A profound dislocation is apparent in post-apartheid Afrikaner identifications. Despite the fact that Afrikaner nationalism has lost its centrality to South African politics, it remains an important political issue due to the economic and cultural significance of Afrikaans speakers. Nonetheless, the measure of contemporary group cohesion and the evolution of this identity, previously bound together by the strength and versatility of the social coalitions of Afrikanerdom, are largely overlooked in the scholarship (O'Meara, 1999:7; Marx, 2005:140). At the same time, it is widely acknowledged that certain Afrikaner constituencies, most notably an increasingly globalised middle class and capital elites, are flourishing in the new South Africa (Financial Mail, 7 April 2000; The Economist, 21 April 2005). Their success is borne out by the position of so-called Afrikaner capital, which now ranks second to declining English capital on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).1 Since the negotiated settlement of the 1990s the ANC government under both Presidents Mandela and Mbeki has not wavered from its commitment to dialogue with the many elements of this disparate community in graphic recognition of their significance (Business Day, 14 July 2005; Mail & Guardian, 16 April 2005).
With the onset of majority rule, many analyses painted a bleak future for Afrikanerdom subjugated beneath a state dominated by the ANC government and broadly aligned against Afrikaner interests; some scholars predicted the tendency of important groups and sectors to simply ‘opt out’ of the state (Giliomee & Simpkins, 1999:43), whilst a resurgence of rightwing militancy and the Boeremag's thwarted bombing campaign raised the spectre of a race war. None of these situations have materialised. The once sound link between an Afrikaner nationalist identity, regime and state which characterised the years of apartheid government, and that sustained a delicate balance of ethnic, racial and class forces, has been irretrievably broken. Notwithstanding the recent and marked increase in white poverty levels,2 it is evident that this newly disempowered minority still commands a vast material and cultural capital accrued under the previous dispensation (Adam, Van Zyl Slabbert & Moodley, 1997:58). Whilst certain of these constituencies have been increasingly marginalised in the new order, others have become important players in the new South Africa and upon the world stage, embracing elements of the wider politico-economic order. It is suggested that a select number have been able actually to refigure the character of the government's hegemonic project itself due to their position within the leading historic bloc.
There is evidence to suggest that those groupings within the ruling party fold enjoy far greater influence than those outside it (Giliomee & Simkins, 1999:117). Indeed, from its beginnings as a resistance movement to its contemporary manifestation, the ANC government has relied upon a wide range of partners and constituencies to achieve three successive electoral victories. It is a trend that is likely only to strengthen with the assertion that the ANC government today is:
leaning towards construction of a procapitalist, interventionist state prepared to use its power, influence and divestment of assets to create a black bourgeoisie, expand the black middle class, and to generally produce a seismic transfer of wealth from white to black over a ten to twenty year period (Southall, 2004:326).
The paradigm shift in political-economic context within a post-apartheid South Africa – where the national political and economic landscape demonstrates compelling continuities with the old, and the present government is ‘heavily conditioned’ by the foundations of the negotiated transition (Michie & Padayachee, 1997:9) – received comparatively little attention until recently and remains the subject of considerable debate (Williams & Taylor, 2000; Terreblanche, 2002; Keolble, 2004). Moreover, the parameters of this new hegemonic order, exhaustively detailed with regard to ANC constituencies and tripartite alliance partners (Marais, 2001; Bond, 2005), remain comparatively unexplored vis-à-vis current manifestations of Afrikaner identity politics. In order to understand the simultaneous paradigm shift in the political-economic context of identifications among Afrikaans speakers in South Africa it is argued that it is necessary to understand both the subjective andobjective experiences of the Afrikaner against the prevailing structure of power relations. For whilst a pervasive sense of ‘being Afrikaner’ exists, characteristically expressed in terms of cultural attributes and less frequently descent, the significance attached to this self-understanding varies considerably.
This paper therefore attempts to provide a new basis for understanding Afrikaner identity in a post-apartheid era. It argues that a wide array of factors inform these identifications, so that previous conceptions of identity politics based on reductionist frameworks inherent in both structuralist or agency-orientated approaches do not properly capture the multilevel dynamics of identity adjustment in an era of increasing globalisation. Instead, it assesses the analytical tools of global political economy and a neo-Gramscian or transnational historical materialism analysis as a means of breaking down the barriers between the global, national and local levels, as well as between the interconnected structural and subjective dimensions of the phenomenon. This approach forms part of a larger effort to provide a richer, more critical framework for understanding identity politics under conditions of globalisation.
A Political Economy of Post-apartheid Afrikaner Identity
Using this framework, the principal aim of this paper is to demonstrate that transformation within the globalised political economy has served to simultaneously constrict or empower different Afrikaner constituencies by analysing their responses to these wider structural changes on a national and sub-national level. It is contended that the global character of the current world order has had a major effect on the political economy of post-apartheid Afrikaner identifications as a globalised neo-liberal consensus has taken hold on the domestic front. In this paper, globalisation is considered as the ongoing transformation of power on a global scale which involves:
the relations – class, economic, social, gender, financial and political – that are generated by the impulses associated with the globe-wide diffusion of capital's power in our current epoch (Taylor, 2005:1028).
Despite increasing recognition of the importance of these structural factors, there has not been any substantive attempt to address the complexities of these identifications, and the methodology and history that link identity to context, in the scholarship (Ebata & Neufeld, 2000:47–71). These flaws have been worsened by mainstream (territorial or state-based) accounts of identity in a global era where diasporic pluralism, hybridity and transnational solidarities take precedence. Tooze argues that the imperative must be the identification and assessment of the social forces that ‘orthodox analysis’ does not recognise (Tooze, 1990:278). Yet these forces have been largely overlooked in past analyses which privilege ‘the relationship of Afrikaner culture to the state and to state power’ as the ‘pivotal issues’ in Afrikaner group politics (Munro, 1995:7). More recently, Giliomee has elaborated on the survival of the Afrikaners as a group without problematising the notion of survival (Marx, 2005:140). This same drift towards ahistoricism is apparent in earlier accounts of Afrikaner history in South African historiography where it is contended that Afrikaners' points of reference entered a virtuous circle, propagating ideas of community and a collective identity that were perpetuated by their very rise to power (Butler, 1998:37). Even when globalisation is raised today, it is viewed in the context of cultural homogenization (Nash, 2000:361), and without any thorough regard to a globalised political economy perspective that privileges a wide spectrum of social forces and historical context.
Historically much of the debate in both academic and nationalist circles regarding Afrikaner identity has been somewhat crudely articulated about two extremes accentuating either cultural resilience or a materialist realpolitik whereby social identities are realised as the products of human agency or choice (Adam & Giliomee, 1979; O'Meara, 1983). Important questions as to the depth and power of ethnic identifications – external categorisation and self-understanding, objective commonality and subjective groupness (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000:27) – the complex process by which class alignments subvert and even supersede ethnic ideologies, as well as the advent of ‘new’ ethnic groups and identifications or scarcity thereof, have all too frequently been missing from the scholarship. Instead, a more historicist account joins with both agency and structure and implies that transformation occurs within the ‘limits of the possible’:
are not fixed and immutable but exist within the dialectics of a given social structure (comprising the inter-subjective aspect of ideas, ideologies and theories, social institutions, and a prevailing socio-economic system and set of power relations) (Gill, 1993:23).
By developing a theoretically informed and historically specific treatment of power, the intent of this paper is to examine how contemporary manifestations of Afrikaner identity justify or challenge existing power relations. Although Afrikaans speakers exhibit a wide range of identifications many of these are not connected to an ethnic, language or even racial heritage. Nonetheless, with the demise of apartheid and the decline of Afrikaner nationalism, the issue of who or what comprises an Afrikaner is as relevant as it has ever been. One enduring legacy of apartheid has been the resonance of the race issue. The existence of non-white or ‘brown Afrikaners’ remains controversial and the three-fold definition of the term Afrikaner introduced below acknowledges the importance of race. The historical relationship between the coloured and white Afrikaans speaking communities has been beset by contradictions, ranging from inclusion to discrimination and racial classification, to partial political and economic integration. Today the position of the four million-strong Afrikaans speaking coloureds within any wider Afrikaner community remains one of considerable ambiguity (Cornelissen & Horstmeier, 2002:79), with contemporary tensions extending to land claims amongst other issues. Determining the depth and power of these identifications is possible only by acknowledging the dynamic and historical balance between structure and agency. The definitions of ethnicity and ethnic identity proposed here therefore build upon a broadly structuralist interpretation that is linked to an equal attention towards the role of purposeful subjects. Thus ethnicity is best viewed as a continuum, varying widely in terms of salience, intensity and meaning (Pieterse, 1997:366).
This paper contends that there are significant inconsistencies among Afrikaans speakers in South Africa today which are part of a distinct historical genesis and contemporary structural change. Whilst this paper focuses upon the development of post-apartheid identifications, distinctions can thus be drawn between the different but historically linked stages of Afrikaner nationalism, namely: group consciousness, the consciousness of being a volk, and national consciousness (Degenaar, 1983:40). Indeed, the term ‘Afrikaners’ for whites was first used early in the eighteenth century alongside other terminology; it was not until the mid-twentieth century that the term was set aside only for white Afrikaans speakers (Giliomee, 2003:xix). The uneven and fractured class, racial and ethnic awareness which characterises this grouping has fluctuated considerably since 1652, most coherent during the years of Nationalist government when an organisational axis of the state and the National Party offered this minority ‘systematic access to the ear, agency and largesse of the state’ (Munro, 1995:9). With the onset of the accumulation crisis during 1974 and the unprecedented success of the socio-economic transformation of the grouping (O'Meara, 1996:148), the very same tensions returned to afflict this conditional unity. The process of managed reform which followed exposed these divisions still further as it sought to ‘rearrange the relationship between the state, race and class interests which lay at the core of Afrikaner nationalism’ (Munro, 1995:12).
Despite the presence of a pervasive sense of ‘Afrikanerness’ or ‘being Afrikaans’ then, the meanings and significance attached to this subjective groupness or selfunderstanding are now so varied that it is moot whether an Afrikaner grouping exists in any formal sense. Given this diversity, and the historical controversy that surrounds the act of classification itself, employing one definition of the term Afrikaner is problematic. This paper introduces three different definitions so as to acknowledge the complexity of the experiences of Afrikaner identity.3 In the first instance, the ascriptive category of Afrikaner will denote every one who has Afrikaans as their mother tongue. Secondly, an auxiliary ascriptive definition will comprise all whites that boast Afrikaans as their mother tongue. Finally, a more circumscribed experience of identity will be covered by a self-definition that describes an Afrikaner as someone who identifies himself/herself as belonging to a distinct group, defined in terms of (a) an identification with cultural homogeneity converging about the Afrikaans language, and (b) in terms of a self-consciousness of being a political minority in South Africa. Whilst the empirical section of this paper will focus narrowly on an Afrikaans speaking white elite, it is intended that this categorisation will allow a broadening of the term in order to inform a wider research agenda in the context of global restructuring.
It is clear then that the concept of identity needs to be carefully re-examined and framed within a new global context. Problematically, little agreement has been reached on the relationship between identity and globalisation. Traditional orthodoxies are being unevenly disrupted by a new politics so that Cerny alludes to the subnational, transnational and supranational cleavages, tribalism and other revived or invented identities that flourish in the wake of the uneven erosion of national idenities, national economies and national state policy capacity apparent in the contemporary global era (Cerny, 1997:256). Much of the literature is not fully cognisant of the paradox between ‘homogenising global flows and continued cultural heterogeneity’ (Meyer & Geschiere, 1999:7), which give expression to ethnic fundamentalisms as well as new diasporic or transnational identities. Yet closer examination demonstrates that ‘locality has survived alongside globality’ (Scholte, 1996:578). Robertson defines this concern with spatial and temporal issues as ‘glocalisation’ where globalisation represents the compression of the world as a whole, and involves the linking of localities, whilst alluding to the ‘invention’ of ‘locality’ as well as its imagination (Featherstone, Lash & Robertson, 1995:35). Thus Hall suggests that social identities now fluctuate along a spectrum between tradition and translation, whereby those which adapt are capable of substantive reconfiguration, revision and even renewal (Hall, Held & McGrew, 1992:310). Together these trends suggest a paradigm shift in the political-economic context of identity politics.
It is intended that the framework introduced below will advance a new research agenda to explore identity politics within a global context. Whilst contemporary globalisation does provide a fundamental reconfiguration of political space, ‘globalisation is not really global’ (Mittelman, 2000:227). It is necessary to examine the key structures within which this politics is practised as well as the politics of different agents therein. The nuances of these ‘transformed social semantics’ can be felt throughout every aspect of society, informing the (re)constitution and/or creation of identities (Featherstone, Lash & Robertson, 1995:2–3). Whilst this new global equation does provide openings and opportunities, these are fundamentally uneven so that the implications of such profound structural change for the economic, territorial and cultural resources that give meaning to a distinct identity politics should not be underplayed. Globalisation is considered here as one of the foremost explanations for the realignment and possible reconfiguration of Afrikaner identity.
Theorising Identity in a Global Era
The concept of power is clearly fundamental to an analysis of identity under conditions of globalisation. Recent scholarship has confirmed that a ‘historicalstructural’ analysis of the transition (including the strength of the meta-discourse of neoliberal global capitalism) is a sine qua nonof any understanding of post-apartheid South Africa. (Taylor & Vale, 2000:402). Although a global political economy analysis highlights only certain aspects of the transition, it is contended that it draws attention to a sphere that has been largely overlooked in the study of identity politics. And which is nowhere more apparent that vis-à-vis prominent Afrikaner constituencies such as capital elites and a cultural intelligentsia who have participated to very different extents in the neoliberal revolution, and in measures to protect their material position and manufacture a new cultural commentary. For it is this transformation that provides the backdrop to the structural shifts in South Africa that have impacted upon the rise and now reproduction (or reconfiguration) of Afrikaner identifications.
At the same time, the local or sub-national level of analysis must take equal precedence in representing the variety in the observable behaviour of Afrikaans speakers. These non-elite actors also respond to the same global and hegemonic forces which have shaped the transition, as their identifications are in turn shaped by local circumstances. The ‘local orientation’ of the ‘new nationalist movement’ has been remarked upon (Munro, 1995:2), and the concerns of this politics have indeed taken a more markedly provincial turn in recent years (Mail & Guardian, 16 April 2004). The so-called local logics of geographic location, generation and provincial politics assume an explanatory weight in accounting for this variety. More specifically, this analytical frame allows a focus on the manner in which certain Afrikaans speakers have disconnected entirely from any notion of a formal grouping, but remain connected to a pervasive if subjective understanding of ‘Afrikanerness’. Indeed, each of these constituencies are grounded within the more sophisticated categorisation of Afrikaners raised above.
It is a central contention of this paper that an assessment of these structural factors and social forces is best represented within a Gramscian analysis. The strength of the dynamic historical analytic framework that Antonio Gramsci promotes lies in its richer formulation of these phenomena, and their deeper connection to particular historical junctures (Morton, 2003:136). It operates on different (local, national, regional and global) levels of analysis simultaneously, assigning each equal analytical weight. It offers a non-reductionist and non-essentialist means of examining the negotiated and contextual properties of social identities. His reading goes far beyond a simple economism to include political and ideological components within an autonomous political dynamic. With the introduction of the crucial concept of hegemony he in effect loosens the notion of power – hegemony represents one form of power – from a tie to historically specific social classes and, in one fell swoop, gives it a broad applicability to allrelations of domination and subordination (Cox, 1983:164). His dialectic comprehension of history offers a simultaneous attention to both structures and agents so that identity is exposed as a structural and contested condition, punctuated by systemic transactions and moulded by agents. Moreover, Gramsci's analysis of hegemony
necessarily draws our attention to regional, religious, ethnic and national – as well as class – lines of cleavage and connection [which] are the subject of a common analytic frame (Wilmsen & McAllister, 1996:83).
Despite the ‘continued vitality’ of Gramsci's legacy in international relations and political theory (Bielder & Morton, 2005:383–4), there is a substantial lacuna within the neo-Gramscian perspectives which have emerged in global political economy in regard to culture and identity politics. Yet, a Gramscian approach is a novel starting point for a rethinking of some of the most fundamental and potentially divisive issues in the recent scholarship concerned with these identifications. To begin, it supports an awareness of power relations that is necessary in the study of ethnicities and related social phenomena. Further, it concentrates on both the global nature of these phenomena and their local variances and influences by placing them within a global context that is sensitive to historicity and path-dependence. As Hall reasons, the point is not to apply Gramscian theory ‘literally or mechanically but to use his insights to unravel the changing complexities [that] historical transformation has brought about’ (Morley & Chen, 1996:429–30). This paper attempts to answer how consensus has been empowered both by linkages with a variety of domestic partners, and connections with the transnational hegemonic order. The most basic argument is that connecting the domestic and global hegemonic orders explains the structural shifts underway in South African society, and thereafter the changing composition of identifications among Afrikaans speakers in South Africa today. Moreover, this process of adjustment is framed within the more complex three-fold categorisation of Afrikaners introduced earlier.
At the centre of this configuration rests the Gramscian concept of historic bloc. It prescribes a complex conception of how different social forces can be joined so as to create a set of alliances and promote common interests or a new historic order (Rupert, in Gill, 1993:81). To succeed, the bloc must devise a worldview that appeals to different communities and to reasonably claim that the interests of the bloc emulate those of the wider society it professes to represent. Thus, in post-apartheid South Africa it is argued that the formation of a historic bloc is underway that, whilst preferring the interests of capital, also favours other constituencies including the middle classes, the African petite bourgeoisie and, to a lesser degree, the organised working classes (Marais, 2001:230–1). In recent years, growing disillusionment in the tripartite alliance over imbalances in the partnership with the private sector has led to a ‘GEAR shift’ whereby:
The principles of macroeconomic stability remain. But because such stability has essentially been attained, there is more space for massive social and economic interventions by the government. In that sense, we are in a post-stabilisation phase, a post-GEAR period (Netshitenzhe, in Gumede, 2005:116).
Only by acknowledging both the ideological composition of the ANC's hegemonic project then, as well as the dynamics whereby a consensus is manufactured around this ideology, can the nature of Afrikaner identifications be properly demonstrated. Likewise, only by linking this notion to a transnational historic bloc that demarcates a particular, neoliberal developmental paradigm can any analysis of the nature of relations between the government and various Afrikaans speaking constituencies be attempted (Gill, 1995:402). The comprehensive social revolution initially prescribed by the ANC liberation movement and later government has irretrievably faltered. Indeed, the task of building a new order distinguishable from and inimical to the former dispensation has been uneven. It has been suggested that contemporary globalisation discourse has projected certain elements of ‘common sense’ onto the transformation process and transition in post-apartheid South Africa (Taylor & Vale, 2000:399). The so-called ‘ideology’ of globalisation is constituted within a neoliberal historic bloc where the ideological, institutional and material elements of neo-liberalism have attained hegemonic status among a transnational elite, among which a number of ANC and other domestic elites number themselves. For the time being neoliberal economic ideas remain hegemonic ideologically and in terms of policy (Cox, 1999:12), despite widely mooted changes to industrial policy (Business Day, 10 November 2005), and a review of black economic empowerment and protective labour legislation (The Sunday Times, 27 November 2005).
The ‘new’ South Africa is not so much the feted break with the past as the outcome of a sequence of compromises and consensus building. Instead, Marais contends that this transition should:
be understood less as a miraculous historical rupture than as the (as yet inconclusive) outcome of a convergence of far-reaching attempts to resolve an ensemble of political, ideological and economic contradictions that had accumulated steadily since the 1970s (Marais, 2001:2).
Nowhere has this been more evident than the paradigm shift between the Keynesian focus of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of 1994, and the market-orientated and Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy which was adopted in 1996. This radical change of direction was borne of the clout of both domestic – including Afrikaans capital elites – and international capital, forces within the ANC's leadership, and the global balance of social forces as opposed to the concerns of its tripartite alliance partners (Koelble, 2004:59). Indeed, Mbeki and his allies promoted GEAR with persistent assertions that South Africa ‘had no choice but to play by the rules of the globalised economy’ (Gumede, 2005:91). While it is widely acknowledged that an ‘elite compromise’ permeated the entire settlement resulting in significant shifts in the ANC's economic policy during the pre- and post-1994 election period (Habib, Pillay & Desai, 1998:105), this spirit of compromise has only strengthened during Mbeki's presidency. Over time he has consolidated considerable power in the presidency where his ‘technocratic style of policy-making’ and reforms have tended to come from above:
Mbeki is not one for the big hall meeting. He excels at formulating policy in small, bilateral groups, and resolves conflict by talking to the parties concerned individually and securing separate agreements. Official policy is increasingly the product of bilateral meetings (Gumede, 2005:64).
It is now more than a decade since the ANC government assumed power. As the political axis of the settlement, it remains sandwiched between several conflicting prerogatives; indulging capital forces has done little to placate its marginalised constituencies, whilst the Africanist turn of nation-building initiatives has not assuaged minority group demands. Indeed, the historical development of the ANC and its hegemonic project has ensured that existent ideological discrepancies on the level of ideas and material forces have become ever more pronounced with the advent of government and the demands of transformation. Today there are many signs of genuine cracks in this settlement as crises at the local level in particular (Mail & Guardian, 27 October 2005), and most recently with regard to corruption within leadership circles, have accumulated. Recent years have proven that there are substantial qualifications to the loyalty of the hegemon's junior if more progressive alliance partners, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) (Business Day, 1 October 2004). It is beyond the reach of this paper to elaborate further on these rifts although it is certain that the tripartite alliance is troubled and the divisions worsening (Bond, 2004:600–2). Despite the unambiguous nature of the neoliberal domestic project, it clear that international and domestic capital elites retain concerns about the government's ambitions for socioeconomic transformation, most prominently Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) legislation. And that these are concerns that the government takes seriously (Mail & Guardian, 12 August 2005).
Hegemony then supplies a methodology for the study of change. As a consequence, it is possible to monitor the openings for groups in real historical conditions – the possibilities for action, innovation and manoeuvre – with the level of hegemony to be addressed as an empirical question. These spaces are constituted not only by ideas but also material and institutional factors, stretching across the sub-national, national, regional and global spectrums to provide opportunities for a reconfiguration of Afrikaner identity. It has become apparent that only certain Afrikaans speaking constituencies have taken advantage of these openings. Because of this it is suggested what is emerging is a plurality of subjective meanings of ‘Afrikanerness’ which are derived from structural conditions, and which intersect with a number of other identities such as class, age, gender and race. For the remainder of this paper, the dynamics of identity adjustment will be examined more closely with reference to material forces. Empirical evidence will be presented to demonstrate the manner in which an increasingly globalised middle class and capital elites – ascriptively defined whites who have Afrikaans as their mother tongue – have bolstered their position by endorsing the neo-liberal economic policies of the ANC government whilst recognising the inescapable agenda of social transformation, as well as its opportunities. The focus of this discussion will then allow for the implications of this consensus for the characteristics of Afrikaner identity politics in a globalised context to be discerned for further analysis.
The Shape of Consenus in the New South Africa
With the end of minority rule, the bases of Afrikaner identity politics were judged to be fragile at best (Munro, 1995:26). Since then empirical observation appears to suggest a simultaneous decline and acceleration in ethnic affiliations; the range of identification among Afrikaans speakers is considerable. A large section of the coloured community, black Afrikaans speakers and verloopte (walked away) Afrikaners remain firmly outside of or even reject any formal grouping. Much of the dialogue during this period has concerned the possibility and desirability of divorcing an Afrikaner identity from Afrikaner nationalism. Thus, Nash can claim that the ‘new politics of Afrikaans’ is concerned with defending Afrikaans language and culture without regard to ‘ethnic background’ (Nash, 2000:340), whilst Die Burger's 4 former editor Arrie Roussouw announced that the newspaper would no longer refer to Afrikaans speakers as ‘Afrikaners’ but more inclusively as ‘Afrikaanses’ (Mail & Guardian, 28 June 2005).
At the same time, however, a resurgence of group-based politics has placed the legitimacy of minority cultural rights – the so-called ‘national question’ – at the top of the agenda (ANC National General Council, 29 June to 3 July 2005). A very small number of Afrikaners are encamped in the Northern Cape demanding a territorial homeland, many are no longer choosing to associate on a traditional group basis, whilst others go abroad either on a temporary or permanent basis in search of better prospects (Du Toit, 1998; van Rooyen, 2000). Others have gone the route of attempting to protect the minority rights of Afrikaners, working within the ambit of the 1996 Constitution, various United Nations conventions and a globalised liberalism.5In that sense, the electoral collapse and dissolution of the New National Party, historically the political home of Afrikanerdom, during April 2004 was largely symbolic given that its traditional support base had long since ebbed away. It is suggested that the coherence and direction of these movements has been influenced both by the success of key Afrikaans constituencies within the ANC's hegemonic project and on the global stage, as well as significant tensions at the provincial level.
More philosophical and intellectual disputes concerned with perceptions of marginalisation, entitlement and belonging, together with pragmatic quarrels regarding institutional and symbolic power have become most prominent at the local level among a sizeable non-elite grouping since 1990. A concentration upon the status of the Afrikaans language and associated contention of cultural space has bestowed an ‘agenda’ beset by contradictions. On the one hand, an influential number among the intelligentsia are wholly committed to a narrow, linguistic and local focus that retains some ethnic undertones in spite of protestations to the contrary. At the same time, this is countered by another, patently more progressive framework. What it is impossible to ignore is that both share an uncritical understanding of the current milieu. Neither grouping properly acknowledges the highly salient fact that any Afrikaner community today represents a minority that still retains a sizeable material andcultural inheritance, an aspect of apartheid's historical legacy that has been reinforced by contemporary global restructuring. To all intents and purposes then, contemporary Afrikanerdom is experiencing a period of unprecedented change within its rank and file.
At this historical juncture, the grouping rests between the complexities of a wider global order that interpenetrates conditions in South Africa, and the character of a popular and class-based ANC hegemonic project that permeates the domestic sphere. Using a Gramsican framework, this section will briefly evaluate how changes in the extent and pattern of liberalisation in the national arena have shaped the character of identifications among certain Afrikaner constituencies. These changes relate to a deeper, structural understanding of how consensus in all the symbolic, institutional and material bases of the ANC's hegemonic project is being manufactured. The ambiguities of various government policies will be placed alongside an exploration of the changing mobility of these different constituencies that has enabled them to take advantage of, engage with or separate from aspects of both the ANC's class-based hegemonic project and the interconnected ideology of globalisation.
The development of the Afrikaner identity project demonstrates that there is a distinct, historical union between the structure of capitalism and the Afrikaner community. Previously various capital factions comprised a crucial group within pax Afrikaner (O'Meara, 1983). Today the position of these same elites must be reanalysed in light of both the dominance of a globalised neo-liberal hegemonic consensus and a new globalised division of labour and power (GDLP). This contemporary restructuring of global capitalism, production and social relations means a core workforce of highly skilled people able to take advantage of opportunities afforded by the global economy rest at the top of this new hierarchy (Cox, 1999:9). It is contended that in contemporary South Africa the inequalities of this new globalism have exacerbated those of the apartheid era,6 so that many Afrikaans speakers are among the best positioned to take advantage of the new GDLP. Despite policies aimed at transformation, contemporary South African society remains in large part distinguished by these ‘inequalities of apartheid’ which significantly include those relating to the distribution of economic power, of property and land, economic, entrepreneurial and educational opportunities and experience, and the share of income and per capital income of the different population groups (Terreblanche, 2002:391–2). Indeed, the impact of this apartheid legacy is such that there remains a strong correlation between being postmodern and being part of the country's highly skilled, most white or Indian (professional, managerial, information and financial) postfordist sector (Tanno & Gonzalez, 1998:153). With the loss of political control, it has become evident that many Afrikaans speakers are ‘now concentrating their efforts on business’ most especially within sectors of the new economy including information technology and electronics (Financial Mail, 7 April 2000). Elsewhere the presence of Afrikaners on the JSE is most evident in the IT sector: 42 per cent of listed companies were headed by Afrikaans speakers in 1999 (The Sunday Times, 13 June 1999). Indeed, as the government begins a review of black economic empowerment and protective labour legislation in an attempt to implement its accelerated growth plan, the position of these skilled workers at home and abroad has been strengthened (The Sunday Times, 27 November 2005).
What is not so obvious, given the elevation in capital circles of a hegemonical common sense understanding of the role South Africa is to play in the new global order, is how cohesive Afrikaner capital has been in positioning itself to take advantage of these material openings. This consensus has certainly afforded capital elites a voice and genuine leverage in economic policies and practices. There is widespread recognition within elite circles, including many from within the business community of which an ‘increasingly internationalised Afrikaner elite’ is indelibly a part, that the ANC's agenda of social transformation has been curtailed by the financial markets (Nel, 1999:23). White capital has not proven to be as vulnerable as was initially suggested, and many of these elites have understood the need to make ‘fundamental adaptations’ in order to continue to operate successfully under majority rule (Randall, 1996:675). However, very recent if tentative moves towards an industrial policy driven by an interventionist, developmental state would provide a new set of challenges for capital (Business Day, 10 November 2005), which has shown itself to be increasingly comfortable with investing overseas, in Britain, the rest of Europe, the United States and also in Africa.7
Thus far the terms of this engagement have been conducted largely within the parameters of the neo-liberal economic consensus. Mbeki was quick to commit his government to substantial and ongoing dialogue with the business sector of the Afrikaner community (The Sunday Times, 30 May 2004), which has been touted as nothing less than the ‘reconsolidation of the Afrikaner establishment’ (Nash, 2000:342). There is little evidence of any attempts by Afrikaner capital to reintroduce any remotely dirigiste direction or innovative, counter-hegemonic strategies that might in any way tamper with or transcend this consensus. In fact, the evidence points quite to the contrary. The Executive Director of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI), Jacob de Villiers, the only one of six chambers of commerce in South Africa directly associated with ‘Afrikaner’ capital, has emphasised that despite areas of difference, in general he believes that:
The support of the Afrikaner capital elites for the government's macro-economic policies is widespread and runs deep. There is a genuine appreciation and enthusiasm for the economic cluster's approach to adhere to strengthening the market drivenness of South Africa. Yet, when government spokespersons do not understand the impact of short sightedness, regarding for example redistribution, the impact of costs/levies on profitability or the brittleness of confidence in the economy, it blunts open support and creates cynicism. Any interventionist action of government, which harms the free market, is suspect and creates doubts. However, we are here for the duration, so we can agree to disagree on some issues. The joint intention is to promote growth and development and our acceptance of each other's integrity, bring us together again and again(interview with Jacob de Villiers, 21 August 2002).
With a strong reliance on capital investment to drive economic growth, the terms of this tacit bargain show no signs of abating despite the government's publicly expressed belief that there has been no ‘quid pro quo’ from business in the form of increased investment and job creation (The Sunday Independent, 19 September 2004). Whilst capital has been quick to counter any government proposals that might restrict profit margins or political influence, it has been careful to hedge its bets. Indeed, legislative initiatives serve as a useful example of the continuing efforts of Afrikaans speaking and white capital elites to cement their historically advantageous position. Black economic empowerment remains the principal policy for the sustained transformation of the domestic economy, vesting the African capitalist class with a key role in the ‘uneven deracialisation of inequality’ (Marais, 2001:173). Levels of compliance have been influenced by the shift from a largely voluntary process between big business and black entrepreneurs to a more ‘interventionist posture’ following the Black Economic Empowerment Commission (BEEC) Report of April 2001 (Southall, 2004:323). At present, however, it would seem that capital elites are discussing more ‘the details of implementation’ as opposed to ‘expressing total opposition’ to the strategy itself (Business Day, 1 April 2005).
Historically the record has been mixed. Early empowerment initiatives focused on co-opting black investors, effectively as investment trusts, using special purpose vehicles, a strategy which ran foul of a troubled domestic and global economic climate (Southall, 2004:319–320). Until early 2001 then, the government took a more restrained role, apparently content with the enrichment of a small number of individuals and demonstrating very real ambiguity at disturbing the terms of the hegemonic consensus. In the aftermath of the BEEC Report, however, a more assertive version of empowerment has begun to take shape. Building on the report's recommendations, a new strategy founded upon a broad-based approach to the empowerment project taking in a growth accord between business, government and labour, as well as targets for the public and private sectors under the auspices of the Broad-Based Black Empowerment Act (53 of 2003). The onus has been placed squarely on all sectors of the economy in this regard, including the key mining and financial services sectors. Whilst different empowerment codes are still being drafted, a number of transnationals and larger corporates, including Old Mutual, Absa and most recently De Beers, have announced empowerment deals.
To date, it has been suggested that progress has been ‘uneven and difficult to quantify’ (Southall, 2004:318). Empowerment initiatives have done little to change the market capitalisation share of black-controlled companies on the JSE which totalled only 3 per cent as of December 2003 (BusinessMap Foundation, 2004:56), whilst 98 per cent of executive director positions of JSE-listed companies in 2002 remained in white hands (Southall, 2004:318). At the same time, a very public spat between Mbeki and Archbishop Desmond Tutu over criticisms that empowerment appeared to benefit only a small ‘recycled’ elite surfaced in 2004. For the most part, however, reaction from business itself has been muted with both capital elites and government in agreement that integrating ‘historically disadvantaged people in the mainstream economy is essential for the sustainability of both our democratic system and a market economy’ (BusinessMap Foundation, 2004:iii). Prior to the legislative changes, reaction was limited to those of economic expediency, as well as sustained pressure against the redistributive ethos of legislation including the controversial Mineral Development Bill. This was despite the fact that the majority were agreed that black ownership should be encouraged and state licensing had become inevitable (Business Day, 11 June 2001; The Economist, 22–28 June 2002).
Just how far the terms of this consensus vis-à-vis the government's economic transformation policy will alter is unclear, more so because of new speculation about a revised industrial policy driven by an interventionist, developmental state. More visible and global corporations have taken the initiative in empowerment deals (The Guardian, 8 November 2005), at the same time as mining companies are expanding overseas operations with the likelihood of disinvestment in South Africa over the longer term (African Labour Research Network, 2005). It has been contended that ‘white capital is beginning to wake up to black empowerment as a political and economic imperative’ (Southall, 2004:327). Mbeki recently praised the empowerment initiatives pursued by Old Mutual and Anglo American, although ANC spokesman Smuts Ngonyama maintained that there are concerns about the ‘division between the political and business leadership’ which is undermining the ‘capability of the developmental state’ in South Africa (Business Day, 15 September 2005). By publicly supporting these policies, white capital has enhanced its position and continues to exert considerable leverage within government circles and the boundaries of a globalised neo-liberal consensus. It remains to be seen what shape corporate innovations and a growing strategic awareness will take but all the indications are that global and domestic capital will continue to adapt to a transformed playing field.
Concluding Thoughts
The focus of this paper has been to emphasise the ideology of globalisation and the global political economy as major catalysts for change in identity politics. It is too early to identify fully the extent of the transformation that is occurring among Afrikaans speakers as a result of this consensus. What is clear is that a metamorphosis of sorts is underway. The reconfiguration of power associated with contemporary globalisation has driven particular political, social, cultural, ecological and gender outcomes (Taylor, 2005:1026). This brief focus on the emergence of an increasingly globalised middle class, as well as the participation of capital elites in the prevailing hegemonic consenus has demonstrated that ethnic and other affiliations which previously assumed great significance are being eroded as other, different affiliations such as class are growing in importance. Whether this is a continuation of the conflict within Afrikanerdom as a whole on the merits of economic growth begun in the 1970s remains to be seen. But it does suggest that the complexity of the contemporary politics of Afrikaner identity is not properly understood without the more sophisticated categorisation and framework introduced in this paper. Regarded in this way, post-apartheid Afrikaner identifications reveal a loosely bound grouping apparently in the process of both retrenching and rebuilding under the aegis of a new regime ambivalent towards the fortune of this population as a whole, and within an increasingly hospitable global context in which important Afrikaans speaking constituencies are now functioning.
Whether or not the acceptance of this neoliberal consensus in the domestic realm has defeated the ethnic slant of the social coalitions that previously sustained Afrikaner solidarity, or rather signifies a new round of identity politics, requires further study. In this setting an evaluation of the divisions andconnections within this broad grouping is clearly long overdue and empirical work to follow will focus on the emergence and nature of a ‘new’ cultural politics involved in the defence of the Afrikaans language and culture, as well as localised and diasporic versions of identity. It is possible that a postmodern Afrikaans identity might yet emerge. That is, an identity that can forgo its hegemonic content, align its resources to appropriate subnational, national and supranational levels, and forge alliances in the common pursuit of economic, cultural and social interests (McCall, 1999:204). Some form of counter-hegemony would need to be assembled in order to overcome the ‘subimperialist’ ideological and material consensus compiled by the ANC government, its hegemonic allies and connected global social forces. But contesting any hegemonic form of politics would require the participation of key Afrikaans speaking elites who presently form a critical part of this politics. There can be no suggestion of any renegotiated pax Afrikaner, but the wideness of the spectrum suggested by that same label now encompasses the rudiments of more alternative localised and globalised, diasporic visions as well. The challenge then would be to build a degree of rapprochment not merely between these diverse Afrikaans speaking constituencies, but also with the majority of South Africans.