Briefings

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Nairobi: World Social Forum

Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem

The 7th World Social Forum (WSF, 20 to 25 January 2007) in Nairobi is one of those ‘once in a life time’ events in the lives of many people apart from the veterans who may continue to attend every one throughout their lives. It is an all comers forum. For instance, the gay and lesbian lobby in Africa are there alongside the maoists, mnachists, peasant movements, trade unionists, other syndicalists, radical scholars, grassroots movements, many roof tops movements, stalinists, trotskyites, leninists, fanonists, cabralists, castroists, nkrumahists, negritudinists, revolutionaries and reformers, all kinds of gender activists and womanists, and more. The reactionaries will say: ‘all lunatics are in town’.

It should be no surprise if there were many Africans since this is taking place in Africa but so marginalised are we in our own affairs that one is always happy to see Africans at these meetings even when they are happening here! Many of the usual suspects are around from the veteran radicals to the budding ones not only from Africa but from across the world. If you want to gauge the state of global revolutionary consciousness, the frustrations, the challenges and opportunities of the global forces for change sand transformation the WSF is the place to be.

But these gatherings always frustrate me for many reasons. One, they show up Africa's weaknesses whether they are held outside or inside Africa. One of the critical areas is our level our participation and preparedness. The majority of the African participants – even many from Kenya itself – were brought by foreign paymasters (whom in a game of twist between those who delude themselves and those being deluded call themselves ‘partners’ in politically correct speak) or organisations funded by outsiders. Often they become prisoners of their sponsors. They must attend events organised or supported by their sponsors who need to put their ‘partners’ on display and the ‘partners’ in turn need to show their loyalty to their masters. Two, even when these meetings happen in Africa the participation of Local groups and citizens are constrained by the three factors of fees for participation, language of discourse and location.

Local activists and sympathisers in the WSF had to organise a protest and even a temporary occupation before the fees for Kenyan participants were waived. Three, we go to these events without adequate preparation about our own agenda and line up behind other peoples’ not so hidden agendas. Although at this WSF there were a number of attempts to forge a Pan African agenda before the summit consultations. One of them was the Pan African Youth Forum working closely with the Youth Commission of the WSF. But the truth remains that many of the youths that came did so on the platform of one donor or the other and mostly not African. This dependence on foreigners both financially and ideologically are so pervasive that they cannot be ignored anymore. There are signs that an increasing number of Africans are not only outraged by it but becoming ashamed by it and looking for ways and means of freeing our activism from the clutches of donor funding and donor-driven agendas. These issues were frankly and honestly discussed at many forums before and during the Summit. They include The African NGO /CSO Summit convened by the Harare-based MWENGO and UN Habitat; African Campaigners meetings convened by the UN Millennium Campaign, Africa Office, jointly with the Pan Africa Programme of Oxfam and the Africa Secretariat of the Global Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP) and also the Africa Policy Office of the AAI and also the Youth Alternatives Platform.

This dependence on foreigners raises a lot of disturbing issues about the state of Africa‘s NGOs and CSOs and their capacity to contribute to lasting changes in the social, economic and political conditions of Africans in favour of social justice. The first is a question of legitimacy. Who do these NGOs represent? Who are they accountable to? To whom do they owe their loyalty: to their donors or to the African people they claim to speak for? The second is the related question of the generally anti-government posture of these NGOs. They take money from foreign governments / agencies like DFID, USAID, DANIDA, SIDA, allegedly as independent CSOs. But why should foreigners be helping us to be independent of our own governments? How are their own citizens independent of them? The same African NGOs that queue up to suck up to all kinds of foreign governments and funders will raise their eyebrows and be shouting ‘autonomy’, ‘sell out’ if any of their members has close financial or political links with their own governments. In effect the autonomy they are asserting is one of being sovereign against their own government and subservience to any foreigner. Where governments are illegitimate or having bad governance record this may hold for sometime but in the long run it delegitimises the NGOs concerned.

The third issue is the constant conflation of NGOs to mean CSOs which should not be the case. Genuine CSOs will include Trade Unions, guild and professional associations, Self-help groups, Village or town associations, faith based charities or interest groups, etc. Their most distinctive character is that they are voluntary, membership-based and generate their funds from their members. How many of our busy-body, noisemaking NGOs qualify in this sense? A situation whereby even those who claim to have members but the members are not the funders of the activities of the group … how can they demand accountability? It is similar to our government's being dependent on Aid from outsiders and we demanding that they should be accountable to us? We do not pay taxes but demand representation and wonder why the leaders are more responsive to any noise that come from outsiders?

The worst excesses of the dependence on foreign sponsors are the various scams that have developed in many of these NGOs about ‘creative accounting’ which does not mean accountability; per diem wrangles; multiple claims; bogus ticket refunds; multiple accounting, budgeting and reporting for similar proposals from the same organisation and many other unsavoury practices that make these organisations not dissimilar to the governments we climb on holy mountains to attack for being corrupt, inefficient and unaccountable.

And this issue of dependence on foreign donors is not just because there are no resources. How come the nationalists freed this continent from the yoke of colonialism without writing proposals to any funder?

Why are our peoples not willing or able to support our activism? Could it be that the people do not associate themselves with the self-given mandate of these largely middle class led, elite focused and urban-based counter elite? Or worst, still people may be seeing that these selfdeclared crusaders whether foreign or local are only there for their own interest. The proliferation in the last decade of MONGOs (My Own NGO), GONGOs (Governmental NGO), BONGO (Business NGO), PONGO (Private NGO), all over Africa may be an indication of democratic openings or state collapse or an irresponsive state but are not good indicators of building democratic, people- led, people-based organisations connected to and organically linked to the wider social movements without whom social progress, democracy and development is not possible.

If they truly belong to the masses the masses will defend them. And if they are truly based on the interests of our people, their first allegiance will be to those they serve.

In that sense it should worry us that the African participation in the first ever WSF in Africa in Nairobi is more of a gathering of NGOs than that of real social and political movements and peoples’ organisations who can make lasting change possible. Many of our successful NGOs like their forebears, the INGOs have become gate-keepers or, to use a better term, commissioned agents, between the masses and their oppressors, occupying spaces for the poor and the marginalised when most of them do not or no longer belong to that class or share their vision of change.

Letter from Nairobi

Janet Bujra

On the second day of the World Social Forum, held in Nairobi from 20-25 January, and for the first time in Africa, I was approached by a member of the Secretariat to respond to a questionnaire. One question seemed particularly urgent: did governments take any notice of it? Here we were in Kenya, where the Kibaki government is staggering under accusations of extensive corruption in the highest places and a continuing failure to transform the economy in the interests of its poverty-stricken masses. Did the arrival of 50,000 passionate and angry social movement activists from around the globe, and particularly from Africa, signify anything, or was our placement in an out-of-town stadium symbolic of our political irrelevance? Though speakers told us that the arguments against neoliberalism and imperialism had been won, Kenya is both subject of and promoter of both.

Amongst those who brought news from the front lines in Darfur, Zimbabwe, Palestine, Iraq and other trouble spots around the world, messages of optimism and empowerment predominated. A Somalian delegation of women spoke out not only of American bombing raids and the Ethiopian intervention, but also of how women had survived sixteen years of ‘men's misrule’, managing to run schools and bring up children in men's absence. ‘Tell men to stop fighting’ was their message to the world.

And the T-shirts revealed a sea change in political discourse in Africa, demanding a ‘Voice for the Voiceless’, with dangerous sentiments being openly and proudly proclaimed. The WSF's own slogan: ‘Another world IS possible’ was translated into ‘Another Kenya is possible’, and borrowed for ‘A world without AIDS is possible’. Here was the banned Mau Mau Land and Freedom Army, quoting their heroes such as Dedan Kimathi, killed in the dying days of colonial rule in the 1950s. Here the marginalised Nairobi Slum Dwellers demanding ‘Basic Rights for All’, whilst another T-shirt dangerously asserted in Swahili that ‘I endure being a Kenyan; I am proud to be a youth of Korogochi’ (one of those same slums).

The import of second-hand clothing from the West, which destroyed Africa's infant textile industries, brought with it the declamatory T-shirt, such as one I once saw worn in innocence by an elderly Tanzanian, which declared ‘Farmers Do It in Wellies’. But in the WSF T-shirts were knowingly chosen for their political messages. Daring statements about gender were particularly evident. Whereas feminism was once regarded as an alien ideology, here were African women insisting that ‘This is what a Feminist Looks Like’ and ‘Feminist. No Ifs. No Buts’. Here were Africans proclaiming ‘We’re here, we’re queer and we’re proud’ emblazoned over a map of Kenya, as the Gay and Lesbian Coalition of Kenya came out in force, multiplying alliances with like-minded groups across the globe. Surprising because homosexuality is banned in Kenya and was equated with bestiality by a local psychiatrist cited in the press. Again, it takes courage in a continent where AIDS carries a powerful stigma, to wear T-Shirts announcing that their owner is ‘HIVPositive’. And in what used to be a bastion of patriarchy I observed a number of African men demanding that ‘Land is property that women MUST own’.

This was no chorus of harmony. Whilst one T-Shirt sweepingly insisted that ‘Our world is not for sale: Smash Capitalism’, the forum itself was clearly seen as a marketing opportunity by many locals. As speakers in workshops earnestly debated how to build solidarity between the working class and those who toil in the informal sector in Africa, the gates were stormed by an influx of petty traders and street children, demanding their share. In the process a restaurant occupying the main food stand for the forum was overrun, exposing its ownership by a government Minister, who had ensured that other food outlets were hidden out of sight. The incomers had another message for the Forum: ‘the forum belongs to the poor. That is why we invaded them. We’re going to eat all the food meant for the rich’.

Speaking at a safe distance, in the plush of the Hilton Hotel in town, the Minister (another one) of Planning and National Development, welcomed the Forum, suggesting that it would help in the fight against human rights violations, though whose violations were not vouchsafed. Had he been listening?

South Africans Urge Sanctions Against Israel

Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign

At a press conference held on the 18th of December in South Africa the Palestine Solidarity Committee, COSATU (the Congress of South African Trade Unions representing 1.8 million workers) and the South African Council of Churches called on the South African government to recall the ambassador to Israel and to implement sanctions against Israel.

Speakers at the conference included Willie Madisha (president of COSATU), Eddie Makue (general secretary of the South African Council of Churches), Ali Halimeh (Palestinian Ambassador to South Africa), Virginia Tilley (academic and author), Na’eem Jeenah (chair), Salim Vally (Palestine Solidarity Committee and Patrick Craven (spokesperson for COSATU). They released the following joint statement:

We, delegates of organisations and movements that represent and have the support of the majority of South Africans, oppose and condemn the Israeli atrocities in Palestine and we make the following call:

We call on the South African government to immediately recall the South African ambassador from Tel Aviv and to begin the process of ending diplomatic relations with Israel.

We call on all South Africans to establish a strong, forceful and determined boycott and sanctions campaign against the Israeli apartheid state until the end of the occupation.

We call on South Africans to identify a national day of action in solidarity with the Palestinian people and to observe it with rolling mass action around the country.

We call on the South African government to ensure that no South African serves – in any capacity – in the Israeli Occupation Forces and that any South African citizen doing so will be prosecuted under the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act.

We demand that Israel immediately withdraws all Israeli Occupation Forces from Gaza and ends the occupation of Palestinian lands.

We demand that Israel abides by the provisions of international humanitarian law and human rights law, and refrains from imposing collective punishment on Palestinian civilians (as per the UN Human Rights Council declaration issued on 6 July 2006).

Call on Israel to release all detained Palestinian ministers and legislators and to release all political prisoners – including hundreds of women and children.

We call on the EU to stop the severe sanctions imposed by Europe on the Palestinian Authority as a penalty for exercising their democratic right and electing a government of their choice. This by itself is a brutal intervention on behalf of the occupation. We call on the United Nations to implement the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on Israel's Apartheid wall.

We call on the United Nations to ensure that Israel fulfils its obligations in terms of international law.

P. S. From Salim Vally in South Africa: After the press conference we embarked on ‘rolling mass action’ in major cities and small towns throughout the country – some marches were as huge as 10,000 strong. We also met with the deputy foreign affairs minister and put across our demands. This year we will be focusing on the boycott, sanctions and disinvestment campaign against (what we call Apartheid) Israel particularly on ‘blood diamonds’ – i.e. the unpolished South African and African diamond companies like De Beers send to Israel for beneficiation.

Oxford, Cambridge, and London Students Hosting Israeli Apartheid Week: Recalling the UN International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the crime of Apartheid, students at the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge and London (SOAS) will concurrently hold Israeli Apartheid Week (IAW) events in their respective campuses between Monday the 12th and Friday the 16th of February. In hosting this week, Oxford, Cambridge and University of London students will be joining their peers in several major US and Canadian universities.

The aim of Israeli Apartheid Week is to push forward the analysis of Israel as an apartheid state and call for a boycott, divestment, and sanctions campaign to achieve the demands in the famous July 2005 Palestinian civil society statement: full equality for Arab citizens of Israel, an end to the occupation and colonisation of the West Bank and Gaza, and the implementation of the right of return and compensation for Palestinian refugees pursuant to UN resolution 194. IAW Speakers will include Palestinian Israeli Knesset member Dr. Jamal Zahalka, Israeli poet Yitzhak Laor and South African educationalist and social justice organiser Salim Vally.

Cambridge University Palestine Society member Sirine Rached recalls that now as ever, peace in the Middle East can only be achieved through putting an end to the Israeli occupation, the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes and equality for Palestinian citizens of Israel. Oxford University Arab Cultural Society member Abdel Razzaq Takriti states that an international campaign of boycott, divestment and sanctions is the only way to get an apartheid regime like Israel to adjust its policies towards the Palestinian people and to pursue peace. On both sides of the Atlantic, the organisers of IAW 2007 join a growing international chorus of opposition to Israeli apartheid that includes voices of Palestinians, Israelis, South Africans, and many others across the world that stand for justice and human dignity. We are sending a message to our governments and institutions in the UK, the US and Canada that we refuse any economic, political, or cultural ties with the state of Israel until it complies with international law and respects the rights of Palestinians to self determination and to return home.

For further information please contact: Email: [e-mail]; Website: www.endisraeliapartheid.net; [e-mail] is an address of the Palestinian Campaign for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions against Israel (BDS). For more information see: www.bds-palestine.net

Seeking Alternatives to the Neoliberal State in the South

David González López

In the past few years, the scourge of structural adjustment and neoliberal policies has been inducing academics from the developing world at large to increasingly share views and explore new and original comparative perspectives on the common challenges that they are facing. In so doing, they have reanimated and gradually consolidated networking among them. More recently, they have attempted to foment new theoretical approaches more in agreement with the shared historical contexts and presentday experiences of the countries and peoples of the South.

In order to systematically pursue this line of work in the framework of the South-South project that they are engaged in, the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO), the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and the Asia Political and International Studies Association (APISA) have been promoting and hosting various comparative research workshops and seminars for a reduced number of academics from the South. The most recent one met in Kampala, Uganda, for three days in late November 2006, inspired by the need to propose alternatives to the neoliberal model imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions throughout the developing world.

The workshop, hosted by the Centre for Basic Research (CBR) in Kampala, held intensive discussions on the topic ‘The Feasibility of Democratic Developmental States in the South’. The objective was basically to revisit the developmental State model that was followed by socalled Third World countries at various times of previous decades, but to think of a variant that would be devoid of the democratic and social shortcomings or deficits that the previous model(s) exhibited. With this goal in mind, the workshop debated the following research proposals that participants had been requested to present:

In her paper entitled ‘Democracy Without Citizens?’ Dr. Silvia Teresa Gómez- Tagle Lemaistre (El Colegio de México) warns about the increasing danger that democracy might be ‘highjacked’ in various countries of the South by a minority segment of the population, while most citizens become more and more disappointed with their democratic institutions. The aim of her research project is basically to study the party systems of several countries according to their classical definition, but attempting an indepth evaluation of the ‘quality’ of their democracy.

This opening presentation brought out an issue that was to be discussed once and again by the workshop: to what extent can democracy be ‘measured’ or established as a number of fixed identical goals for each country/situation?

The paper ‘Democratic Developmental State in the South’, by Dr. Privthi Ram Mudiam (University of Hyderabad, India), expounded on a wide-searching research proposal the aim of which is to review the previous-existing developmental State model in order to propose a number of desired characteristics for a new brand of (democratic) developmental State.

In her presentation entitled ‘The Potentiality of Democratic Developmental States in the South: Uganda and Botswana compared’, Dr. Pamela Mbabazi (Mabara University of Science and Technology, Uganda) informed participants about the research results that she had already arrived at and published in a book after working jointly with Dr. Ian Taylor on a comparative perspective around the question of to what extent Botswana and Uganda can be associated to what might be considered a democratic developmental model. She also put forth several hypotheses about the constraints and challenges that both countries face to fully adopt the model.

Dr. Teivo Teivainen (Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Lima, Peru) emphasized, in his presentation ‘Changing Boundaries of the Political: From the ‘Developmental State’ to the Alter globalization Movements and Back’, the way in which the possibility of (traditional) political action has been gradually eroded vis-à-vis the globalizing neoliberal thrust. He then goes on to expound on what would be the centre of his research effort: the possibility of countering this erosion by resorting to a new type of movements and new ways of organizing and networking as is becoming apparent in the international social fora.

Dr. Dennis D. Trinidad (De la Salle University, Manila, Philippines) presented a paper entitled ‘Theorizing State Capacity: Policymaking Agents, Exogenous Pressure and the Reform Process in the South,’ in which he explained his research proposal that focused on an assessment of the capacities of the Southern State to appropriately achieve its development functions. After locating the deficits of most developing countries in this area, he put forth several hypotheses about the way in which an ‘incapable’ State can become a ‘capable’ one.

The paper ‘Democratic Developmental States in the South? Malaysia and South Africa's Institutional Structures for Incubating an Indigenous Entrepreneurial Class and Reducing Poverty’, presented by Dr. Omano Edigheji (Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, South Africa), proposes a comparative study in order to produce a list of concepts akin to a developmental State. It would also undertake an analysis of the internal institutional characteristics of South Africa and Malaysia and their relationship with the emerging entrepreneurial class among (majority in South Africa; minority in Malaysia) underprivileged native population groups.

‘Constructing and Deconstructing the Democratic Developmental State: The Challenges of Democratization in Nigeria and South Korea’, paper presented by Dr. Daniel Atime Omoweh (Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria), reviews, in a comparative perspective, the origin, nature and polities of post-colonial States in Nigeria and South Korea, in particular the characteristics of what he calls the crises of State democratization. He further proposed a number of strategies to be researched in order to assess if they might permit the emergence of a democratic developmental State in those two countries.

MSc David González López (Centre for Studies on Africa and the Middle East, Havana, Cuba) presented the research project entitled ‘The Contribution of South-South Cooperation to the Strengthening of Democratic Developmental States’, prepared together with Dr. Silvio Baró Herrera. The authors argue that because the emergence of democratic developmental States will require a strong attention to social areas neglected during many years of neoliberal policies, while the developed world remains reluctant to provide assistance in the required levels, South-South cooperation will become indispensable in those areas. Researching practical results of Cuban health and literacy assistance to Guinea-Bissau, Guatemala and Eastern Timor would allow an approach to the potential of South-South cooperation for the construction of a new type of developmental State.

Can the relationship between democracy and reduction of poverty be measured? That is what Dr. Elie Ngongang (University of Yaoundé II, Cameroon) will attempt to prove according to his research proposal entitled ‘Electoral Democracy, Poverty and Poverty Reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Theoretical and Empirical Study’. In it, the author argues (through the elaboration of various equations that would give measurable numerical support to his hypothesis) in favour of the feasibility of a theoretical and empirical-analytical framework that would substantiate the view that electoral democracy should contribute, to a great extent, to an improvement of the welfare of the population at large.

During the last session of the workshop, in the final exchange of view among participants as well as in the closing presentation by Dr. Simon Rutabajuuka (Executive Director of the Centre for Basic Research) entitled ‘Convenor's Synthesis: Discussion on Emerging Issues and Reflection for Further Research’ and the closing remarks by Dr. Ebrima Sall (Senior Programme Officer and Head of Research, CODESRIA, Dakar, Senegal), a certain number of conclusions emerged, together with various topics requiring further study. Among them:

• •

  The concrete historical experiences of different governments were discussed: concepts such as ‘democracy’, ‘State’, ‘development’ were revisited; definitions and theoretical experiences were presented and previous experiences (taken as ‘models’) of developmental states were analyzed, all of which was essential for the future construction of democratic developmental States.

• •

  It was concluded that democratic developmental States are desirable, but the question that remains unanswered is to what extent they are feasible. Therefore, the ‘feasibility’ aspect of the issue requires a more in-depth discussion as well as the elaboration of an operative definition of said States, together with the establishment of a conceptual framework in which to study them. The common features of this type of State must be clearly identified, and the themes under discussion (for instance, the ‘agents’ of such a model) require an in-depth conceptualization. They also need to be put in a historical perspective.

• •

  A common language must be sought through a review of the existing literature on the topic. The role to be played by the State must be highlighted. An inventory should be build up of the existing possibilities to promote this type of State, and in this light we must resort to social movements with capacities to become agents of transformation. We must not lose sight of the massive way in which information circulates nowadays, and of the impact that discussions such as these can have on the public.

• •

  The different experiences of various countries must be taken into account: for instance, Asia and Africa have a lot to learn from recent experiences of Latin America. There is an abundant amount of literature about developmental States in Asia, a bit less in Africa and in Latin America, but there is very little about what a democratic development State would be like. We have to be attentive to what is being produced everywhere throughout the South, review all that has been written there and not only read what is being produced in the North. We must establish cross-references of our own production and accumulate empirical data of the South in order to make our own contributions.

• •

  The conclusion was reached that the State is the major player in such a type of State, but not the only one: one must keep in mind the citizenry as well as other agents. With respect to democracy, details must be established about the way in which citizens can pursue their economic rights, their right to work, to healthcare, etc. The issue of democracy within the framework of a developmental State requires further consideration, and the question of whether or not the previous model (with its shortcomings and deficits) is no longer viable. In the last analysis, we have to define how States and governments can be made to effectively fulfil their roles.

• •

  The past history and the significance of South-South cooperation and their perspective impact on the construction of democratic developmental States was discussed, together with the impact and significance of transnational forces on the construction of such a model. But one must forecast how those States will act internationally, in the prevailing anti-democratic and hostile world scenario that that they will necessarily challenge. Therefore, we must foresee the challenges that they will face and the way in which they will relate with the North and with other countries of the South.

• •

  Globalization has had the effect of limiting the emergence of democratic developmental States; therefore, we must negotiate our way through the avatars of globalization, and in that framework, South-South cooperation will be important: other similar resources should be sought. We must closely follow the way in which countries such as Brazil, India and South Africa relate to each other in the framework of South-South cooperation. But one must not lose sight of the fact that sometimes South-South relations are exploitative and cannot be idealized: some of these problems have incapacitated certain States of the South.

• •

  The key roles of institutions remain unclear: which institutions are we referring to? What will be the role of civil society? etc. The nature of the State throughout the South and the relationship between Southern States must be studied. South-South dialogues must be closely followed, together with topics such as the ongoing religious awakening in the South, the emerging cultures as a result of South-South relations and how human values (work ethics, etc.) are violated, etc. Finally, the major question: Is it possible to combine something so diverse as democracy and development?

• •

  All the presentations in the workshop exhibited a marked social interest, but the problems that are being encountered by specific social groups must be discussed more emphatically: problems of social classes, of gender, etc.; in particular, gender issues are still absent from this general topic. There are also other questions that remain unanswered, such as: How has the economy been involved in the construction of such a model? Politics is important to give form to the economy; the requirements of the environment must also be discussed. But to what extent will a democratic developmental State be able to take them into account?

In the immediate future, participants will be expected to pursue their research work taking into account the discussions around their presentations and seeking answers to these and to other questions. In a few months, they should be submitting reports on their ongoing research work that will be published in a book on the feasibility of democratic developmental States in the South. It is hoped that this will be a positive contribution to the incipient debate on the subject, and that it will stimulate more discussion from various perspectives.

Global Security or Poverty Eradication: The Politics of the European Union's Development Assistance

Mikaela Gavas

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, development co-operation and aid allocations have increasingly fallen under the shadow of the global ‘war on terror’. Though aid has rarely been given without some element of self-interest on the part of donors, the end of the Cold War saw the logic of poverty reduction gradually begin to eclipse strategic and commercial concerns as the main worldwide determinant of aid allocation. Poverty reduction has come to be seen as a goal in and of itself, rather than a means to an end.

However, these gains are now under threat all over the world as governments use and re-use the rhetoric of ‘fighting terrorism’ to reframe the function of international aid. Aid resources are increasingly being deployed alongside trade, defence and diplomacy as instruments of foreign policy.

Some governments have tried to argue that the links between poverty and terrorism are such that aid for counterterrorism contributes towards poverty reduction. Although many of the official policy papers advocating a re-definition of aid imply a clear link between poverty and terrorism, the reality is far more nuanced. Most poor countries do not experience terrorism, supply nor support terrorists. But even if, in some circumstances, conditions of poverty combined with perceptions of injustice and alienation could contribute to instability, conflict and even acts of terrorism, this is an argument for an increased commitment to poverty-focused aid, which will engender greater economic and social equity, unlike aid focused on law enforcement, financial regulation and border control. If alleviating poverty can contribute towards reducing terrorism then there is no need to create a new counter-terrorist goal in development programmes.

Yet, there is a real danger that already scarce and inefficient aid resources could be further undermined as some donors seek to pursue self-interested security objectives through their aid policies. Is development co-operation once again becoming a crude extension of donor foreign and defence policy, like during the Cold War? The fear is that that counter-terrorism may become the end goal of development assistance, relegating poverty alleviation programmes further down the priorities of donors, thus reducing the actual amount spent directly on the poor.

Top Ten Recipients of EC Official Development Assistance in 2004

1.	Serbia and Montenegro
2.	Democratic Republic of Congo
3.	Turkey
4.	Morocco
5.	Afghanistan
6.	Egypt
7.	Palestinian Areas
8.	Tanzania
9.	Mozambique
10.	South Africa
Source: Annual Report 2005 on the European Community's Development Policy and the implementation of External Assistance in 2004.

European Union: Aid as an Instrument of Foreign Policy?

The EU has the unique ability to deploy a number of policies other than aid: trade, in particular, but also foreign and security policy. It thus has the potential to leverage its aid efforts in a ‘coherent’ way that multiplies their impact. It is therefore expected and hoped that development co-operation deployed at this level could be more effective in achieving coherent policy-making – with development objectives at the fore and development co-operation as an instrument for achieving them. However, there is also the threat that money set aside for development co-operation will be diverted to areas of public policy that are not linked to poverty reduction and are more of a priority for developed countries than developing countries.

EU external relations policy projects its ‘civil power’ role by prioritising regional stability and democracy promotion in the ‘near-abroad’ and other countries and regions of strategic importance, themes which also help articulate a distinctly ‘European identity’ at home and abroad. Conflict resolution and crisis management are now favoured trajectories for the promotion of Europe as a global player. Some analysts fear that, in this context, Europe's development aid will become increasingly politicised, influenced more by the so-called ‘CNN Factor’ than long-term development needs.¹ Others welcome this trend as the expression of a more robust, liberal inter-nationalist EU engagement in the conflict, security and development. Due to the complex nature of the EU, the tensions play out in the following ways:

• 1) There is a perceived dichotomy between foreign policy, which is a relatively newcomer to the EU and relatively short term and immediate in its concerns, and development co-operation, which is an older, better established policy area for the EU and more longterm and strategic in its objectives.

• 2) Perceptions and priorities for EU external action differ in many areas: a) There are the intergovernmental vs. the supranational approaches; b) There are Member States which have sought to professionalise their development cooperation and focus on poverty eradication vs. others which link development co-operation more closely to national interests; c) And there are Member States which are interested in Least Developed Countries especially Africa, and those who would rather focus on the near abroad or the EU's neighbourhood.

Today's agreement shows that Europe has put itself at the forefront of efforts to reduce global poverty’

(Hilary Benn, UK Secretary of State for International Development, General Affairs and External Relations Council Meeting, Brussels, 24 May 2005).

With its global presence, and global influence, the EU has a unique standing in the world. Its potential in defeating poverty cannot be overstated. In 2005, for the first time, a timetable was set for reaching the long-standing UN target of 0.7% of Gross National Income for development assistance, by the EU as a whole. While the majority of donor countries have not achieved or surpassed this target, those that have are members of the EU.²

With an interim target for the EU to reach an average minimum level of 0.56% by 2010, the current commitment is for the 15 ‘old’ Member States to reach the 0.7 % target by 2015, coinciding with the deadline for achieving many of the Millennium Development Goals, including the principal one of halving the proportion of people living in absolute poverty. Taken as a whole, the EU will mobilise an additional estimated 20 billion euros by 2010 and 54 billion euros by 2015.3 However, despite being the world's most generous donor, the EU's influence in world affairs remains inhibited by a lack of coherence in the policies and structures guiding its development assistance. Although, EU development assistance has been more clearly defined in terms of international efforts of poverty eradication at the same time, these objectives have remained largely rhetorical, as the implementation of aid programmes have been increasingly determined by foreign policy objectives.

The EU allocates a relatively low share of its development assistance to least developed countries (LDCs). In 2004, around 43% European Community (EC) development assistance was allocated to LDCs,⁴ but the figure has increased for 2005 to 46%.⁵ Although the EU's poverty focus is increasing, there is clearly a mismatch between poverty reduction and the allocation of resources. In theory, aid allocations correspond to an objective assessment of the needs and performance of potential aid recipients, according to indicators measuring the level of poverty and human development criteria and gauging the country's overall commitment to alleviating poverty and promoting good governance. In practice, however, they are the result of protracted political negotiations in which each Member State has its own vested interest.

The overall distribution of EC aid reflects a defining political trade-off among EU Member States. The Nordics, the Netherlands and the UK argue for a povertyfocus in overall allocations and within programmes. Southern EU Member States tend to argue for allocations on more political grounds, either to address domestic political concerns (e.g. migration) or to pursue external political goals.

The new security situation and the threat of international terrorism affects development policy just as so many other areas of our lives

(Louis Michel, European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, ODI, London, 24 February 2005).

In 1997, the EU began to forge a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under which tentative steps towards a shared defence policy were made in the form of joint military interventions in Macedonia and in the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, a large proportion of the costs of these operations was met by participating states than the EU. Only recently have security goals been explicitly embraced in the EU's institutions and budget. The heightened focus in 2005 on financing for development and achieving the 0.7% target has been coupled with a priority given to security issues in EU discourse and shifts in both aid conditionality and resource allocation. The heightened focus on security at the EU level has been characterised by:

• •

  Reinforced institutional capabilities to respond to security threats;

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  Systematic integration of a clause on co-operation in the fight against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in all agreements signed with developing countries;

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  The fight against terrorism as a systematic feature of the political dialogue with developing countries;

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  The revision of EU political conditionality to include counterterror priorities;

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  Pressure from certain EU Member States to review the DAC criteria in order to integrate security concerns;

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  The creation of the Africa Peace Facility and transfer of €€ 250 million to that instrument from the European Development Fund and its replenishment;

The Creation of a Stability Instrument

In June 2003, a new EU security framework was announced by the Council's CFSP High Representative, Javier Solana, and was adopted by the subsequent General Affairs and External Relations Council. The new framework outlines the nature of new global threats emerging in the post-Cold War environment and after the 9/11 events. It declares security as a ‘first condition for development’ but fails to mention the reverse, that development might also be a precondition for security. It proposes creating a synergy between security and development goals through a more coherent and comprehensive approach.

Javier Solana, the Council's High Representative, has long argued that EC aid funds become the resource to plug the gap between expectations and capabilities in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Put crudely, the argument amongst EU policy constituencies responsible for foreign and security policy is that whilst Europe might never be able to be united on issues like war in Iraq; Europe CAN unite on less controversial, more limited foreign policy actions. As European governments are generally reluctant to finance actions under the CFSP, they look to aid resources to provide the EU's muscle.

2005: Top Ten Recipients of EC Official Development Assistance

1.	Serbia and Montenegro
2.	Turkey
3.	Uganda
4.	Afghanistan
5.	Niger
6.	Democratic Republic of Congo
7.	Sudan
8.	Bangladesh
9.	Mozambique
10.	Burkina Faso
Source: Annual Report 2006 on the European Community's Development Policy and the implementation of External Assistance in 2005.

If you're not with us, then you're against us

(US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in response to the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1955).

The EU Security Strategy was followed by the Madrid Council declaration on combating terrorism of March 2004⁶ (after the Madrid bombings) which included commitments to facilitating vulnerable countries in enhancing their counter-terrorism capability, to promoting good governance and the rule of law by addressing counter-terrorism concerns into all relevant external assistance programmes and to ensuring that counterterrorism is a key element of political dialogue at all levels, in particular with those countries which represent a potential terrorist threat to international peace and security. The Declaration also stated that ‘the commitment of countries to combat terrorism on an ongoing basis’ would be an ‘influencing factor in EU relations with them’.

A reflection note on ‘Development and Security’, disseminated by the Portuguese Government to the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (Doc. no 126/04 DEVGEN) proposed that ‘effective counter-terrorism clauses’ should be part of all agreements with Third Countries, ‘reflecting the priorities of the revised Plan of Action’. Alongside this, ‘counterterrorism objectives should be inserted into the work of the geographical working groups and external assistance programmes’. Furthermore, the paper calls on EU Ministers to consider ‘the widest range of options’ in terms of reviewing the eligibility criteria for ODA.

Redefining the Goals

This was set against a background of efforts within the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which sees itself as ‘guardian’ of the credibility of the definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA), to broaden the goals of development assistance.

While the allocation of aid based on political considerations has already diluted the poverty focus of aid, the global security agenda has affected not just who receives aid, but what activities are funded.

Changing mandates for ODA in donor countries have been accompanied by debate within the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to expand the criteria for what can be counted as aid. Since 1969, donors in the DAC have set common and detailed criteria for spending that counts as ODA in relation to the UN target for aid spending of 0.7% of Gross National Income.

Explicitly excluded from these criteria are military aid and military enforcement aspects of peacekeeping. Donors are allowed to include related areas such as rehabilitation assistance to demobilise soldiers, measures to counter the recruitment of child soldiers, training in customs procedures, counter-narcotics activities, disposal of weapons and landmines, and the training of police forces in civilian police functions (but not in counter-subversive methods).

In April 2003 a high level meeting of the DAC endorsed a policy statement ‘A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key Entry Points for Action’. NGOs raised concerns that several sections of the paper may be interpreted as opening the door for the re-direction of aid away from poverty reduction and towards a counter-terrorism and security agenda. According to the DAC, ‘Development co-operation does have an important role to play in helping to deprive terrorists of popular support … and donors can reduce support for terrorism by working towards preventing the conditions that give rise to conflict in general and that convince disaffected groups to embrace terrorism in particular … this may have implications for priorities including budget allocations and levels and definitions of ODA eligibility criteria.’⁷

At the high level meeting in April 2007, DAC members are expected to return to discussing whether additional aspects related to conflict and security are ODAeligible. Some donors are supporting an expansion of the ODA criteria to include military aspects of security sector reform, the ‘modernization’ of the military in developing countries, as well as other military aspects of peace operations. Indications are that they will also discuss whether to include delivering humanitarian aid by the military of developing countries, and the operational costs of donor contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. Some donors are in favour of expanding the ODA criteria in this direction, while others are not. European countries in favour include, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium. Germany, France, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, the UK and Ireland do not appear to be in favour.

The major challenges that the EU will meet over the next 10-15 years – migration, energy, political Islam, terrorism and climate change – also need to be addressed in Africa

(Contribution by High Representative Javier Solana to the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development, December 2005).

Signed in June 2000, the Cotonou Agreement is a co-operation agreement between the EU and the group of 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The Agreement is based on five interdependent pillars with the underlying objective of: the fight against poverty, an enhanced political dimension, increased participation, a more strategic approach to co-operation focusing on poverty reduction, new economic and trade partnerships and improved financial co-operation.

The Cotonou Agreement is considered by many as a model for development cooperation as it stresses the equality of partners and the local ownership of development strategies, by recognising the importance of participation, dialogue and mutual obligations, differentiation and regionalisation. In principle the ACP determine how their societies and economies should develop. Government is no longer the main actor as dialogue, priority setting and monitoring is opened up to other actors in society (including civil society and local government). Furthermore, co-operation varies according to the level of development in the country, its needs and performance.

Every five years, the possibility exists to adapt the Cotonou Agreement – which has a duration of twenty years – to new realities and evolving needs. The first review was conducted between May 2004 and February 2005. Some of the EU proposals for the review process aimed at adapting the Cotonou Agreement's strong political dimension to today's external relations and security challenges. Thus, the political provisions of the Agreement would be enriched with references to the International Criminal Court and the fight against terrorism. A more controversial element was the EU proposal to extend the list of ‘essential elements’ of the partnership by adding a reference to co-operation in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and on the fight against terrorism. As a result, violation of this could lead to a suspension of EC aid. This was done, in spite of the fact that the ACP countries strongly objected, arguing that the fight against terrorism is not an essential element for development and poverty reduction.

In 2004, the EU approved a €€ 250 million grant to the African Peace Facility to support regional peacekeeping in conflict zones. This was controversial because Member States funded it by shaving 1.5% off the aid allocation to each African country despite the fact that the Peace Facility supports military operations which do not qualify as ODA. This was meant to be a one-off decision, but in 2006 a decision was taken to replenish the Africa Peace Facility with further funds from both the 9th and 10th European Development Fund (EDF).⁸ The bulk of this money is likely to be spent on peacekeeping operations such as in Darfur, however some of the funds are reserved for capacity-building work and for meeting the longer-term needs of the African Union's African peace and security architecture at both continental and sub-regional levels.

Furthermore, the framing of the new Stability Instrument now provides the opportunity to replicate this type of support from the EC budget. Its aims are to respond to crises in order to reestablish the condition for regular aid and to cooperate in confronting global and regional trans-border challenges, technological threats and weapons proliferation. However, with the exception of some elements of peace support operations, most assistance delivered will qualify as ODA-eligible. This means that that a proportion of EU development aid will be regularly diverted to the counterterrorist agenda.

Finally, the European Consensus on Development⁹ signed in December 2005 by European Heads of Government, which sets out the EU development policy for the coming years, together with the EU's Strategy for Africa,¹⁰ also signed in December 2005 both give prominence to the centrality of eradicating poverty in the EU co-operation strategies towards developing countries and in the use of its aid. However both these documents also give increased emphasis to issues related to security in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and migration. The guidelines which are used for the programming of EU development aid from 2007 to 2013 include guidelines on the war on terror and migration, demonstrating the European Commission is serious in its intent to use development money for these purposes.

Global Security & Development: a Role for Civil Society

Advocacy on the link between security and development is a highly contested field with a long history prior to the September 11 attacks, especially with respect to humanitarian principles and practice. Different NGOs working in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, humanitarian relief, service delivery and political campaigning have varied perspectives on the issues, usually reflecting their own organisational experience, financial interests and political vision.

Undoubtedly, there is a need to monitor, analyse and report on the use of development assistance and the changing nature of development co-operation relationships. Civil society organisations involved in international development can play an important role in safeguarding the poverty focus of development and bringing to light abuses of aid and the donor-recipient relationship.

Amongst the key roles for NGOs are policy surveillance, monitoring aid budgets and spending, raising public awareness and advocacy. NGOs will also need to engage with the other strategic policy constituencies, such as official and nongovernmental actors working on security or foreign policy. Some NGOs are already engaged in this work, within their own spheres (such as human rights or arms exports) or their own country. However, there is a strong case for international co-operation amongst NGOs to facilitate comprehensive information gathering and analysis, and to maximise the impact of advocacy and awareness-raising.

In Conclusion …

Changes in the EU's approach are illustrative of a general tendency in the international community to now consider security as a pre-condition for development. In the 1980s, good governance and later democracy were introduced as the main pre-conditions and conditionality for development. It is clear that the international community has now adopted the concept of security as an additional pre-condition to development; no development would now be possible without democracy and security.

The risk is that this debate relegates the role of the EU as a major aid donor and that development policy becomes a mere instrument of foreign affairs. In addition, the fact that certain Member States are so reluctant to increase the resources allocated to Community policies puts limited aid resources at the danger of being diverted to fulfil the new security objectives.

Mikaela Gavas, EU Policy Advisor, BOND (British Overseas NGOs for Development); e-mail: [e-mail]

The Spanish Action Plan for Africa

Ana R. Alcalde

In 2006 the Spanish government developed and approved an ‘Action Plan for Africa’. For the first time in its history, this ‘historic milestone’ – as defined by the Spanish government – Spain joined the club of the United Kingdom (UK), the World Bank, the European Union (EU), the G8 and even China – all of whom also approved various ‘plans’ for Africa during 2005-06. Traditionally Spain focused its foreign policy on Latin America and tried to play a role within the European context of a bridge between Europe and Central and Southern American countries. However, during the 1990s the Mediterranean became an area of growing interest and Spain began to devote efforts and resources to enhance its role in the region. Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (and to a lesser extent Eastern Europe) remained residual, until recently.

This explicit change of Spanish foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa has been the result of a timid process that began in 2005, when three key elements came together. First, the new government came into cabinet with an ambitious plan to reform the Spanish Development Policy and to ensure that Spain contributed to main international commitments on Official Development Assistance (ODA). This basically meant incorporating the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the poverty eradication agenda (with commitments like Copenhagen 20/20 to basic social services and Least Developed Countries, LDCs) as core elements of Spanish aid policy and to agree on a substantial increase ODA from 0.21 of GNP in 2004 to 0.5 of GNP in 2008. The immediate consequence has been an increasing interest in sub-Saharan Africa, where most LDCs are.

Second, the rising number of sub-Saharan migrants, arriving at Spanish southern coasts in a most dramatic manner by the so-called pateras (very basic small handmade boats, that might transport between 20 to 50 people through the Atlantic Ocean), has attracted the attention of the media and put a lot of pressure on the Government. Especially significant were the events of Ceuta (a Spanish city on the Moroccan coast) where, in September 2005, hundreds of Africans crossed over the Spanish border during the night. The media and the opposition conservative party's reaction in Spain to these events has spread among average citizens the feeling of being invaded by sub-Saharan foreigners. This has compelled the government to provide a serious and comprehensive response to what was perceived as a crisis.

Third, but not the least important, is the growing interest of some big companies of Spanish origin (Spanish trans-nationals) in the African energy market. Spanish private sector interest in sub-Saharan Africa has been very limited and mainly dominated by the fisheries in countries like Mauritania, Namibia and Mozambique. The biggest investment efforts were usually made in Latin America in very profitable sectors such as telecommunications, banking, energy, and infrastructures. The collapse of some of the Latin American markets like Argentina and the political crisis in Ecuador and Bolivia, forced Spanish investors to look to other shores.

Within this context, a Plan of Action for Africa became a priority for the Spanish government. The plan was initially conceived as a development aid tool that would draw from the Spanish Aid Master Plan 2005-08, concrete commitments for the continent and led by the Secretary of State for International Cooperation. However, as it widened its scope, it became a foreign policy plan led by the political branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. A special Ambassador was appointed to conduct the preparatory works of the plan and several ministries and government institutions were involved in the drafting. During this process, some interesting diplomatic events took place like the unusual trip of the Vice President to Maputo to celebrate International Women's Day; several trips by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation to Africa and the visit to Spain of Mr. Konare, President of the African Union, in April 2006.

The elaboration of the Plan took about a year but it was more a bureaucratic process than a political one, missing an opportunity to open a sound dialogue with other Spanish and African actors and partners (like Spanish NGOs, civil society and even the private sector; and in Africa, an especially much needed dialogue with African counterparts, government and non-governmental organisations). However, even before the plan was finalised, it proved to be a key communication tool for the government to respond to the pressure coming from the so-called ‘migration crisis’. The government officially approved the Plan on 19 May 2006, the day after 647 migrants crossed the sea and reached the Canary Islands – linking this sequence of events to the migration crisis, even though the Plan is much more ambitious than that. The final version of the Plan was presented in Madrid in July 2006 by the Vice President and Dr. Chambas, the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS in a public event but with very limited participation.

The Spanish Action Plan for Africa is structured in four parts: 1) why a plan is needed; 2) analysis of the African continent; 3) objectives, and 4) priority areas. The Plan recognises three main reasons for its existence: a new encouraging African context, citizens’ attitudes of solidarity, and a new Spanish foreign policy. The new African context is defined by three elements: the consolidation of democracy and the progress made in conflict resolution; greater economic dynamism based on the price increase of raw materials; and the development of regional and subregional institutions.

Most of the Spanish plans for Africa, like the British or the World Bank’s, recognise progress has been made in Africa in favour of greater democracy. They see regional and subregional organisations as an asset, especially within the African Union and NEPAD. Whether these statements are accurate or can be taken for granted, they are an essential part of the recent Western discourse to justify the ‘big push’ and the supposedly increased commitment for Africa; the Spanish government also shares this approach. The assumption that there is more economic dynamism due to the rise of raw material prices is a much more controversial element. The fact that these statements are no more than rhetoric is evident when the Plan analyses the African context, a five page Overview (out of 159) that provides little evidence for optimism. Even if the intention to avoid stereotypes about the ‘disaster’ of Africa is mentioned, the Overview stresses the situation of intractable conflicts and deep economic and social crisis more than anything else.

Citizens’ attitude of solidarity is definitely one of the most claimed reasons to justify the increasing importance of ODA in Government budgets. Most public surveys indicate a high level of public approval of Spanish cooperation efforts with developing countries, and generally there are high levels of citizen mobilisation when emergency campaigns take place. In the past, civil society and citizens groups have felt closer to Latin American but, as the Plan recognises, migration and, especially the growing role of Spain (government, media, civil society organisations, private sector actors) in global issues, might be re-focusing citizens’ interests to other regions. However, the Plan also discusses a key issue: the reality that links the citizens’ feelings of security with stability and peace in Africa.

Spanish foreign policy is one of the landmarks of the new government. As a major change of vision from the previous conservative government, it entails effective multilateralism, compliance with international law and greater involvement in global challenges. Specific mention is made of the EU and the United Nations (UN) as key partners for Spain in Africa. But this new vision, as incorporated in the Africa Plan, relies mainly on the commitment to increase ODA. This commitment has been one of the key driving forces of the Plan but it is not enough to build a sound partnership without recognising increased Spanish diplomatic activity – initally linked to what was perceived as a migration crisis, and therefore originally focused on Western Africa. There is still a need to improve the multilateral African policy both towards African institutions and the EU, where so far little has been done.

Interestingly enough, the Plan's analysis devotes half of its African initiative to analysing other international players, such as the UN, the G8 and OECD, the EU, IFIs and other bilateral agencies such as China, the US, Japan, Russia and Brazil – a bizarre mix. While the first four are highlighted by their increasing trade interest in sub-Saharan Africa – especially in the energy sector – Brazil is mentioned (jointly with other countries like Cuba) for its potential partnerships in terms of South-South cooperation, especially with Portuguese speaking countries, culturally closer to Spain.

The Spanish Action Plan for Africa 2006-08 is very ambitious. It sets up seven aims and identifies three geographic categories of priorities. The aims include a broad variety of political, socioeconomic and cultural issues combined with specific foreign policy, economic and development cooperation priorities:

• 1) Contribute to the consolidation of democracy, respect for human rights, peace and security, preferably within an EU framework and, under the umbrella of the UN and in compliance with international legality. Main measures relate to institutional development and electoral monitoring, support to regional initiatives on conflict prevention and resolution, cooperation in defence and the fight against terrorism.

• 2) Contribute to poverty eradication and Africa's development agenda. Measures are drawn from the Spanish Development Cooperation Master Plan that stresses the areas of basic social needs (education, health etc. food aid, gender equality, environment, microcredits, debt relief and humanitarian action with specific attention paid to both combating HIV/AIDs and malaria, and to debt relief. The Spanish government agrees to back the multilateral debt cancellation proposal (launched in July 2005 during the G8 Summit at Gleneagles), and to promote bilateral debt for education swaps for sub-Saharan countries with a high poverty rate.

• 3) Encourage cooperation to adequately regulate migration flows coming from the sub-Saharan region. Main measures include the improvement of Spanish border controls and some migrants’ integration measures; the promotion of Agreements of Migratory Cooperation and Re-admission with African governments; and the ‘Europeanisation’ of the migration policies with Africa. These areas are a priority for the Spanish Government.

• 4) Promote an active participation in the European Union Strategy for Africa, especially in the area of Peace and Security (EU Africa Peace Facility). The increase in Spain's contribution to FED will be followed by an active promotion of Spanish professionals within European institutions.

• 5) Promote trade and investment with Africa, especially in the areas of fisheries and energy (oil and gas). While recognising the limited weight of Spanish trade and investment in the continent, the Plan intends to use already existing traditional trade promotion mechanisms (like export credit facilities, trade promotion offices, trade fairs) while increasing Spanish participation in big infrastructure projects by the World Bank and NEPAD. Regarding fisheries, the Plan includes measures at European and bilateral level and supports the establishment of specialised agencies for cooperation with some African countries. Regarding the energy sector, the Plan intends to foster the participation of Spanish companies in the exploitation of African oil and gas resources in a sustainable way, with special reference to the growing interest in the Gulf of Guinea. According to the Plan, energy investments should benefit Africa's social and economic development and to this end, Spain will support initiatives like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

• 6) Strengthen cultural and scientific cooperation, including the promotion of the Spanish language (an official language of the African Union because of Equatorial Guinea, a former Spanish colony). The Plan prescribed the setting up of the Casa África, located in Canary Islands, as an institution for cultural cooperation. Spain will support the UNESCO programme, ‘World Alliance for Cultural Diversity’, and the strengthening of links between culture, education and communication. The Spanish language will be promoted through the opening of Aulas Cervantes in several African countries, the deployment of Spanish lecturers and the organisation of examinations for the Diploma of Spanish as a Foreign Language (DELE).

• 7) Increase Spain's political and institutional presence, mainly through diplomatic redeployment (opening of new embassies, cooperation offices and enlargement of existing ones), and the promotion of Spanish professionals in international organisations working in sub-Sahara Africa. Special mention is made of strengthening political dialogue with African partners and the inclusion of other players like Parliaments or the media. Finally, this part of the Plan also foresees the establishment of a coordinating mechanism between the Government and Spanish civil society, the so-called Africa Round Table, not yet implemented.

It is the first time that Spain seeks to develop a broad comprehensive approach to sub-Saharan Africa, to organise areas of interests, and identify main African and multilateral partners. Aid, trade and investment, migration, defence, terrorism, culture are some of the dimensions considered. Regional African institutions are given a very especial role and are considered as privileged associates. The Spanish government will join European Union initiatives, playing a more active role in its policies towards Africa.

Although Spanish stakeholders recognise these assets and the effort made by the Spanish Government, some relevant critical points have been made by civil society organisations and specialised academics. In spite of the different nature and levels of complexity of these aims, the Spanish Action Plan considers all of them as a coherent and comprehensive set and does not define any hierarchy among them. Neither does it differentiate between those attainable within the Plan timeframe and those that clearly go beyond it. Aims combine complex issues linked to deep African political changes, like the contribution to democracy and peace and security, with others more straightforward and bureaucratic – like the increase of Spain's presence in the continent. Potential contradictions between the promotion of some investments in the energy sector and the consolidation of democracy and peace are avoided. Likewise, the links between migrants’ re-admission agreements with African countries and Human Rights violations are ignored.

Spain's own interests are explicitly stated in a very traditional ‘Realist School’ approach, while other recent plans, like the British or the EU, have a different focus and stress common areas of interest that come from a vision of interdependency and a globalised world. In addition, some of the aims and measures included in the Action Plan are very controversial (and even old fashioned) like the promotion of the Spanish language in a continent where most local languages are neglected; the exploitation of African oil, gas and fishing resources by Spanish companies, and the implementation of border control measures and re-admission agreements. The very recent trip of Mr. Moratinos, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, to Equatorial Guinea to facilitate access of a Spanish oil company and the subsequent visit to Spain of Mr. Obiang is an example of the type of controversies that the Plan brings up.

Geographic priorities cover up almost all sub-Saharan countries. The three categories established by the Plan are priority countries, countries of ‘specific focus’ and countries ‘to be followed up’. Priority countries include traditional partners like Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, Angola, Mauritania, Namibia or Senegal with new ones of Mali, Kenya and Ethiopia. Countries of ‘specific focus’ – where Spanish interests are limited to a number of aspects – are mainly located in the Gulf of Guinea. Reasons for ‘specific focus’ are as varied as transit for illegal migration, economic interests in fisheries or tourism or the existence of historic or cultural links with Spain. The final category are countries ‘to be followed up’, and are those considered a risk for regional peace and security, where the Plan includes Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo with Zimbabwe or Ivory Coast. Geographic priorities have been highly criticised not only because of the high number of countries that limit the strategic focus of the Plan, but also because of the lack of clear criteria for country selection and classification. The Plan does not specify different types of measures per category and, the three categories are not well defined making it difficult to understand why some countries are considered under a category.

Finally, the Plan does foresee some follow up and evaluation measures, basically consisting of semester and yearly reports made by Embassies and the Ministry and, a final report with lessons learnt for the next Action Plan for Africa. The Plan is a result of an important effort on the side of the Spanish government and shows a u-turn in traditional Spanish foreign policy interests. However, it is an ambitious Plan that would require more internal coherence and broader consultations with Spanish and African partners in order to be fully implemented and become a valuable tool to guide the new born Spanish sub-Saharan African partnership.

Ana R. Alcalde, Aid Effectiveness Program Coordinator, Centre of Studies for International Cooperation, Fundación Carolina; e-mail: ana.alcalde@123456fundacion carolina.es

Personal Reflections on Guy Mhone

Thandika Mkandawire

Guy Mhone's death – on 1 March 2005, in a Pretoria hospital after an extended illness – is a great loss. It is difficult for me to talk about Guy without getting personal. Our lives were so intertwined. We often joked about how often we found ourselves in the same places. ‘Tawonanaso’ – ‘Here we meet again’ – was what we often said when we met. I recount the story in a personalised way to acknowledge my great intellectual indebtedness to Guy, with whom I have maintained the longest intellectual conversation.

Guy's early education was at Gloag Ranch Mission in Zimbabwe and Livingstonia Secondary School and Junior College in Malawi. He excelled, winning both the national student essay competition and a scholarship to the Ivy League's Dartmouth College in New Hampshire, USA. His masters and doctoral degrees in economics were awarded by Syracuse University in New York. While completing his thesis on ‘The Legacy of the Dual Labour Market in the Copper Industry in Zambia’ (1977), he also served as associate professor at State University of New York. He later lectured at the New School for Social Research in New York City, Howard University in Washington, DC, and the University of Zimbabwe, before coming to Wits Graduate School of Public and Development Management as a full professor in 1998. He was director of the school during the early 2000s.

Although born in Malawi, Guy and I were brought up in the same town, Luanshya, on the Copperbelt of Zambia, and we lived in the same ‘sections’ of the mining township. We were also relatives. Guy's father was a great administrator and award-winning gardener. One consequence was that Guy and I were once sent out to sell vegetables in the then exclusively white residential area. It was an eye-opening experience. As children living in the ‘locations’, we were shielded by family and neighbourhood from the ravages of the racial order. This walk through the white area just across the river confronted us not only with unimaginable opulence, but also with the insults of children our age who happened to be white, and the boundless curiosity of other white kids who wanted to reach out to us but were prevented by the ‘colour-bar’ from doing so. This must have left a mark on our understanding of the world. I believe this was probably a significant source of Guy's abiding interest in ‘dualism’ and racial injustice.

Like all Nyasa migrant workers, Guy's parents were deeply concerned with giving their children the best possible education. Guy was sent by his father to a boarding school in the then Southern Rhodesia for his primary schooling. My own father, also unhappy about the mining school education, decided to send his children to Malawi for our primary education. I went to Mzimba Primary School and then to Zomba Catholic Secondary School. During one of my school vacations, I was grilled by Guy's father on education in Nyasaland. I believe he was interested in finding out what good it had done to me. I believe I gave a sufficiently good impression of education in Nyasaland that he decided to send Guy to Livingstonia, Malawi for education. Guy and I met again when he came to visit me in Blantyre, where I was at Malawi News. Guy then came to the United States, where I had gone in 1962. He frequently came to visit me at Ohio State University, in Columbus. We spent hours discussing the future of Africa – from literature to politics to music, especially jazz and South African music.

In 1965, we were both made persona non grata in our own country. I was in Latin America when this news reached me, and I eventually ended up in Sweden as a political refugee. We continued our intense conversation through incredibly long letters on a whole range of subjects. For a while the subject was literature, with me taking a more ‘social realist’ perspective and Guy a more existentialist view. Guy wrote great poetry and it was only his modesty that let me continue pontificating on the arts and literature. His poetry was engaged. When Guy was in Belize he sent me a poem that so poignantly captured underdevelopment that its imagery is permanently etched in my mind. He described a situation of extreme poverty where dogs were so starved they had to lean against a tree to support their barking.

Through our correspondence, we came to the conclusion that we did not have to spend our exile years out of Africa waiting for Malawi's liberation. In 1978 I moved to Senegal. We were to meet again when I visited him in Oneanta, New York, where he was teaching. We spent hours together comparing notes, engaging in some of the most rewarding discussions I have ever had with anyone. Once again the subject matter of our late discussions ranged wide. By this time Guy had become an accomplished saxophonist, deeply influenced by John Coltrane and Ornette Coleman. It also became clear to me: Guy was definitely not happy working outside Africa and he, too, had decided to move back. Although he was doing well professionally in the United States, he longed to return to the continent.

In 1982, I moved from Senegal to Zimbabwe on secondment to the Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies. To my absolute delight I learned that Guy was coming to join the University of Zimbabwe. During two years together in Harare we were closely associated and spent huge amounts of time together. This was as close to home as we could get. This was also at a time when Kamuzu Banda's security services roamed freely in the region, assassinating Banda's enemies.

One thing that was striking to many who knew Guy was his devotion to teaching. I first noticed this during one of his lectures at the New School in New York. I was to be privileged later to observe him in action while teaching in the same department of economics at the University of Zimbabwe. He was respected by both his colleagues and students, and across the racial divide. It is this commitment to teaching and to students that explains his anger at the fact that so little self-examination had taken place within the white university establishment in South Africa, and that so little was being done to facilitate the lives of black faculty and students in South African institutions of higher learning.

In his scholarship, Guy was convinced that the struggles against poverty and injustice were served best by rigorous analysis and disciplined work. He disliked name-calling and uninformed polemics.

Guy's major intellectual concern was the problem of poverty and inequality. He was most particularly interested in the ‘dualistic’ manifestation of poverty in the Southern African region. For Guy, capitalism in Southern Africa emerged as ‘racial capitalism’ which was superimposed over pre-capitalist social relations. These structural features did not suddenly end with liberation. Policy initiatives that failed to address this legacy were condemned to reinforce and reproduce the legacy of racial discrimination. His Ph.D. thesis addressed the problems of dualism in an original manner, insisting that the dualism of Southern Africa was not benign as recounted in development economics texts, but malicious, premised on racism and exploitation. Guy's understanding was that to the extent that the new governments in the region adopted the existing economic structure and logic of the ‘economies of discrimination’ that underpinned them, they would produce ‘enclave economies’, with all that entailed. He later took up this idea while looking at Malawi's agricultural performance. As was usual with Guy, this position was formulated in a rigorous matter. In his article on Malawi agriculture, he demonstrated how the ‘bimodality’ of agricultural development pursued by Banda would lead to the great impoverishment of the peasants. At this time the Malawi economy was being treated as a success story by the World Bank. Guy also demonstrated his thesis in a chapter on ‘Social policy in Zambia’, part of a collection I edited, in which he argued that attempts to ‘Africanise’ the racist ‘welfare regime’ that had been set up for whites in the copper mines would simply reproduce the social order and be fiscally unstable. Guy extended scholarship to gender analysis by insisting on understanding the structural underpinnings of gender discrimination.

It was from this perspective that Guy looked at the failure of agricultural development in Africa. For him, the issue was not simply producing more for export or ‘food self-sufficiency’. Agrarian transformation would do away with the immiserising tendencies of dualism and produce a mutually beneficial dynamic of interaction between the sectors. His point was:

We need development strategies that absorb the economically marginalized and excluded – the vast majority of the population – into a dynamic, growing economy.

The dualism that interested Guy was not merely that within each country, but that of the entire region where, just as within each of the countries, the development of the ‘modern sector’ tended to lead to greater immiserisation in the ‘traditional sector’. He noted that the ‘white’ economies of the region tended to have similar effects on the ‘resource labour economies’. Even in the post-liberation phase, the structural features of these ‘enclave economies’ were such that they would continue to play this role until they did away with their internal dualism.

Virtually everyone has remarked on Guy's modesty and generosity of spirit in intellectual debate, his immense love of life and sense of humour, which was often directed at the pompous and repressive. They have all recognised his principled nature. However, there was a naughtiness to Guy's humility. I was always impressed by how, in any argument, he gave the other side close attention and even granted it the benefit of doubt. He would go so far as to help the other side to more rigorously reformulate its position before embarking on the demolition of that position. He often joked about this as giving the rope to the adversaries with which to hang themselves.

Guy, like many African scholars, was preoccupied with the link between democracy and development, and with the need to think about ‘developmental democracies’. He was appalled at the turn in economics which had led to the displacement of developmental economics with a discipline concerned with static allocative efficiency and stabilisation. He rigorously stated his argument in a major ‘summing up’ he was preparing for CODESRIA, and told me that he wanted to extend it into a full monograph.

Guy and I went back to Malawi in 1994 after more than 30 years in exile. We were there to attend the launch of the book (Malawi at the Crossroads: The Post-Colonial Economy) that he had edited for SAPES. He was so moved by the event and by the opportunity to finally participate in an intellectual event in Malawi that he broke down in tears and was not able to complete his speech. We planned to come back on a less emotionally charged trip. During our last meeting, when he and Yvonne spent some time with us in Geneva, we planned on spending holidays together in Malawi. In the event, this did not happen. We definitely did not plan for this tragic journey back home to honour a great African scholar and a great human being. Many of us have lost a brother, friend and comrade; African scholarship has lost one of its best and most committed minds. The loss is difficult to understand given the vitality of the man.

Tribute to José Negrão

Sabina Asselle & Joseph Hanlon

José Negrão, who died 9 July 2005 at the age of 49 of a cerebral haemorrhage, was a Mozambican academic who always linked his research to political action. He finished secondary school in 1975, the year of Mozambican independence, and was swept up into the revolutionary activity of the era. As an undergraduate at Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, he was part of TBARN, a project to try to introduce appropriate technologies in rural areas. His PhD tackled one of the key areas for Mozambican development – the rural family economy. This led directly to the subject that he would make his own – access to land.

Unlike its neighbours, Mozambican land is owned by the state, peasants have rights to the land they occupy, and there is no obvious land shortage. Negrão's research showed that the reality was more complex and that the elite were claiming peasant land. He provided the key technical back-up and much of the political force to the 1997 reform of the land law, which increased peasant rights while resisting international pressure for land privatisation. Based on his rural research, he formulated the alternative, which was adopted, of collective rather than individual titling. But he also rejected false appeals to ‘tradition’, and ensured that the law guaranteed women access to land, replacing customary practices which only allowed access to land through the father, the husband or the maternal uncle.

The following year he became the driving force behind the Mozambican Land Campaign to inform peasants of their new rights and how to protect their land. The Land Campaign was not a new NGO and ‘did not aim to substitute the voice of the small farmers, but to inform the producers, as well as the operators and businessmen, about the rights and duties of each according to the new law,’ he wrote.

It became increasingly clear that the rural family with its plot of land could not be seen in isolation, but had to be linked to the macro level of globalisation as well as to all the various actors who interacted with that rural family. The economic actions of the rural family can only be understood by realising that production (land and labour) and consumption (capital) are inseparable. By placing the rural family in context, Dr Negrão became a critical and effective political actor.

In 1997 he established Cruzeiro do Sul (Southern Cross), a ‘research institute for development’, which encapsulated his belief that research is political and can be used to benefit the poorest. Research had to be directly linked to lobbying and social intervention, and it could be used to bring people together, as in the Land Campaign. He was also a founder of (and, again, a driving force behind) the G20, a platform of civil society organisations, which created the ‘poverty observatory’ and produced a non-governmental annual report on poverty in Mozambique. Using research methods adapted to the reality of the country, they challenged the rosy picture of economic growth and formulated development models appropriate for Mozambique. He was also an active participant in regional networks, including the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) and the Southern African Regional Poverty Network (SARPN).

His immense capacity for work allowed him to continue to do serious research on land while dynamically leading Cruzeiro do Sul and the G20, finding time for students and other researchers, and being politically active. He came to be seen as the Mozambican land expert. At the time of his death, he was visiting professor at the universities of Louvain la Neuve in Belgium and Coimbra in Portugal. He had also taught at the University of Bologna in Italy; Lund in Sweden; and Cape Town, Durban, and Wits in South Africa. And, somehow, he had a social and family life with his wife and four children.

In a young country like Mozambique, with too few skilled, dynamic and imaginative people, committed individuals can make a huge difference. José Negrão was one of those people, and Mozambican academia and civil society are still struggling to fill the gap.

Ryszard Kapuscinski

Lionel Cliffe

Just before the Wall came down in East Europe, a handful of ROAPE editors were invited to a still unreformed Poland to a conference on Africa. The Poles we met – and there were some serious Africanists - would always get around to asking with suitable patriotic pride whether we knew their best known writer on Africa, Kapuscinski. We certainly knew his writings and mentioned how impressive was his short book, The Emperor: Downfall of an Autocrat. This was a study compiled in the immediate aftermath of Emperor Haile Selassie's overthrow in 1975 by long conversations with the middle-level of palace officials, who had not been detained. From this Kapuscinski pieced together a remarkable insight into how this semi-illiterate old man managed to rule the large, disparate territory, and to keep powerholders in the regions and in separate departments loyal to him – a wonderful and evocative glimpse of how secret power worked. Imagine our surprise when our Polish friends agreed that it was a real revelation about the realities of autocratic power – “the most revealing book on current Polish politics”. They saw his book about Ethiopia as an allegory of autocracy in Poland! So Kapuscinski deserved double respect for this study.

His other memorable memoir on Africa available in English is the account of his adventures when he was the last foreign correspondent to get out of Luanda, ahead of the South African invasion of Angola in 1975 – and adventure story but also a valuable record of the realities of the ‘civil war’ from the grassroots. He also wrote a stunning document of the collapse of the Soviet (and Russian) system in the 1990s, Imperium.

His most lasting contribution to outsiders’ understanding of Africa came with his famous reflection, The Shadow of the Sun: My African Life (Penguin, 2000). He could justly claim an ‘African Life’ as he first visited Ghana as a green, young journalist in 1958; lived in, and operated out of, Dar es Salaam in the exciting 1960s; and was witness to dramatic events, but also everyday life, in many parts of West and Southern Africa, and the Horn over the next 40 years. He became one of the most read foreign correspondents. But The Shadow of the Sun lives up to two of its introductory claims. He does provide accounts of ‘wandering with nomads through the desert … and being the guest of peasants of the tropical savannah’, sympathetic to their endless toil and torment, while ‘avoiding official routes, palaces, important personages, and high-level politics’. Yet through the rich anecdotes he does explain much to the outsider about the politics as well as the life of Africa. However, he argues that the very richness of life means ‘that the continent is too large to describe’. His corrective to the simplistic generalisations in many similar books is that ‘In reality, except as a geographical appellation, Africa does not exist’.

His work should be remembered and reread, but also its perspective should be a constant reminder to outsiders of what matters as one reports on ‘Africa’. Ryszard Kapuscinski, 1932-2007.

Wanjiru Kihoro: Activist, Feminist, Patriot, Visionary, Leader, Friend

Dr.Wanjiru Kihoro's brave battle from the coma which she has been fighting since 24 January 2003 came to an end at 10 p.m. on Thursday, 12 October 2006 at Kenyatta National Hospital. Dr. Kihoro went into a coma following the Busia plane crash in which three people were killed. A distinguished economist, Dr. Wanjiru Kihoro graduated from Columbia University and went on to earn an MA in Development Studies and a PhD at Leeds University. Over the years she gained the respect and admiration of many for her dedication to matters of gender, equality, justice and democracy. A long time London resident, Dr. Kihoro was one of the founders of the Committee for the Release of Political Prisoners in Kenya formed in 1982. The Committee fought to highlight the plight of university lecturers, students and other socalled ‘dissidents’ incarcerated in various Kenyan maximum security prisons. Largely as a result of the Committee's pressure, most of the prisoners were adopted by Amnesty International and other international human rights organisations as prisoners of conscience.

In her capacity as Director of ABANTU for Development, Dr. Kihoro garnered an international reputation as one of the most recognised names in the African feminist movement. Her organisation held numerous workshops, seminars and training sessions in East, Central and Southern Africa. She was also a keynote speaker at various international conferences in Europe and North America.

Previously, Dr. Kihoro worked at the Africa Centre in London and other organisations including the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), the National Christian Council of Kenya and the United Church Board for World Ministries.

She was an OXFAM trustee (1994-2001), a member of the Debt Campaign Network, a member of The Nelson Mandela Reception Committee and a founder member of Akina Mama wa Afrika among many other organisations and groups. She was also awarded the Hansib Award for Services to the black community.

Further information on Dr. Wanjiru Kihoro can be found on Daudi's tribute and also Pambuzuka News website. As Daudi writes, Dr. Kihoro was, among other things, ‘an activist, feminist, patriot, visionary, leader, friend. An inspiration and example for all Kenyans’.

Dr. Kihoro was the daughter of Onesmus Matenjwa and Elizabeth Wanjiru Matenjwa, she was married to Wanyiri Kihoro, former MP for Nyeri and was a mother of 4 – Kui, Pambi, Amandla and Mim and the mother-in-law of Mich. She had 5 sisters and 1 brother – Wanjiku, Njeri, Wahu, Nish, Wambui, Boss and the sister-in-law of Sam and the late Waithera. She was the aunt of Maggy, Mwangi, Kihoro, Beth, Fidel, the two Tesh’s, Kui and Nyokabi among others and the cousin of Father Matenjwa. http://drwanjirukihoro.wordpress.com/

The Noma Award for Publishing in Africa

Lebogang Mashile

South African Performance Poet Wins Noma Award for her First Published Book

The Noma Award for Publishing in Africa announce that Lebogang Mashile has won the Noma Award for Publishing in Africa in 2006 for her poetry anthology In a Ribbon of Rhythm. The book was published by Oshun Books, South Africa, in 2005, and co-published with the Mutloatse Arts Heritage Trust. The Jury's citation reads:

This is a powerful voice which has great beauty, delight and meaning. The poet weaves her feelings, experiences and expectations around the story of her life, which merges with the story of the struggle for freedom among South Africans. In masterly and sonorous style, the poetry has a distinct oral flavour, developing oral poetry and performance beyond the boundaries of the poetry of the era of resistance. From the personal to the wider world, this is fresh philosophical writing, movingly declaiming the pride of heritage. These poems are the spoken word in all its beauty, power and elegance.

Lebogang Mashile is one of South Africa's best-known spoken word poets. Writer, performer and actor, this is the first published work of her performance poetry. Edited by Don Mattera, the poetry is infused with the hip-hop beat that has made performance poetry a mainstream cultural revolution in South Africa. Recognising the power of art to heal, this first published work shows what it means to be a young, black woman with confidence and soul. The Noma Award, under the auspices of UNESCO, will be presented to Lebogang Mashile at a special ceremony details of which will be announced later.

105 titles, from 63 African publishers, in 15 countries, in 8 languages, were submitted for the 2006 competition. The Jury singled out a further two titles for Special Commendation, and two titles for Honourable Mention. The list is attached.

The Noma Award Jury is chaired by Walter Bgoya from Tanzania, one of Africa's most distinguished publishers, with wide knowledge of both African and international publishing. The other members of the Jury in 2006 were: Professor Peter Katjavivi, Ambassador of the Republic of Namibia to the Federal Republic of Germany and former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Namibia; Professor Femi Osofisan, head of the Department of Theatre Arts at the University of Ibadan, and past director of the National Theatre in Nigeria; and Mary Jay, Secretary to the Managing Committee (the Jury). The Award is sponsored by Kodansha Ltd, Japan. For further information about the Award, please contact: Mary Jay, Secretary to the Noma Award for Publishing in Africa, PO Box 128, Witney, Oxon OX8 5XU, UK. Tel: [phone] Fax: [phone] Email: [e-mail] www.nomaaward.org

Special Commendation: Tree Atlas of Namibia by Barbara Curtis & Coleen Mannheimer; Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC by William Mervin Gumedi

Honourable Mention: Lena's Bottle Tree by Wendy Maartens; Tshepang: The Third Testament by Lara Foot Newton.

Notes

Footnotes

1. See Gorm Rye Olsen and Chris Alden and Karen E. Smith, LSE, ‘Strengthening Democratic Structures and Processes in Africa: A Commentary on the Role of the EU’, presentation at IISS seminar in Lisbon, November 2003.

2. Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden all provide at least 0.7% of their GNI annually in ODA; Norway is the only country outside the EU that is a member of this club.

3. Annual Report 2006 on the European Community's Development Policy and the implementation of External Assistance in 2005, p. 6.

4. Annual Report 2005 on the European Community's Development Policy and the implementation of External Assistance in 2004, p. 16.

5. Annual Report 2006 on the European Community's Development Policy and the implementation of External Assistance in 2005, p. 16.

6. Madrid EU Declaration on Combatting Terrorism: http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_ Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/79637.pdf, p. 6.

7. A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key Entry Points for Action, DAC High Level Meeting, 22-23 April 2003, p. 6.

8. EDF 10 will fund the Africa Peace Facility with €€ 300 million during the period 2008-2010. The short-term replenishment for 2006-2007 from EDF 9 amounted to €€ 50 million, in addition to the €€ 250 million already provided. Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions, General Affairs and External Relations Council, Luxembourg, 10 April 2006, p. 13.

9. The European Consensus on Development, Joint statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, the European Parliament and the Commission on the European Union Development Policy, October 2005: http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/develop ment_policy_statement/index_en.htm

10. The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, December 2005.

Editor's Note: What can one say when one who so touches your heart is no longer there. Wanjiru was a remarkable woman, a fine role model and a great loss not only for Africa, but for the rest of us as well. We will miss her.