential to a democratic system, as a means of preventing conflict and protecting civil liberties. Mill (1989:19–25), for example, argued that a public press that creates an arena for free debate ensures a transparent political system. The key problem is that the print and electronic media has only a limited coverage in Somaliland, with the newspapers having a small circulation. Four media companies publish four dailies in Somali, three weeklies in English and three weeklies in Arabic. The biggest Somaliland paper is Jamhuriya, which only has a daily circulation of 2,000-2,500 copies, as well as 1,000 in London. The smallest, the government-owned Mandeq has a circulation of approximately 500 (Dualeh, 2005:155–156). Likewise radio (with the exception of the BBC) and television broadcasts having a restricted coverage. This limited media presence made it difficult to promote a Somaliland-wide political discourse during the elections.
Somaliland toyed with the idea of adopting a press law based on the Ethiopian one but rejected the idea, and the Somaliland press is consequently freer than in Ethiopia. However, reporters who criticize government are regularly jailed. In 2004, the Somali Journalist Network reported four different cases of journalists being arrested on duty. Nonetheless, the media get away with severe criticism of the government, and papers such as Hatuf and Jamhuriya regularly publish highly critical articles, as well as cartoon caricatures of prominent politicians. Seemingly the relationship between the Somaliland government and its press were developing to the better, and was of an entirely different nature than the equivalent relationship in neighbouring countries as Ethiopia, but the trend changed.
On 2 January 2007, Yosuf Gabobe Yusuf Abdi Gabobe, Somaliland Times editor (Somaliland Times being the English version of Hatuf) and also the chairman of Haatuf Media Network and Ali Abdi Dini the editor of Haatuf daily newspaper were arrested together with Mohamed Omar, because of a critical article accusing the president's wife of corruption. It is open to debate whether the articles that the charge was based on were defamatory according to Somaliland law. However, The Somaliland courts choose to follow the chaotic precedence from Ethiopia, invoking the harsh Somali Penal law of 1963 instead of Somalilands press law, this although the latter law explicitly states that it should have precedence.16 The fact that onethird of the printed press in Somaliland (the Hatuf media group's newspapers) was severely hit (if not destroyed; the license of the Hatuf media group was withdrawn by the time of writing) by the court actions, show how vulnerable the Somaliland press is. Although the charged journalists were pardoned by the president because of foreign pressure, the above described juridical precedence has not been revoked
All the Somali papers covered the political debates during all of the elections, while also discussing clan issues. Themes, such as corruption within the government, government gerrymandering, the contested eastern regions, the level of tax in Berbera port and its impact on trade were all covered by the press. The small number of newspapers and their financial fragility means that the print media is vulnerable to political manipulation and the suppression of free debate. Additionally, The Somaliland newspapers are largely an urban phenomenon that have limited impact in a country that has one of the highest illiteracy rates in the world (World Bank/ UNDP, 2003). This is a serious obstacle to strengthening democracy in Somaliland. Political issues are not brought out to the countryside, opening debates on, for example, the influence of clan considerations on voting preferences, as well as of outright buying of votes.
Radio, or TV, could offset the effect of illiteracy, as well as the limited circulation of the printed press. However, the range on the Somaliland radio and TV stations is limited. Moreover, the largest broadcasting institutions, Somaliland National TV and Radio Hargeisa, are owned by the government, and their coverage is limited to areas around Hargeisa and Sahil region.17The range of information available to the public, including exposure to political debates, is therefore limited.18 In addition to this, the broadcast media is biased towards the government. Somaliland National TV coverage of the 2005 elections was clearly skewed to the government and Radio Hargeisa allocated more time to the government candidates.19 Ironically, the only media that is able to reach the rural nomadic population is the BBC Somali Service. However, the BBC is restricted from covering political debates in Somaliland in depth, because it has to treat Somaliland on equal footing with the other parts in Somalia.
This lack of media scrutiny is exacerbated by a weak civil society. A strong civil society is often claimed to be important element in a functioning democracy. According to Francis Fukuyama (2004:30) it has the possibility to enhance accountability. However, the civil society in Somaliland is elite driven, often dependent on external donors. The relatively small size of the Somaliland elite ensures that connections between local NGOs, parties, and clans are strong, and civil society organisations are seldom seen as neutral. Moreover, although being reasonably efficient in educating voters during the elections, they generally fail to engage the Somaliland rural population outside election times.
Conclusions
The series of democratic elections since 2002 have brought significant changes to the political system in Somaliland. They have served to consolidate Somaliland as territorially-defined political entity, with all the regions within its borders (with the exception of Sool and eastern Sanaag) having elected councils and elected representatives in government. The introduction of universal suffrage and the creation of political parties that are not based on clan mark a significant attempt to change the system of kinship-based politics. The achievements in Somaliland are in many ways remarkable in a region more often associated with authoritarian regimes and conflict.
There are however challenges looming over Somaliland's new democracy. Somaliland's political parties are weak, due to their young age, lack of resources, and lack of ideology. The continuing influence of clan politics is clear. While this ensures extensive political participation, it also weakens the function of the political parties. This is unlikely to change while the rural population remains outside the political discussions. Factors as the lack of party funding for candidates (creating dependency on funds provided by clan), young and fragile party organisations, lack of media channels to channel the themes political discussions to the country side, will contribute to an a large group of clan focused voters in Somaliland. If the Somaliland media fails to politicise the rural population, their electoral choices will be influenced by the clan and the gifts they bestow, in this sense Somaliland might fail to politicise its electorate, they will be kept outside the political discussions, only aware of clan factors. As a result significant segments of the Somaliland population failed to participate in the elections and are not well represented in the parliament.
The adoption of winner-takes-all majoritarian electoral system has done nothing to enhance the political participation of women and the representation of minority clans. A lack of resources and a robust legal framework restricts the ability of the media to play a role in safeguarding civil liberties. This all means that Somaliland's fledgling democracy could unravel. As Charles Tilly (2003:37) has commented, ‘contrary to the comforting image of democracy as a secure cave into which people can retreat forever from the buffering of political storms, most regimes that have taken significant steps toward democracies for the last two centuries have later dedemocratised, at least temporarily’.
The experiences of neighbouring countries, as well as the history of the Somali Republic, indicates that this potential ‘de-democratisation’ need to be addressed. Somaliland's solutions might also be interesting in a region with many political systems facing similar challenges; hopefully Somaliland can show the way to handle such problems. Indeed it must address these issues, or it might follow the many negative examples of other entities in the region.